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ABSTRACT 
 
My PhD dissertation aims (1) at reconstructing the structure of the context of discovery of 
‘data-driven’ (big data, data intensive) biology and (2) at comparing it to traditional 
molecular approaches. Within the current debate in philosophy of science, ‘traditional 
approaches’ in molecular biology should be understood as the discovery and heuristics 
strategies identified by mechanistic philosophers such as Carl Craver and Lindley Darden. 
Therefore, key questions of my thesis are: what is the structure of discovery of data-
driven biology? Is data-driven biology methodology different from traditional molecular 
approaches?  
The reason for doing such an analysis comes from a recent controversy among 
biologists. In particular, sides disagree on whether high throughput sequencing 
technologies are stimulating the development of a new scientific method somehow 
irreducible to traditional approaches. I will try to disentangle the debate by reconstructing 
and comparing data-driven and traditional methodologies. The dissertation is composed 
of five chapters. 
The first chapter deals with methodological issues. How do I compare data-driven 
and traditional molecular biology structures of discovery? Mechanistic philosophers have 
extensively characterized the discovery structure of traditional molecular biology. 
However, there is not such an analysis for data-driven biology. In order to do this, I will 
critically revise the discovery/justification distinction. The debate on 
discovery/justification has provided valuable tools on how discovery strategies might be 
conceived, and it is clearly one of the main forefathers of recent philosophical discussions 
on scientific methodologies in biology and physics.  
In Chapter 2 I shall to try to infer a full-fledged account of discovery for data-
driven biology by means of the philosophical tools developed in Chapter 1. This analysis 
will be done in parallel to the investigation of key examples of data-driven biology, 
namely genome-wide association studies and cancer genomics. In Chapter 3 I analyze the 
epistemic strategies enabled by biological databases in data-driven biology. In Chapter 4, 
I will show how the discovery structure of ‘traditional molecular biology’ can be more 
efficiently rephrased through the same theoretical framework that I use to characterize 
data-driven biology.  
Since data-driven and traditional molecular biology seem to adopt the same 
discovery structure, one might consider the controversy motivating my research ill posed. 
However, in Chapter 5 I shall argue that there is still a valuable reason of disagreement 
between the sides. Actually, data-driven and traditional molecular biology endorse 
different cognitive values, which provide the criteria for evaluating models and findings as 
adequate or not. Here one might say that, although the structures of discovery (i.e. how 
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reasoning and experimental strategies are structured and depend on each other) of the 
two sides are the same, the contexts of discovery (i.e. the set of both 
reasoning/experimental strategies and epistemic values/background assumptions that 
motivate discovery) are different. Therefore, in this last chapter I shall pinpoint the 
cognitive values behind traditional and data-driven biology, and how these commitments 
stimulate the heated disagreement motivating my research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN TRADITION AND 
INNOVATION 
 
 
These are great times for being a philosopher of science, especially a philosopher of 
biology and/or medicine. As in several scientific fields, in molecular biology things are 
changing at a hectic pace. This is not to say that there is progress, but just that there is 
something that is changing towards unknown directions. Clearly, there has been 
acceleration in biology after the first releases of the Human Genome Project (Lander et al 
2001) and its competitors (Venter et al 2001). The Human Genome Project (HGP) has 
been an incredible catalyst of transformation for biology in many respects (Hood and 
Rowen 2013). In particular, HGP drove the development of sequencing technologies (e.g. 
Next-Generation Sequencing) that eventually are stimulating a maniacal focus on data 
production.  
The amount of data produced by biology in the new century has reached a 
psychological threshold and this has created tensions among biologists. In this 
dissertation, I will try to disentangle a methodological dispute related to how biologists 
perceive this focus on data production. In particular, the controversy is over the nature of 
contemporary discovery strategies based on data intensive approaches and sequencing 
technologies stemming from the post-HGP era (the so-called ‘data-driven approach1’). 
Factions in this debate agree on the idea that there are a ‘traditional’ and a ‘novel’ way of 
doing molecular biology, but disagree on which approach is the best for molecular 
biology. Some argue (Weinberg 2010, Alberts 2012) that ‘data-driven’ molecular biology 
makes use of a method that is not properly scientific, and that this methodology 
undermines the survival of a ‘traditional’ way of doing molecular biology. Others (Golub 
2010; Garraway and Lander 2013) support the idea that a ‘data-driven’ approach is 
genuinely scientific, and that it can provide insights that traditional approaches cannot. 
Here, I will provide an epistemological analysis of both approaches in order to understand 
where exactly the disagreement lies. Therefore, the aim of this project is to characterize 
the context of discovery of contemporary molecular biology. 
																																																								
1 I do not think that this label is particularly appropriate. I share these doubts with other intellectuals and 
practitioners (Smalheiser 2002; Callebaut 2012; Strasser 2012; Leonelli 2012a; 2012b). However, since the 
received view on this kind of biology is to call it ‘data-driven’ I will use this label throughout this dissertation 
anyway. 	
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Before going into the detail of this controversy and the questions I would like to 
answer, I shall make a short introduction to disentangle certain terms like ‘big data’, ‘big 
science’ and ‘data-driven’, in order to mark the boundaries of the biology I will talk about.  
 
Big Data, big science and data-driven approaches 
 
Recently scientists, policy-makers, economists and sociologists have started debating the 
issue of ‘big data’. However, there are different interpretations of what ‘big data’ actually 
means. It seems that ‘big data’ is a new label describing a paradigm shift in how to 
organize multiple aspects of contemporary ICTs-based societies, ranging from scientific 
research to societal issues. A common idea is that nowadays information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) produce unprecedented massive amounts of data on a 
daily basis. Somehow this restless production of data is changing the way we organize 
society, encompassing all of its aspects. There is also interplay between technological and 
cultural (even mythological) aspects (boyd and Crawford 2012). Technological aspects 
should be identified with the possibilities of the ever-increasing computational power of 
contemporary ICTs. Mythological and cultural feelings rest on the idea “that large data 
sets offer a higher form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that 
were previously impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy” (2012, p 3). 
Therefore, people – from the computer scientist to the sociologist - are arguing in favour 
of an on-going revolution encompassing all aspects of human society due to the ‘big data’ 
phenomenon. 
 In the context of scientific research sometimes people superimpose ‘big data’ to 
‘data-driven science’. I do not think it is accurate. As I am going to show, not all big data 
scientific projects are strictly driven by data (although the aspect related to the data 
‘deluge’ is prominently highlighted), but rather by hypotheses or by other types of aims. 
Let us clarify the big data phenomenon in the context of scientific research. 
First of all, in science ‘big data’ can be identified with the phenomenon of ‘big 
science’, although Big Science does not necessarily imply the production of data usually 
associated to Big Data. For instance, The Manhattan Project involved more than 130,000 
employees as well as 2 billions dollars of investment, but it was not a ‘big data’ project, at 
least not directly. 
According to Eddy (2013) there are three kinds of big science: the big experiment, 
the big map, and the leading wedge. 
The big experiment is, by definition, a specific experiment (therefore guided by a 
single and precise hypothesis) requiring a large-scale community effort. A good case in 
point is the detection of the Higgs Boson at the Large Hadron Collider in Geneva in 2012. 
	 11	
The idea is that, in order to test the theoretical model elucidating the features of the 
Boson particle, one requires a particularly complex instrument to do a specific 
experiment. In this case, the big experiment involves the design of thousands of small 
experiments, the analysis of 25 petabytes of data (as to 2012) and a facility (the Large 
Hadron Collider) where nearly 10,000 people work. Actually, the Large Hadron Collider is 
the most expensive and largest scientific infrastructure ever built. The reader might 
understand why the big scientific experiment of the Higgs Boson fits very well the 
requirements of the big data phenomenon. Although these experiments generate a 
massive amount of data, they are clearly driven by a hypothesis (the theoretical model of 
the Higgs Boson). Experiments are designed in order to obtain a specific effect, i.e. the 
Higgs Boson itself.  
Next, a big map “is a data resource – comprehensive, complete, closed ended – to 
be used by multiple groups, over a long time, for multiple purposes” (Eddy 2013, p 
R261). Biology is a discipline more prone to maps rather than big experiments. A 
paradigmatic example of map in big data biology is HGP (Lander et al 2001; Venter et al 
2001). This project had (and it is having) a huge impact on biology and medicine. In a 
nutshell, HGP is used as a map to orient research (e.g. to locate genes, to compare 
nucleotide variants, etc). This map, although in principle it is not indispensable, is crucial 
in practice.  
Finally, a leading wedge is a project designed as a massed technology 
development effort. Clearly Eddy refers to leading wedges as different in type from big 
experiments and maps. However, while maps and big experiments are mutually 
exclusive, leading wedges and maps (or leading wedges and big experiments) are not. 
Actually, both the big experiment and the big map imply somehow a leading wedge. HGP 
involved the massive development of sequencing technologies while the Higgs boson 
experiment required an incredibly advanced technological infrastructure (the Large 
Hadron Collider) as well as a great development of computational power to deal with 25 
petabytes of data. Big experiments and maps fuel technological ruptures. Some argue 
that there are also big science project that are leading wedges tout court. For instance, 
recent debates on the Human Brain Project (HBP, see http://www.neurofuture.eu/) raise 
the issue of whether the HBP might be conceived as a large-scale scientific project with 
only a technological rationale. Eddy stresses this point also for the Brain Activity Map 
(BAM) that “is not a map, nor an experiment; it is all leading wedges” (Eddy 2013, p 
R261).  
To my knowledge, there are no big experiments in biology. Better: There are no 
experiments in biology that are even comparable in size to experiments such as the Higgs 
Boson briefly explained above. Eddy emphasizes this by saying that “[w]e feel a strong 
temptation to spin all big science projects in biology as big experiments, whereas the 
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complexity of biology (…) is such that big experiments are nearly nonexisting in our field” 
(Eddy 2013, p R261). As Eddy further stresses, HGP was sometimes spun as 
revolutionary for understanding the human genome. But this was wrong, because it just 
provided the sequence of the human genome without explaining much how the human 
genome works – and yet HGP as a resource is essential. 
But if there are no big experiments in biology, is big data biology just a bunch of 
maps? Not really. I think that Eddy misses an important type of big science project. This 
type of project is called the data-driven project2. Data-driven projects are neither big 
experiments, nor maps, but they might imply leading wedges. A good candidate for being 
both data-driven and leading wedges are many studies fuelled by The Cancer Genome 
Atlas, which clearly has boosted sequencing technologies towards a great improvement. 
Data-driven projects are not big experiments because they are not driven by a specific 
hypothesis as the big experiments are. In the context of big data biology, a data-driven 
project is a project that generates a massive amount of data without a specific hypothesis 
in mind. So far, it is similar to the map: Generating data without somehow evaluating 
claims. Yet, in another sense data-driven projects are not like maps. Data-driven projects 
have an aim of their own, unlike maps that are just designed to aid the biological 
community in a way or another. Maps are tools to orient research, and aid biologists by 
offering a basis of comparison in several respects. If maps “are about enabling small 
science” (Eddy 2013, p R261) and they are not the science itself, data-drive projects are 
instances of big science, but they have the same aims of small science. Data-driven 
projects generate big genomic data sets and by means of comparison with either other 
data sets or maps (in the sense explained above) are able to detect patterns that 
traditional molecular biological approaches would not be able to detect – or so supporters 
of data-driven projects say. In this dissertation I shall be focused especially on data-
driven projects. However I will extensively also talk about maps, since maps are involved 
in the heuristic strategies used in the discovery procedures of data-driven molecular 
biology. Let us now see the methodological controversy over data-driven projects that 
motivates the present work 
 
Data-driven molecular biology: a methodological controversy 
 
In the last few years, molecular biology has become more and more entrenched with 
sequencing technologies. This is a consequence of the expansion and hype of so-called –
omics technologies. There is a clear tendency to use these technologies to generate 																																																								
2Some calls data-driven projects ‘hypothesis-free’ although this is not an entirely appropriate label, as I will 
show 
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bigger and bigger data sets, and then to discover significant patterns instead of starting 
from a single general guess and to design a plethora of experiments to refine the initial 
claim. However, there has been also a tendency to contrast this new fashion. For instance 
Weinberg (2010), who identifies the method of molecular biology as being ‘hypothesis-
driven’, claims that ‘data intensive3’ studies in biology have not, so far, shown the same 
success as the ‘traditional’ methodological paradigm of starting from hypotheses and then 
applying a reductionist approach of studying parts of a system in isolation. Weinberg is 
claiming that a biological study, to be scientific, should start necessarily from hypotheses. 
Data intensive studies, Weinberg argues, are the new fashion just because there is the 
misleading perception that traditional studies cannot, in principle, map the complexity 
coming out of studies using sequencing technologies. Todd Golub (2010) on the contrary 
argues that the ‘data-driven’ approach can lead to discoveries that traditional studies 
(identified as ‘hypothesis-driven’) could not reach. Golub is particularly diplomatic, and he 
runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds, especially when he says that “[a]lthough 
hypothesis-driven, experimental research should remain central to the field, unbiased 
surveys of cancer genomes afford an unprecedented opportunity to generate new ideas” 
(2010, p 679), but clearly he stresses the point that “[t]his large-scale, data-harvesting 
approach to biological research has significant advantages over conventional, 
experimental methods” (2010 p 679). Weinberg and Golub’s contributions have been 
published in the same issue of Nature with the paradigmatic titles of, respectively, Point: 
Hypothesis First and Counterpoint: Data First. But this is just the tip of the iceberg: The 
disagreement is pervasive. Indeed, there are different levels in this controversy. 
 First, there is a controversy over the notion of proper scientific method and the 
best mode of research. As stressed in O’Malley et al. (2009), it is conventional for 
scientists and philosophers to claim that one of the main activities that can successfully 
demarcates science from non-science is hypothesis testing. This clearly has led to an 
oversimplification of the practices of science, thereby ignoring all other inductive and 
exploratory activities that have populated in a way or another the history of science. 
Somehow this was also reflected in the guidelines of funding agencies (O’Malley et al 
2009) where the ‘hypothesis-driven’ mode has been prominent for several decades. 
However, in contemporary molecular biology the accumulation of data and the 
development sequencing technologies points to other – and different – modes of 
research. For instance, O’Malley and colleagues report the example of the NIH. While to 
some degree this funding agency recognizes also a place for exploratory experiments, the 
focus on hypothesis testing is pervasive. But this way of conceiving science can have 
some puzzling consequences. For instance Gannon (2009) publishes a parody of a peer 
review funding process where Charles Darwin’s project is rejected because of the lack of a 																																																								
3 In this work ‘data-driven’ and ‘data-intensive’ are synonymous 
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clear hypothesis guiding his research. On the other hand, there is a tendency to be overly 
enthusiastic about data intensive enterprises (Yaffe 2013). Therefore, an aspect of the 
controversy deals with the right scientific method for biology, with people like Weinberg 
claiming that the ‘hypothesis-driven’ and reductionist approach is the right one for 
biology, and scientists like Golub claiming that only a data-driven approach can in 
principle make sense of biological complexity. 
 The second level is on the opposition between ‘data-driven’ and ‘hypothesis-
driven’. But what is exactly a ‘data-driven approach’? As far as I have understood from 
the received view on this matter, an approach is data-driven – as opposed to hypothesis-
driven – if it designs an experiment merely to generate relevant data and not to obtain a 
specific effect in order to test (directly) a specific causal claim. In a sense, data-driven 
projects are devoted to the generation of hypotheses. Biologists like Eddy (2013) or 
Weinberg (2010) think that molecular biology is mainly a matter of testing claims, and a 
scientific research without hypotheses is blind and misguided from the very beginning. 
Others think that a hypothesis-free or data-driven approach is in principle unbiased and 
therefore it has several advantages over approaches driven by guesses. In particular in 
the context of genome-wide association studies (GWASs), these types of screenings are 
seen as eminently unbiased so that they can lead to genuine new discoveries. For 
instance Brookfield (2010) argues that the “GWAS approach is hypothesis-free, in that it 
looks at very many SNPs simultaneously rather than focusing on loci whose biology 
suggests that a causal relationship to the disease is likely” (p 4). Another example is the 
commentary by Guessous and colleagues (2009), where they claim that “[t]he 
conventional GWAS approach is a hypothesis-free, systematic search of tagging single 
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) across the genome to identify novel associations with 
common diseases” (p 1). Finally, Yeo writes an editorial (2011) and he says that “because 
of its ‘hypothesis free’ nature, the power of GWAS lies in uncovering potentially new 
biology that would not have been possible using a candidate gene approach” (p 1), where 
a ‘candidate gene approach’ is a typical hypothesis-driven mode of research. Therefore, 
on the one hand ‘traditional’ biologists think that proper science should be done with 
hypotheses, while ‘data-driven’ practitioners claim that a data-driven approach could 
overcome the limits of the old method. 
Third, there is the ‘reductionist versus non-reductionist’ quarrel. ‘Reductionist’ 
should not be understood in the technical philosophical meaning, but rather in a more 
intuitive fashion. Especially in molecular oncology (the main case study in this work), the 
quest for cancer genes can be approached in two ways. Either we do a sort of ‘trial-and-
error’ approach, and we test genes to see their effect on cancer phenotypes, or we 
establish some criteria that a gene should met to be of interest, and by means of 
sequencing technology we try to see whether all genes - simultaneously – meets these 
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criteria. The latter is the idea that data-driven molecular biology can provide a system-
level view of biological systems. Vogelstein and colleagues (2013, 1554) describe this 
idea by means of a metaphor saying that if a jungle appear chaotic at ground level, one 
can distinguish several interesting patterns by taking a view from 30,000 foots. The 
’30,000-foot view’ is the system level view of data-driven biology. Please note that the 
‘system-level’ view versus reductionist view is not an ontological controversy, at least not 
here. It is purely methodological, namely it is the question “What is the best approach to 
attack the complexity of biological systems?”. Therefore, data-driven biologists claim that 
their approach is the most effective, while ‘traditional’ biologists let 50 years of successes 
of reductionist approaches speak for themselves. 
 There is also another aspect of the controversy. ‘Data-driven’ molecular biology is 
mostly organized around big consortia. For instance, to do a GWAS more is needed than 
just a single lab: Funding data-driven projects is particularly demanding. Therefore the 
controversy is also about which projects we should fund. For instance Alberts (2012) 
thinks that small lab-based science is somehow threatened by the emergence of big 
consortia. 
 
To sum up, there is a controversy between a well-established tradition of 
discovery strategies of molecular biology called ‘hypothesis-driven’ that I shall call 
‘traditional molecular biology’, and an emerging community of scientists that identify 
themselves as ‘data-driven’, ‘hypothesis-free’, ‘systemic’ (that is different from ‘systems 
biology’) molecular biologists that I will call, for simplicity, ‘data-driven’ molecular 
biology. In this dissertation I would like to answer to the following questions: 
 
Which are the epistemological differences between ‘traditional’ and data-driven molecular 
biology? 
Is this controversy misplaced and misguided? 
If not, where does exactly the disagreement lie? 
 
Recently, a proposal has been advanced. Instead of being in opposition, data-driven and 
hypothesis-driven are complementary and hybridized (Strasser 2011; Smallheiser 2002; 
O’Malley and Soyer 2012; Keating and Cambrosio 2012). The problem with these 
proposals is that they do not explain, from an epistemological point of view, how these 
two approaches are complementary. Therefore in this dissertation I will analyse the 
discovery strategies of both data-driven and traditional molecular biology in order to 
highlight similarities and differences. 
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Structure of the thesis 
 
 The dissertation is structured as follows. Since I will analyse from a philosophical 
point of view discovery strategies, in Chapter 1 I will scrutinize the debate in philosophy 
of science over methodologies of discovery and I will try to elaborate a minimal 
framework of how discovery in science is pursued. To do this, I will go through the debate 
fuelled by Reichenbach and its controversial distinction between the context of discovery 
and the context of justification. The debate stems from this distinction has continued for 
several years, leading to the present mechanistic philosophy. I will then come out with 
my framework of scientific discovery, combining virtues of different positions emerged in 
the debate. 
 In Chapter 2 I will analyse data-driven molecular biology strategies of discovery in 
light of the framework elaborated in Chapter 1. I will analyse especially case studies from 
cancer genomics and GWASs.  
 Chapter 3 should be conceived as complementing Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I shall 
point to the important epistemic role that biological databases play in contemporary 
biology. In Chapter 3 I distinguish two important epistemic uses of biological databases. 
In a first sense, databases are evidence-enhancers, in the sense that they aid biologists 
in identifying biological phenomena and in elaborating claims about phenomena. In a 
second sense, databases are ‘mined’ with theoretical aims in mind. 
 In Chapter 4 I shall focus on ‘traditional’ discovery strategies in molecular biology, 
especially in molecular oncology. The orienteering tool here is the idea that discovery 
strategies in molecular biology are attempts to build mechanistic descriptions of biological 
phenomena. Therefore, I will draw from the literature of the so-called mechanistic 
philosophy (Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Darden 2006, Craver and Darden 2013) to 
identify the main epistemic features of molecular biological practices, and I will then 
compare these with the framework elaborated in Chapter 1. 
 In Chapter 5, I will compare the two approaches and I will claim that the main 
reason motivating the heated disagreement lies in the endorsement of different cognitive 
value of a special kind. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A TRIPARTITE FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
In this chapter, I discuss what scientific discovery is, how it is structured, and which 
criteria might influence its development. These conceptual tools will be applied to both 
data-driven and traditional molecular biology to grasp the discovery strategies 
underpinning these enterprises. I draw these conceptual tools by analyzing in detail the 
debate about the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification, that is arguably the locus in the philosophy of science literature where 
discovery was debated most. I analyze the most influential positions on this topic and 
argue that scientific discovery is composed of three phases: hypothesis generation, 
hypothesis prior-assessment and hypothesis justification. Moreover, I list some possible 
types of inferences used within each phase. At the end, I complement this analysis by 
introducing the topic of epistemic values showing why we should consider these types of 
epistemic desiderata when analyzing discovery strategies.  
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In philosophy, the topic of discovery has been extensively analyzed and explored. Some 
have seen the problem of discovery as a traditional issue in epistemology dealing with the 
‘justificatory’ part of knowledge (viz. ‘justified true belief’) while others have focused 
more specifically on scientific discovery. In the latter case, the term ‘discovery’ has many 
interpretations (Nickles 1980; Schickore 2014). One might think about ‘discovery’ as a 
recognized scientific achievement, or as the process leading to a scientific achievement. It 
can be either an ‘ah-a’ experience or a comprehensive and successful scientific inquiry. 
Conceived in a stronger sense, ‘discovering’ can be identified with ‘knowing’, while in a 
weaker sense ‘discovering’ is just the act of having an idea, implying no evaluation of that 
idea whatsoever.  
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In this dissertation, by ‘discovery’ I mean the process leading to a scientific 
achievement. Therefore, when I said in the Introduction that I want to compare discovery 
strategies and structures of data-driven and ‘traditional’ molecular biology, I meant that I 
want to compare the processes leading to their scientific achievements. In order to do 
this, I need a framework of scientific discovery that can be used as a basis for the 
comparison of the two approaches. This does not mean that I have to elaborate a 
framework able to represent the formal structure of any scientific discovery. Rather, what 
I need is an account that might include a minimal core of phases and epistemic moves 
that any scientist should pass through when ‘discovering’. In other words, this would be a 
framework providing a set of necessary steps and epistemic moves of scientific discovery. 
With this account in place, I can identify similarities and differences of the two 
approaches within each phase of scientific discovery. 
I have three goals for this chapter. First, I want to show that scientific discovery, 
understood as the process leading to a scientific achievement, is a procedure constituted 
by at least three phases (hypothesis generation, hypothesis development and 
evaluation). I call this process of generation-development-evaluation the tripartite 
framework of discovery. In order to make the case for my tripartite framework, I critically 
scrutinize the debate on the distinction between the context of discovery and the context 
of justification that is arguably the main debate on scientific discovery in the philosophy 
of science. Next, I show that within each phase there is an umbrella of possible inferences 
that can be used. Finally, I argue that each inference – depending on the phase where it 
is applied and on the context to which is embedded in - is guided by a set of preferences 
that are called ‘epistemic desiderata’.  
 
2. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY AND 
THE CONTEXT OF JUSTIFICATION 
 
In philosophy of science, the topic of discovery, understood as the process leading to a 
scientific achievement, has been discussed as part of the debate on the distinction 
between the context of discovery and the context of justification. This distinction stems 
from Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction (1938; 1961) and The Rise of Scientific 
Philosophy (1951). The distinction has been spelled out in many ways, but there is a core 
in Reichenbach’s initial proposal that has been widely discussed and has generated 
different and conflicting positions.  
In outlining the descriptive task of epistemology, Reichenbach (1961) argues that 
this discipline is interested in internal relations between thoughts. But if epistemology is 
interested in internal relations between thoughts, then it seems that it should also be 
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focused in providing descriptions of thinking processes in the way they are actually 
performed. According to Reichenbach, this is deeply wrong. Epistemology is only 
interested in the logical interconnections between thoughts, and not in how thoughts are 
performed. Therefore, epistemology is aimed at constructing “thinking processes in a way 
in which they ought to occur if they are to be ranged in a consistent system” 
(Reichenbach 1961, p 4). Whereas psychology describes actual thinking processes as 
they are actually performed, epistemology rather focuses on a ‘justifiable set of 
operations’ between the starting point and the end of a thought processes. In other 
words, epistemology has to reconstruct the way in which thinking processes are 
communicated to other individuals, e.g. the way a discovery is presented in a peer-
reviewed journal4. Hence the difference between psychology and epistemology is the 
same as the difference between a person’s way of finding (for example) a theorem, and 
the way of demonstrating the theorem itself. In order to better explain the difference, 
Reichenbach introduces the distinction between the context of discovery (the way 
thoughts are actually performed) and the context of justification (the way thoughts are 
rationally reconstructed). Moreover, in (1951) Reichenbach elaborates a stronger 
position. Namely, he argues that the scientist who discovers a theory is guided by 
guesses, and “he cannot name a method by means of which he found the theory” (1951, 
230). Reichenbach explicitly says that there is no way to rationally discover a theory or a 
hypothesis. How a theory is generated is more an empirical question, and it is 
investigated by disciplines such as history or psychology. Therefore according to 
Reichenbach one first discovers a theory or a hypothesis in a non-rational way, and then 
she justifies it.  
The core of the distinction then is as follows. In the context of discovery, one 
generates a hypothesis by tentative guesses, and how exactly this has been done is 
investigated by empirical disciplines such as history or psychology. In the context of 
justification, one then tries to justify the generated hypothesis. The way a hypothesis is 
justified can be subjected to logical inquiry, and this means that only the context of 
justification is the realm of investigation of philosophy of science because the context of 
discovery is alogical at best, if not illogical. From this sketch, the distinction of the 
contexts has been understood in many ways. For instance Hoyningen-Huene (1987; 
reprinted and further developed in 2006) distinguishes five major ways of understanding 
the distinction, while Nickles (1980) identifies seven forms of it. Since I am not interested 
in subtle distinctions, I will divide positions in this debate according to two problems. The 
first problem is whether a distinction between a phase where a hypothesis is generated 
and a phase where a hypothesis is evaluated is sufficient to make sense of the complexity 
of scientific practice. For instance, is it sufficient to say that in actual practice scientists 																																																								
4 This is called by Carnap ‘rational reconstruction’ 
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generate a complete hypothesis that is then put at test? Second, what is debated is the 
nature of the first phase, whether it is rational and, if this is the case, whether there are 
clearly identifiable rules for hypothesis generation. Stemming from these problems, there 
are two big families of positions about scientific discovery (understood as the process 
leading to scientific achievement). The first is the family of those who think that there is 
nothing epistemologically relevant for science in how hypotheses or theories are 
discovered – for the sake of simplicity I will call this group of ideas the Popperian family, 
because Popper (2002) is arguably the most influential philosopher supporting this 
position. This family of positions is useful to discuss the issue of whether the process of 
generating hypotheses can be in principle rational and hence whether can be the subject 
of a philosophical inquiry. The second set of positions include those who do think that 
discovery is epistemologically relevant for science, and that it can be at least rationally 
reconstructed. Echoing Ronald Giere (Nickles 1980; 1985) I will call this ‘family’ friends of 
discovery. These positions are useful to investigate whether there are just hypotheses 
generation and justification, or whether there is something else. 
 
2.1 The Popperian Family 
 
Views belonging to the Popperian family explicitly separate belief-forming procedures 
from belief-justification procedures by claiming that how do we form belief (how do 
scientists generate a hypothesis) has nothing to do with the epistemology of science. 
Therefore, the attitude towards discovery as a generative phase of hypotheses is that 
discovery procedures are epistemologically irrelevant. This is because discovery strategies 
are mainly inductive (or so the Popperian family claims), and induction is unreliable. This 
position is sometimes developed by saying that, since discovery is irrelevant to 
epistemology, and epistemology should be logically based, then discovery has nothing to 
do also with logic. Again, this stemmed from the idea that discovery was seen as an 
inductive enterprise, and for induction there was not a clear framework, let alone a strict 
logic. Prominent philosophers supporting this type position are Popper (2002), Braithwaite 
(1953), Hempel (1966), but also Feigl (1970). Here I just focus on two main positions 
(Popper and Hempel), that cover what other members of this family have said. 
 In Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002), Popper draws a sharp distinction between 
the psychology of knowledge (dealing with empirical facts) and the logic of knowledge 
(dealing only with logical relations). Attempts to construct an inductive logic, Popper says, 
stems from a misleading belief that confuses psychological and epistemological problems. 
This idea of identifying logical laws with psychological laws is called by Popper 
psychologism (Popper 2002, p 7).  
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 The idea that the early stage of scientific inquiry - namely the act of conceiving or 
inventing a theory - can be rationally reconstructed is pervaded by psychologism. Unlike 
the methods of justification, this early phase cannot be subjected to any kind of logical 
analysis. Hence, Popper distinguishes sharply between the process of conceiving a new 
idea (hypothesis or theory), and the methods for examining it logically. The epistemology 
of science (the logic of knowledge) has to do only with the latter phase. But, even if we 
admit that the task of epistemology of science is to do the rationally reconstruction of the 
whole process – the steps that have led the scientists to the discovery of new truths – 
then we should ask what could be in principle reconstructed. Since for Popper hypothesis 
generation is the “stimulation and release of an inspiration” (2002, p 8), and since 
inspirations contain creative elements, then there is no method of conceiving hypotheses 
or theories, because these processes contain an irrational element of creativity that, by 
definition, cannot be subjected to logical analysis. In Popper’s analysis there is no way, 
not even a very contingent one, through which the phase of hypothesis generation can be 
somehow subjected to logical analysis. The phase cannot be rationalized in any way. 
Hempel’s argument (1966, Chapter 2) is close to Popper’s, but Hempel provides a 
stronger motivation for endorsing it. The question he wants to answer is the following: 
How are hypotheses derived in the first place? A standard answer, Hempel says, is to 
state that hypotheses are inferred from antecedent collected data by means of ‘inductive 
inferences’. This idea of ‘inductive inferences’ is, in a particular wave of philosophy of 
science, a synonym of ‘hypothesis generation’. Hempel identifies four stages of an ideal 
scientific inquiry guided by ‘inductive inferences’: 
 
(a) Observation in which all facts are recorded 
(b)  Facts are analysed and classified 
(c) Generalizations (theories of hypotheses) are inductively derived 
(d) Generalizations are tested 
 
According to Hempel, this scheme has serious problems. The first thing to be noted about 
(a) is that a scientific investigation “could never get off the ground” (Hempel 1966, p 11) 
without hypotheses. Trivially, the first phase could never be carried out, since a collection 
“of all the facts would have to await the end of the world” (1966, p 11). Even all the facts 
up to now are almost impossible to be collected, since there is a incredible high number 
and variety of them. One might say that we do not need to collect all the facts. Rather, 
we need just to collect the relevant facts. A problem with this proposal is that we should 
nonetheless specify what facts are relevant to. At this point, one might rebut that facts 
should be relevant to a certain problem. But, as Hempel stresses, what sorts of data are 
reasonable to collect is not determined solely by the problem under scrutiny, but rather 
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by a tentative answer to the problem itself. Therefore the moral of the story is that 
“empirical ‘facts’ or findings (…) can be qualified as logically relevant or irrelevant only in 
reference to a given hypothesis, but not in reference to a given problem” (Hempel 1966, 
p 12). The idea is that data cannot be gathered without guidance provided by antecedent 
hypotheses. At least tentative hypotheses are needed to orient scientific investigation. 
Accordingly it is impossible to provide a mechanical set of rules able to generate 
hypotheses unless one has a bunch of hypotheses already in hand. 
 The second phase (b) is problematic as well. Facts can be analysed and classified 
in many different ways. Indeed, they should be analysed and classified according to a 
particular research plan. If they were not, then analysis and classification would be 
useless for the particular scientific investigation. For the second phase to take place, it 
should be based somehow on a tentative hypothesis in order to give a direction to 
analysis and classification. As Hempel puts it, “without (…) hypotheses, analysis and 
classification are blind” (Hempel 1966, 13). 
 Next, Hempel arrives at the core of its argument about scientific discovery. 
Inductive inferences are supposed to provide rules for mechanically deriving general 
principles from observed facts. Here the logic of discovery is identified as an inductive 
inference. This is the old idea of the scientific method as famously conceived by Bacon. 
However, as Hempel shows, a naïve conception of inductive inferences has dubious 
reliability. Moreover Hempel seems to imply that these rules are like algorithms. 
However, even in very special and local cases in which there is a procedure to derive 
hypotheses, the mechanical procedure for the construction of a hypothesis stems from an 
antecedent less specific hypothesis, which cannot obtained by the very same procedure. 
Actually, “scientific hypotheses and theories are not derived from observed facts, but 
invented in order to account for them” (Hempel 1966, p 15). In other words, hypotheses 
are ‘happy guesses’. Moreover, Hempel supports a temporal view of the distinction, by 
saying that hypotheses first are freely invented and proposed, but they are accepted only 
after justification is provided. 
 
 
2.2 Discussion: Is hypothesis generation irrational? 
 
The problem with Popperian-like conceptions of hypothesis generation is that sometimes 
requirements ascribed to this phase are too demanding. Popperian-like positions 
overestimate hypotheses generation in (at least) three respects. 
Hempel is representative of the first kind of overestimation. His argument against 
a logic of hypothesis generation stems from the idea that a logical procedure of discovery 
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must rely on strict logic. However, this requirement is too demanding (Nickles 1980). 
There is here a hidden (and unjustified) assumption that philosophical inquiries are just a 
matter of logical arguments, where ‘logic’ stands for an articulated system of rules, and it 
is equated with rationality. If you put together strict logic and rationality, then there is 
clearly no rationally reconstructed hypothesis generation phase. But if you stop to think 
for a moment in terms of algorithms and reason instead in terms of heuristics then there 
is room also for a rational phase of hypothesis generation. Heuristics should be 
understood as rules of thumb (Langley et al, 1987; Wimsatt 2007; Gross 2013) applied to 
find possible solutions to a complex problem. This is different from applying rules of an 
algorithm. An algorithm would provide just the optimal solutions to a problem. The notion 
of heuristic is related to the idea of bounded rationality (Bechtel and Richardson 2010), 
that is, the idea that in order to solve a problem the solutions we will find are limited to 
the initial information we have. When we start to consider hypothesis generation in terms 
of heuristics and bounded rationality, we become more liberal and we can start to accept 
reasoning modules such as analogical reasoning that can be rationally reconstructed even 
if they are not strict logic.  
Next (the second overestimation), Hempel claims that hypothesis generation 
procedures should be hypothesis-free in the sense that it should be based on purely 
inductive organization of data. He then argues that there is no such a discovery 
procedure because there cannot be hypothesis-free procedures. Hempel’s proposal is that 
data cannot be gathered without the guidance of antecedent hypotheses. But this too 
seems unjustified. While contemporary accounts recognize the impossibility of a 
completely hypothesis-free research (Leonelli 2012; Rheinberger 2011), this 
impracticability is not seen as a barrier to the epistemological analysis of discovery 
procedures. It is not clear at all why the impossibility of hypothesis-free research bans 
discovery procedures. For instance, if we admit that hypothesis generation depends on 
previous knowledge, we can nonetheless rationally reconstruct the procedure of 
derivation from background knowledge. Even if we are not hypothesis-free, we can 
nonetheless elaborate a procedure to generate hypotheses. 
Finally, there is a third aspect of overestimation (Laudan 1980; Kelly 1987). Larry 
Laudan argues that a logic of discovery might be epistemologically relevant only if it 
provides epistemic warrant for the hypotheses it generates. However, this too seems to 
be unjustified – at least for the phase of hypothesis generation. Reichenbach’s ‘straight 
rule’ of induction (1961) is a case in point as this rule might be considered as a logic for 
generating hypotheses. However, Reichenbach explicitly says that its inductive method 
should not be conceived as a method to produce also the justification of the belief in the 
hypothesis generated. The justification should be pursued by other means. In other 
words, hypotheses generated don’t have to be justified. Indeed, they can turn out to be 
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false and this would be found out in the phase of justification.  
Therefore, these considerations suggest that there can be a phase of hypothesis 
generation that is not irrational. It does not need to be strictly logical, but it can be based 
on rules of thumb that can be properly subjected to a rational reconstruction. In other 
words, hypothesis generation can be subjected to philosophical analysis. 
 
 
 
2.3 Friends of discovery 
 
The second family of positions tries to debunk the Popperian position. The position shared 
by friends of discovery is exactly the attitude toward the phase of discovery as a 
methodology to generate hypotheses. Some say that there is a strict logic of discovery, 
while others claim that hypothesis formation is more a heuristic, but the point is that for 
all these positions hypothesis generation is a rational procedure that can be subjected to 
philosophical analysis. Most important, friends of discovery also reveal the possibility (and 
somehow the necessity) for another phase in scientific discovery, thereby undermining 
the idea that scientific discovery is just hypothesis generation and justification. Some 
calls this additional phase “prior assessment” (Curd 1980), others “weak evaluation” 
(Schaffner 1993) or “theory pursuit” (Whitt 1990; McKinney 1995; Seselja and Strasser 
2014). Despite subtle differences, the underlying idea is that once a hypothesis is 
generated, it has no plausibility. If we use rules of thumb to generate possible solutions 
to a problem, then we do not have to attach plausibility considerations. Plausibility 
considerations come from another source. In other words, hypotheses do not have to be 
justified in the very moment when they are generated. Plausibility considerations are 
attached to hypotheses when these are weakly evaluated. 
 The positions of friends of discovery were anticipated by Hanson (1975; 1958; 
1960). He (indirectly) anticipates the idea of an additional phase within discovery and 
justification.5 According to Hanson, hypotheses or theories might be thought in two 
general ways. A first way of looking at theories or hypotheses is that they are derived by 
typical Baconian inductio per enumerationem simplicem, ubi non reperitur instantia 
contradictoria. This was perceived as highly problematic, and Hanson recognizes that 
inductio per enumerationem wrongly suggests that laws are just a summary of data. As a 
matter of fact, scientists rarely find laws by enumerating or summarizing observation. 																																																								
5 Actually, Hanson’s aim was to show that there can be a logic of discovery but, in failing to show this, he 
opened up the possibility for the phase of prior assessment/theory pursuit/weak evaluation. As shown by many 
critics (Nickles 1980; Schaffner 1993), Hanson is not able to demonstrate the existence of a logic of discovery in 
the sense of hypothesis generation, but rather he elaborates a methodology of prior assessment of existing 
hypotheses. 
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Another way is to think about hypotheses/theories as premises of a hypothetico-
deductive (H-D) system. Theories and hypotheses are regarded as ‘quasi-axioms’ and by 
means of derivation some predictions will eventually follow, which are then contrasted to 
data. These accounts “begin with the hypothesis as given, as cooking recipes begin with 
the trout” (Hanson 1960, 101-2). Hanson notes that this is what usually physicists do 
after catching hypotheses. However, which are the reasons for proposing a hypothesis 
instead of another? According to H-D supporters there is no reason because hypotheses 
are generated by leaps of genius. In other words, according to Hanson both H-D and 
inductive frameworks are problematic, in the sense that they can hardly make sense of 
the processes discovery in science. 
Therefore, these accounts should be rejected, or at least substantially revised 
because they do not explain a fundamental aspect of science: Why do we try to justify a 
hypothesis instead of another? Where do hypotheses come from? Clearly, hypotheses do 
not come out of the blue. According to Hanson one problem with these perspectives 
(especially the H-D account) unable to cope with hypothesis generation is that there is a 
conflation of reasons for suggesting a hypothesis into the realm of reasons for accepting a 
hypothesis. According to Hanson there is a logical difference between the two types of 
reasons. Famously Reichenbach states that any logical consideration is justificatory in 
nature, therefore ‘suggesting’ and ‘accepting’ are of the same logical type. Any other 
(non-justificatory) reason to propose a hypothesis is psychological, historical or 
sociological. Therefore the very issue here is whether the difference between suggesting 
and accepting a hypothesis is of logical type, or of degree, or 
psychological/sociological/historical (Hanson 1960). According to the position Hanson 
argues against, if one is interested in understanding the specificity of hypothesis 
generation procedure, then either he would consider hypothesis generation criteria as 
reasons for accepting a hypothesis as true (therefore implying the denial of the specificity 
of hypotheses generation with respect to hypothesis justification) or he would analyze 
psychological, sociological or historical considerations. In both cases, discovery as 
hypothesis generation is missed. In the first case it is conflated to justification, in the 
second case logical analysis is irrelevant or in general not applicable. 
 However, Hanson (1975, p 71) not only thinks that there is something more than 
psychology in hypothesis generation, but that this procedure has its own peculiar logic. 
Instead of relying on induction or deduction, Hanson shifts the attention to a different 
idea. Hanson suggests that there might be another type of inference at the origin of the 
discovery of theories. Following Peirce and Aristotle, he endorses the logic of the 
retroductive (or abductive) inference from a set of facts to a hypothesis (say H). The 
inference has the following structure: 
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1. A surprising phenomenon P is observed 
2. P is explained only if a certain hypothesis H were true 
 
Ergo 
 
3. There is good reason for elaborating and going deeper in the hypothesis of the 
kind H 
 
2.4 Discussion: Is it really just generation and justification? 
 
Contra Hanson, the idea that scientific theories are discovered according to the 
retroductive inference is problematic. Some argue that Hanson’s scheme does not show 
how hypotheses are generated or discovered (Nickles 1980; Schaffner 1993). It merely 
says how hypotheses are evaluated in the first place. The way hypotheses come into 
mind is perfectly compatible with Popper’s ideas on discovery. Popper would say that the 
kind of inference at stake here does not generate hypotheses, because the hypothesis is 
not in the conclusion of the argument, but in one of its premises6. Achinstein (1970; 
1971; 1987) and Harman (1965; 1968) also note that (a) Hanson does not consider the 
role of background of theories in scientific inference and (b) the fact that a hypothesis is 
chosen because it is more legitimate than others. For these reasons Schaffner (1993) 
concludes that Hanson’s framework is flawed because it does not distinguish between a 
logic of generation (articulation of an hypothesis) and a logic of preliminary evaluation 
(that is what Hanson develops). In other words, Hanson shows not how a hypothesis is 
generated, but rather how a hypothesis is in fact weakly evaluated without being put at 
test as it is done in the traditional H-D framework. But if this is the case, then Hanson is 
not talking about reasons for suggesting a hypothesis, but rather of reasons for pursuing 
a hypothesis (i.e. plausibility reasons) because ‘suggesting’ implies ‘generating’ but here 
there is no logic of generation.  
Some friends of discovery go deeper in this idea of ‘plausibility reasons’ (Nickles 
1980; Curd 1980; Schaffner 1993) and they make a distinction between hypothesis 
formation and hypothesis weak evaluation showing how the phase of discovery is much 
more complicated than it might appear. This is, for instance, the purpose of Curd’s essay 
(1980). According to Curd, it seems that the discovery phase should be divided in two 
sub-phases: a phase of theory/hypothesis generation and a phase of prior assessment of 
the theory/hypothesis generated. Therefore, the discovery/justification distinction became 																																																								
6This is why Nickles rightly points out that “[s]ince it is not a logic of generation but takes H as given, Hanson’s 
claim that retroductive inference differs from hypothetico-deductive inference is shaky” (Nickles 1980, p 23).  
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a tripartite distinction: hypothesis generation, hypothesis prior assessment, and 
hypothesis justification. Schaffner means the same with ‘weak evaluation’ (1993). Other 
commentators refer to prior assessment as ‘pursuing’ (Whitt 1990; McKinney 1995; 
Seselja and Strasser 2014). 
The idea behind the phase of prior assessment is that theories or hypotheses are 
not generated in the final form to which they are subjected in the phase of justification. 
That is to say (as Duhem has claimed (1955, p 221)) that theories do not come out of the 
blue, but rather they are subjected to a ‘period of incubation’. In this period of incubation 
hypotheses and theories are developed. 
However, some raise an issue of serious concern: Why exactly should plausibility 
be treated differently from justification? For instance, one might accept this logical 
distinction but deny the conclusion that we should keep separated plausibility and 
justification (Salmon 1967). Consider Bayes’ Theorem. As it is widely known, this 
theorem requires the existence of prior probabilities of a hypothesis. Salmon interprets 
reasons for plausibility as if they were prior probabilities of a theory/hypothesis. 
Therefore, since prior probabilities are part of the Bayes’ Theorem, then the logic of 
justification subsumes plausibility. Therefore, philosophers like Salmon would say that 
supporters of the tripartite distinction are merely relabeling part of the context of 
justification as ‘prior assessment’. With this trick, philosophers are pretending to talk 
about discovery but rather they are writing about the context of justification. An 
argument against this thesis might be as follows. Prior assessment and justification have 
different goals. Prior assessment “concerns the methodological appraisal of hypotheses 
after they have been generated but before they have been tested” (Curd 1980, p. 203). 
What kind of appraisal I am talking about? The idea is that since there is no limit to the 
number of hypotheses that one could derive from the body of data collected7 then how 
does one decide which hypothesis to develop or to put at test? The idea of the ‘prior 
assessment’ is that some hypotheses are developed and taken seriously because they are 
worth being developed according to certain criteria (provided by the kind of prior 
assessment employed). Accordingly, prior assessment is necessary because without it 
science would be unable to choose which hypotheses, among the many derived from 
data, should be developed and eventually tested. A complementary argument would be 
that prior assessment “offers different sorts of evaluative questions than those usually 
considered” (1980, p 21). The cases in point are traditional theories of confirmation that 
consider only the acceptability of finished hypotheses. However, these theories 
completely ignore those epistemological considerations that lead to the development of 
hypotheses from being very abstract to being accurate and precise. In this phase of 
development some hypotheses are discarded on the basis of reasons that are different 																																																								
7 This is another way to put the idea of underdetermination (Duhem 1914; Quine 1951; Skyrms 1966) 
	28	
from the one usually considered by theories of confirmation, and those reasons also 
specify the development of hypotheses that seem to be worth of being developed. Whitt 
(1990) expresses a similar idea by saying that the kind of evaluation provided by the 
pursuit considerations are rather distinct from justificatory reasons. This is because 
reasons for accepting a theory (justification) are epistemic, while reason for pursuing a 
theory might be also pragmatic. Claiming that a theory is promising and it is worth 
developing is quite different to accept a theory, and the criteria of theory choice involved 
appear to be pretty different. Focusing just on two monoliths (discovery and justification) 
may miss all the subtleties of scientific practice (Franklin 1999, p 163). 
 Therefore, from discussions of so-called ‘friends of discovery’ about Hanson’s work 
some important concepts emerge. First, retroductive strategies are not really about 
hypothesis generation, but rather disclose a different kind of evaluative consideration. 
This different type of evaluation is what provides reasons not for accepting a hypothesis, 
but rather reasons for pursuing and developing it. These reasons might be pragmatic or 
evidential. Therefore it seems that in addition to strategies of generation and justification, 
there are also strategies of what have been called prior assessments/weak 
evaluation/theory pursuit. These strategies form an independent phase of scientific 
discovery. The phase is independent from hypothesis generation because during 
generation one does not need to put forth evidence for the plausibility of a hypothesis, 
while it is different from justification, because during the justificatory phase (let us call it 
‘strong evaluation’) reasons for accepting a hypothesis are strictly epistemic. 
 
2.5 Summary  
 
Now we have all the ingredients for my tripartite framework. I have shown in 2.3 that 
hypothesis generation can be conceived as a rational procedure, if we take ‘rational’ as 
encompassing both strict logic and heuristics strategies. Hypothesis generation would be 
a heuristic by providing just a set of possible solutions to a problem and not an optimal 
solution. However I have also shown (2.4) that hypotheses need to be prioritized because 
we cannot put at test all the possible conceivable hypotheses. Moreover, I have 
highlighted that reasons of plausibility might be different from reasons of acceptability. 
Therefore, the minimal account for scientific discovery is a process involving three 
phases: hypotheses generation, priori assessment of hypotheses, and strong evaluation 
(justification) of hypotheses. All the three phases can be subjected to philosophical 
analysis. 
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3. Type of inference in hypothesis generation, prior assessment, 
and justification 
 
So far, I have provided arguments in support of the thesis that, when discovering, a 
scientist might reasonably pass through three phases: hypothesis generation, prior 
assessment and justification. As Nickles notes (1980), there is no magic in number three, 
in the sense that one might distinguish several sub phases depending on the context of 
inquiry. However, a threefold distinction seems to capture a minimal core of phases that a 
scientist, sooner or later, will pass through. However, we should add something to this 
analysis. Provided that there is now a ‘list’ of phases delineating scientific discovery, we 
should start to understand what happens in each phase. The task of this section is to list 
the types of inference occurring within each phase. This list of inference is not intended to 
be exhaustive but it will be useful in the next chapters to identify the type of reasoning 
employed within each phase in both data-driven and ‘traditional’ molecular biology. I 
draw from the Schaffner’s table of inferences in scientific discovery (1993, Chapter 2), 
but some points have to be corrected. Let us consider Table 1. 
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The Popperian family is arguably right in saying that, in the phase of hypothesis 
generation, there are no strict logical inferences pointing to a hypothesis. In most cases, 
analogical reasoning plays a prominent role. Sometimes, in reasoning about a certain 
phenomenon, scientists derive a hypothesis about that phenomenon from an analogous 
case or from a completely different context. For instance Morgan and his colleagues 
thought about chromosomes as strings (and genes as beads on the strings) thereby 
facilitating the reasoning to the hypothesis “that traits with genes together on a single 
chromosome (…) [are] inherited together” (Craver and Darden 2013, p. 71). Lindley 
Darden has provided a rich discussion on the role of analogies in several works (Darden 
1991; 2006). In some cases what fuels hypothesis formation is a leap of genius, or an 
intuition. A good example is Kekule’s hypothesis of the structure of benzene. The ‘ring 
formula’ of benzene was demonstrated (justified) through the accumulation of evidence 
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over many years. The particular way evidence had been combined together in order to 
justify the hypothesis of the cyclic structure of benzene can be understood as the method 
of justification of the hypothesis of the structure of benzene. But the way Kekulé arrived 
to the hypothesis in the first place is quite peculiar. In the winter of 1861-1862 Kekulé 
had a dream of a snake seizing its own tail and, when he woke up, the cyclic structure of 
benzene came up in his mind. Sometimes it is possible to face a situation that is more 
prone to be rationally reconstructed. In particular, it is when a scientific hypothesis is 
derived as a consequence of the status of knowledge of a particular field. Traditional 
molecular biology is a good example of this situation. However, in most cases this 
derivation is done in parallel with intuition and creativity making hypothesis formation a 
particularly nebulous situation. It is also worth to be pointed out that in this phase, while 
generating several hypotheses, one does not need to provide compelling evidence for 
those hypotheses because, as I said, phases of discovery do not subsume justification. As 
suggested by Franklin (1999), how convincing the evidence for a hypothesis should be, 
grows gradually from the first to the last phase of justification. In other words, “[t]he 
evidence that might encourage a scientist to propose a hypothesis may be less convincing 
than that required to further pursue it, which will be, in general, far less convincing than 
that required for (…) justification” (1999, p. 178).  
 In prior assessment/weak evaluation/pursuit one is likely to find out situation that 
can be rationally reconstructed more precisely than those situations of hypotheses 
generation. There are several heuristics or inferences used to weakly evaluate 
hypotheses, to discard blatantly false hypotheses or simply to develop initial hypotheses. 
I have included also Baconian induction even though Bacon clearly thought that his 
method was also able to provide justificatory force, i.e. discovery subsumes justification. 
However, the Baconian method might be seen as a heuristic to discard false hypotheses 
generated in the first phase. The same applies to all varieties of eliminative inferences. 
Another important tool for prior assessment is retroduction. As I have shown above, 
though in Hanson’s logic of discovery retroduction is erroneously considered as a 
hypothesis generation method, this type of inference provides plausible reasons to go 
deeper into a particular hypothesis and hence it can be considered as an inference to be 
pursued.   
 Finally, justifying hypotheses in science means providing more stringent evidence 
that the hypothesis under scrutiny actually holds. In other words, justifying hypotheses 
means looking for observational data or evidence speaking directly in favor of a 
hypothesis. This is the topic of confirmation, i.e. how we might say that a hypothesis is 
confirmed by evidence. The topic of confirmation is not only vast, but it is arguably the 
most debated issue in the philosophy of science. For the sake of this chapter I just say 
that there are many ways of dealing with confirmation. Putting aside famous cases such 
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Hempel pioneering work (1945) or Popper’s falsificationism (2002), there are two big 
families of approaches to confirmation. The first is the hypothetico-deductive method and 
all its varieties (thereby including Popper’s work). The second approach is inductive, and 
it includes all the statistical and Bayesian methods. Therefore, when treating both data-
driven and traditional molecular biology phase of justification, I will look for some of the 
varieties of confirmation methods. 
 
4. Evaluating and valuing 
 
The tripartite distinction seems to capture the minimal account of how discovery is 
pursued. One might then distinguish, within each phase, several sub-phases, but the 
tripartite distinction seems to capture at least conceptually how scientists deal with 
scientific hypotheses. This tripartite distinction is useful because it identifies the phases of 
scientific discovery. Using these tools to analyze discovery strategies means looking for 
these phases in scientific discovery, and to understand how each of these moments is 
pursued. In the previous section, I listed the kind of inferences that can be used in each 
of the three phases. For instance, one might use analogy in hypothesis formation, while 
another might derive a hypothesis from a coherent body of knowledge. Prior assessment 
can be faced by means of an eliminative framework, while another might use retroductive 
inference. Finally, one might face the phase of justification by using of one the 
approaches to confirmation. 
However, something else is missing. I have shown the abstract and conceptual 
temporal phases that lead a hypothesis from being formed to its acceptance. For a 
hypothesis to be accepted, it has first to be generated. One then might say that rarely a 
hypothesis is generated in a complete form and then put to the test of acceptance. 
Accordingly a hypothesis - once it has been generated - should be developed and refined. 
After that, a hypothesis can be finally “accepted,” whatever this means exactly. But 
something else should be clarified. As I said, in the three phases hypotheses are 
evaluated and refined at any stage by means of a certain type of inference (e.g. 
induction, H-D method, abduction, etc). However, it is not still clear, whatever the 
inference used, the criteria establishing whether a hypothesis is a “good” scientific 
hypothesis. In a sense, inferences are just empty boxes, which have to be filled somehow 
with contents. Independently of the type of inference used, some questions must be 
answered: Why should scientists select a set of hypotheses instead of another? According 
to which criteria some hypotheses are worth developing? And in which direction should 
we develop hypotheses? Which are the features of a hypothesis that makes it an 
hypothesis “acceptable”? In other words, my questions are about criteria of theory choice. 
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Therefore we should note that in each phase there are criteria (which I call for now 
epistemic desiderata) that play a pivotal role in orienting research in a direction instead of 
another. But the tradition I will refer to, sees theory choice not as an unambiguous 
procedure embedded in strict rules, but rather as being embedded in a sort of value 
judgment. This is the topic of epistemic values. Although I will go deeper in the issue of 
epistemic values in the last chapter of this work, it is useful to introduce the topic now. 
The plan for this section is to introduce the notion of epistemic values and to show that, 
within each phase, different epistemic values can guide hypothesis generation, prior 
assessment and acceptability. These considerations will form one important part of the 
philosophical tools that inform my analyses of discovery of data-driven and traditional 
molecular biology in chapters 2 and 4. Simply put, in the next chapters – for both data-
driven and ‘traditional’ molecular biology – I will see what happens in their discovery 
processes by tracking generation, prior assessment and acceptance and the epistemic 
desiderata orienting these phases. But, first, let us introduce the issue of epistemic 
values. 
By borrowing a distinction from McMullin (1983), I distinguish evaluating and 
valuing. When we evaluate a hypothesis, we investigate whether a hypothesis satisfies 
certain criteria, e.g. whether it is empirically accurate or it is consistent with the corpus of 
certain disciplines etc.  Yet, we can also evaluate a certain methodology, by analyzing if 
that kind of methodology is able to develop a hypothesis in a direction that would satisfy 
certain criteria. Unlike evaluation, when we value we do not try to understand whether a 
hypothesis satisfies certain criteria, but rather we discuss the criteria themselves. As 
already mentioned, these criteria are called epistemic values.  
An epistemic value is an epistemic desideratum. It is ‘epistemic’ because it is likely 
to promote those characters of science that make it the type of knowledge usually seen 
as “the most secure knowledge available to us of the world we seek to understand” 
(McMullin 1983, p. 18). It is a ‘desideratum’ because it is something one believes will help 
to achieve that kind of knowledge, if adequately pursued. McMullin’s iconoclastic paper 
(1983) aims to show that theory appraisal is a procedure much closer to value judgement 
than to some rule-governed type of inference. McMullin does not mean ‘value judgement’ 
in any ethical or moral sense. Although it is now uncontroversial that ethical values can 
play a role – even an epistemic role (Douglas 2000) – in theory choice, McMullin’s thesis 
should be understood in a different sense. McMullin means exactly what Kuhn means by 
‘value judgement’ in his famous Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice (1977) 
when he says “the criteria of [theory] choice function not as rules, which determine 
choice, but as values which influence it”  (1977, p. 331). Therefore value judgement is to 
be understood not as an unambiguous procedure to determine which choice is the best, 
but as a propensity - which origin is difficult to be determined or to track down – to 
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consider a characteristic of an entity to be desirable for an entity of that kind. And the 
judgement of ‘value-judgement’ involves not the evaluation of how much a particular 
entity epitomize that value, but mainly how much we value that characteristic in that 
particular entity.  
There are many epistemic values. For the moment I will draw on Kuhn’s analysis, 
which is focused on traditional epistemic values. I will look for these traditional epistemic 
values within data-driven and traditional molecular biology in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Kuhn  (1977) makes a list of the characteristic values of a good scientific theory. 
He mentions five desiderata for a scientific theory that are quite uncontroversial: 
1. Predictive accuracy, i.e. how accurate predictions our theory/hypothesis is 
2. Internal coherence, i.e. whether a theory is hang together properly, without logical 
inconsistencies  
3. External consistency, i.e. whether a theory is consistent with other relevant 
theories. A good case in point is the steady-state cosmology that violated the 
important principle of conservation of energy 
4. Unifying power, i.e. the ability to bring together multiple areas of inquiry 
5. Fertility, i.e. the ability of a theory to make novel predictions not previously part of 
the original agenda 
 
Of course there can be many other desiderata8, but the point here is that, according to 
both Kuhn and to McMullin, the assessment of theories/hypotheses involves value-
judgement. This type of judgement is somehow essential, because value-judgement 
involves an appraisal of the kind of desiderata that we ascribe to a scientific theory. But 
one might say that, for example, whether a particular theory is fertile or it has internal 
coherence is not a matter of valuing, but rather of evaluation. However, valuing enters in 
the game because scientists “may not attach the same relative weights to different 
characteristic values of theory, that is they may not value the characteristics in the same 
way” (McMullin 1983, p. 16). A classic example in the history of science is the 
disagreement between Bohr and Einstein on the acceptability of quantum theory. Einstein 
negatively evaluated quantum theory because it lacked consistency and coherence with 
the rest of physics, while Bohr played down the importance of consistency, arguing that 
predictive success was more important as a criterion for theory choice. Clearly the two 
evaluations of quantum theory employed radically different epistemic values on what 
possibly constitutes a good theory. 
 While there might be criteria to evaluate whether a scientific hypothesis ‘embodies’ 
a specific desideratum, sometimes there can be disagreement on how we value a specific 
desideratum. Before we evaluate a desideratum, we should say whether we value a 																																																								
8 McMullin mentions also simplicity, but he also recognizes how problematic this desideratum might be 
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desideratum. Exactly this idea of valuing can provide the answer to the questions above 
mentioned. As a remainder these questions are: 
• Why should scientists select a set of hypotheses instead of another?  
• According to which criteria some hypotheses are worth to be developed? And in 
which direction should we develop hypotheses?  
• Which are the features of a hypothesis that makes it an acceptable hypothesis? 
 
Therefore in the tripartite distinction we should include also value judgement: 
 
1. When we generate hypotheses by means of, e.g., background assumptions, we 
should motivate the desiderata leading to what we think is an optimal set of initial 
hypotheses 
2. When we decide to develop some hypotheses, we should say which are the 
desiderata we value that establish which hypotheses are worth to be developed. 
Moreover, we should also establish the desiderata that orient in a direction or 
another the hypotheses themselves 
3. Finally, when we accept a hypothesis as a good scientific hypothesis, we should 
say according to which criteria hypotheses are good scientific hypotheses 
 
As a consequence, value-judgement is not just a matter of hypothesis acceptance, but it 
permeates the whole scientific process of hypothesis formation and prior assessment. 
Value-judgement lies at all levels: From choosing the set of background assumptions to 
generate hypotheses, to the choice of the experimental setting, to the final hypothesis 
acceptance. While the controversy motivating this dissertation is focused mainly on 
methodologies - as if the choice of methodologies could be decided in an unambiguous 
way - in this thesis I shall consider also how the structure of value-judgement informs 
this kind of controversies. 
 Therefore in the following chapters I will analyze not only the structure of the 
three phases of discovery in data-driven and traditional molecular biology. I will also 
identify the (traditional) epistemic values behind those enterprises in order to understand 
whether the controversy motivating the present work is about the evaluation of epistemic 
values or the valuing of those values.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have drawn from the debate on discovery versus justification the 
philosophical tools to infer the discovery strategies of data-driven biology. I have 
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evaluated the debate on discovery/justification by dividing the positions in two big 
families, according to the attitude towards the process of discovering and developing 
hypotheses. The Popperian family is undermined by its tendency to look at hypotheses 
merely in their final form, thereby missing those scientific procedures and heuristics 
leading to the formation of hypotheses. The second family – the ‘friends of discovery’ – 
provides a richer picture of how scientists deal with hypotheses. In particular, they 
provide arguments on why we should distinguish at least two sub phases in the phase of 
hypothesis discovery. Merging virtues of both families, I have come out with a tripartite 
picture of how scientists deal with hypotheses: hypothesis generation, hypothesis 
development, and hypothesis justification. However, this picture seems too abstract, for 
at least one reason. Both families completely avoid explaining the criteria establishing the 
desiderata for a hypothesis to be worth developing, or the features that a hypothesis 
should have in order to be considered an acceptable hypothesis. I have then introduced 
the topic of epistemic values in order to say that value-judgment rather than some sort of 
inference establishes the criteria used to develop in a direction or to accept hypotheses. 
For instance one might employ a Bayesian-like framework, and saying that if a hypothesis 
has a certain prior probability then it is worth of being developed and if, after adding new 
evidence, a hypothesis reaches a certain amount of probability then it can suggest a 
‘justified belief’. However, what kind of evidence should we use here? In the case of Bohr 
versus Einstein, how do we weight the evidence of external consistency and the evidence 
of predictive accuracy? Analyzing these issues by means of epistemic values can make 
sense of the type of evidence that we value in scientific reasoning. Therefore, in the next 
chapters I shall analyze data-driven biology and traditional molecular biology by trying to 
identify in their strategies hypothesis generation, prior assessment and acceptance. I 
shall look for the kind of inference used in each phase. But I will complement this analysis 
by trying to identify the epistemic desiderata that are valued within each phase. Only by 
looking both at the inferential level and at the level of (epistemic) value-judgment can we 
accumulate enough material to compare data-driven and ‘traditional’ molecular biology.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DATA-DRIVEN APPROACHES TO MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
In this chapter, I discuss the logic of discovery of data-driven biology. I identify the 
phases of the tripartite framework of Chapter 1 in typical data-driven screenings. These 
include genome-wide association studies and cancer genomics screenings. In particular, I 
highlight the role of background assumptions in hypothesis generation and the eliminative 
inference structure of the phase of hypothesis development. Finally, I identify the 
epistemic values embedded by these studies within each phase of discovery. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the first chapter, I critically reviewed the debate on the distinction between discovery 
and justification in order to make sense of scientific discovery and how it might be 
structured. The result is a set of orienteering tools useful to analyze both data-driven and 
traditional molecular biology. According to the philosophical tools elaborated in the 
previous chapter, scientific discovery is composed of three phases (hypothesis 
generation, prior assessment, and justification), each pursued with a specific inference 
(see Table 1, chapter 1) and guided by one or more epistemic values. In this chapter I 
analyze data-driven approaches to molecular biology by looking for the three phases and 
the type of inference used and by identifying the epistemic value(s) guiding each phase. 
In this analysis I also note that biological databases play a prominent role. Therefore in 
the second part of this chapter I discriminate two uses of biological databases in 
contemporary biology and I discuss their epistemic significance in detail. 
 But before starting my analysis on data-driven biology, I will recall what I have 
already said about data-driven molecular biology in the introduction to this work. 
Moreover, I shall specify also the types of case studies I consider as paradigmatic 
instances of data-driven molecular biology. 
 
1.1 Data-driven molecular biology 
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What is a ‘data-driven approach’? An approach is data-driven – as opposed to hypothesis-
driven – if it designs an experiment merely to generate relevant data rather than to 
obtain a specific effect in order to test (directly) a specific causal claim. In particular, 
data-driven projects aim to generate specific hypotheses. Biologists like Eddy (2013) or 
Weinberg (2010) think that molecular biology is mainly a matter of testing claims, while 
data-driven supporters start from data to derive hypotheses, rather than starting from 
hypotheses and then going consequently to data as in the standard H-D framework. As 
we will see, in data-driven biology data are relevant to a corpus of background 
assumptions, while in hypothesis-driven biology data are relevant only to a specific and 
narrow claim, though the specific claim involves also other auxiliary statements.  
As paradigmatic examples of data-driven biology I will employ two classes of 
contemporary cutting-edge studies widely used in contemporary biology: Genome-wide 
association studies (GWASs) and Cancer Genomics screenings. The reason to choose 
GWAS and cancer genomics lies in the fact that these two enterprises have become 
possible only through the development of technologies post Human Genome Project and, 
as a consequence, they share many of the features usually attributed to big data. Both 
generate astonishingly vast data sets, both are supposed to exemplify a ‘hypothesis-free’ 
way of doing science (Garraway and Lander, 2013; Vogelstein et al, 2013; Brookfield, 
2010; Cortes and Brown, 2011; Guessous et al, 2011; Gorlov et al 2009; Yeo, 2011) and 
both make extensive use of maps as essential part of their heuristic discovery strategies.  
 
1.1.1 Cancer Genomics 
 
Cancer genomics is essentially the molecular study of cancer with a massive use of 
sequencing technologies. Several molecular studies starting from the mid 1970s showed 
that cancer “is the result of the activation, by modification or over-expression, of a 
highly-conserved family of oncogenes” (Morange 1998, p 219). The idea that genes 
regulating basic functions of cells when mutated might lead to cancer is known as the 
oncogene paradigm9. I will develop this idea in the next chapter, since it forms the core of 
the paradigmatic example of ‘traditional’ molecular biology as Weinberg means it: 
Molecular oncology. Therefore from the mid 1970s biologists were mainly involved in 
discovering cancer genes, using a piecemeal approach by trying and testing guesses 
about genes. Biologists are still looking for cancer genes, but the approach has slightly 
changed. 
																																																								
9 A distinction has been developed between oncogene and tumour suppressor gene. The former is a gene that, 
when activated by a mutation, increases the selective growth advantage of a cell, while the latter is a gene that, 
when inactivated by a mutation, increases selective growth advantage of the cell 
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In a famous commentary, the leading scientist Dulbecco (1986) says that evidence 
shows that cancer is somehow linked to some “viral genes”. This is the prototypical idea 
of ‘cancer gene’ or ‘driver gene’ that is, a gene containing mutations which confer “a 
selective growth advantage” (Vogelstein et al 2013, p. 1549) to the cell. However, as 
Dulbecco emphasizes, a piecemeal approach to discovering cancer genes would be less 
effective than a more comprehensive one. Having a higher system-level view of all the 
genes in a cancer genome would be of some help in discovering ‘driver’ genes. This 
became possible some years after the Human Genome Project, with the development of 
massively parallel sequencing leading to the sequencing of several exomes10 and, in 
2008, the first whole cancer genome (Ley et al. 2008). Cancer genomics, by employing 
massive parallel sequencing, is the systematic study of the cancer genome. Its aim is to 
identify genomic loci of derangement that could possibly lead the development of cancer. 
As Vogelstein and colleagues say, to appreciate this concept  
 
“One must take the 30,000-foot view. A jungle might look chaotic at ground level, but aerial view 
shows a clear order, with all the animals gathering at the streams at certain points in the day, and 
all the streams converging at a river. There is order in cancer, too” (Vogelstein et al 2013, p. 
1554).  
 
Exactly as Dulbecco imagined, cancer genomics aims to have a systematic view of all 
mutated genes (and all the mutations) of a cancer genome. Through a systematic view, it 
tries to discover the driver genes and their driver mutations11 and to elucidate the 
mechanisms12 that trigger cancer development. In this sense, cancer genomics is not so 
different from traditional molecular studies of cancer. It has one advantage: instead of 
the problematic piecemeal approach emphasized by Dulbecco, it has developed the 
technology to obtain a comprehensive picture of the mutated genes, and hence it can 
discriminate more easily which genes to focus on. By ‘comprehensive’ picture I mean 
some kind of representation of all genes of a genome. While with the piecemeal approach 
we select some genes as being of potential interests for opaque reasons (e.g. a gene not 
investigated in the literature, an intuition, etc) with the ‘comprehensive approach’ we do 
select some genes because of statistical reasons. 
As an instance of big science, cancer genomics is frequently organized in big 
consortia. The most famous consortia of cancer genomics are The International Cancer 
Genome Consortium (Hudson et al., 2010) and The Cancer Genome Atlas (Garraway and 																																																								
10 The exome is the set of the exons of a genome 
11 As Vogelstein and colleagues note > 99.9% of the alterations are simply passenger changes, and they do not 
increase the growth advantage of a cell 
12  Cancer genomics also deals with massive genomic rearrangements such as chromotripsis or kataegis. 
However, while these phenomena have been identified, it is not yet clear which are the mechanisms that can 
possibly explain them. See in particular the case of chromothripsis (Korbel and Campbell, 2013) 
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Lander 2013;). In this dissertation I shall focus on The Cancer Genome Atlas (TCGA). 
These projects are ‘big science’ projects because, taking whole genome/exome 
sequencing as their hallmarks, they tend to sequence as many genomes/exomes as they 
can. The reason for doing that is statistical. Theoretically, since driver mutations confer a 
growth advantage to cancer cells, they should be positively selected. If mutations are 
positively selected, then they should be detected more often than passenger mutations. 
Therefore, the more the sample size of sequenced cancer sample grows, the more it is 
likely to detect mutations that are statistically significant  - though it increases the 
possibility of false positives too.  
The brief history of cancer genomics has some important successful stories of 
mutations becoming statistically significant as soon as the sample size has been 
increased, and being successfully linked to genes or processes that were not at all 
associated to cancer. A good example is a mutation in IDH1 (Ledford 2010). This gene is 
involved in cell metabolism, a process which was not associated to cancer. However, “as 
efforts to sequence tumour DNA expanded, the IDH1 mutation surfaced again: in 12% of 
samples of a type of brain cancer called glioblastoma multiforme, then in 8% of acute 
myeloid leukaemia sample” (Ledford 2010, p 972). This type of discovery is possible only 
because data sets are big, since smaller data sets would be unable to show a robust 
regularity. Although scientists might be lucky and with a piecemeal approach they may 
discover all the cancer genes, methodologically big numbers do make a difference. It is 
also important to note that projects like TCGA might be seen also as a type of leading 
wedge. In the case of TCGA, this project clearly fuelled a massive development of 
sequencing technologies, with the consequence of price dropping for these expensive 
techniques13. 
To conclude this brief section, let us now give some facts about the consortium 
where I shall take my main case studies for cancer genomics, namely TCGA14 (Giordano 
2014). TCGA is a joint effort of the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National 
Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI). The project aims to map the genomic 
changes in over 30 types of human cancer. By January TCGA had generated something 
like 1 petabyte of data about somatic mutations and structural variations from almost 
10,000 cancer samples. In the next sections, I will scrutinize publications from TCGA. I 
will not show any particular preference for some of the laboratories involved in the TCGA, 
since almost all the studies of this consortium have the same structure, unveiling a strict 
and rigid structure of discovery. 
																																																								
13 HGP had an overall cost of 2 billions dollars, while as at 2014 sequencing a genome costs few thousand 
dollars 
14 http://cancergenome.nih.gov/pdfs/TCGA_DataPortal_Brochure_2014 
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1.1.2 Genome-wide association studies 
 
Genome-wide association studies (GWASs) fall under the category of epidemiological 
studies. GWASs have been defined by the National Institute of Health as “any studies of 
common genetic variation across the entire human genome designed to identify genetic 
associations with observable traits” (Manolio and Collins 2009, p 444). They scan markers 
across the entire genome of many individuals in order to find variants associated to a 
particular phenotype. In particular it is a type of epidemiological study that associates 
variants present in at least 1% of the population (named single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms, SNPs) to complex traits like common or chronic diseases (certain 
cancers, diabetes, hypertension, etc). The type of design of GWAS I shall consider here is 
the classical case-control design. Simply put, a group of individuals with a particular 
disease is compared to another group of individuals whose features are similar to the 
individuals of the first group, but they lack the disease. Individuals of the two groups are 
compared with respect to the presence of certain variants, namely SNPs. The goal is to 
see whether there is a significant difference in the allele frequency of certain SNPs within 
the two groups. To successfully associate some SNPs to a phenotype two conditions must 
be met: 
1. The allele frequency of those SNPs should be above a certain threshold in the 
group with the disease  
2. The allele frequency of those SNPs should be below in the control group  
 
Though conceptually a GWAS is quite simple, technically speaking, it is a rather complex 
affair. 
SNPs are scanned across all the regions of the genome. As of October 2014, 
dbSNP (the main database of SNPs) contain a total of 112 million of SNPs15. Hence in any 
GWAS epidemiologists look for all these SNPs, and then they compare the allele 
frequency of the two groups. Groups might be large, involving thousands of people. 
Therefore, it is easy to understand why these studies are instances of “big science”: we 
have thousands of individuals examined for millions of single nucleotide variations. 
GWASs are facilitated by the existence of certain big maps such as the HapMap 
Project16. It is the rule (as I will show also for cancer genomics) that maps facilitate data-
driven screenings. A project called HapMap is of great help for GWAS. HapMap is an 
international project designed to provide a map of human genetic variation. As it is clearly 
stated in the overview of the project, the genome of any two people is 99.5% identical. 																																																								
15 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/mailman/pipermail/dbsnp-announce/2014q4/000147.html 
16 http://www.genome.gov/10001688	
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However, in the remaining 0.5% there are variations that might strongly impact disease 
development or drug response. Among these variations, there are SNPs. Due to the 
principle of linkage disequilibrium17, closer SNPs are inherited in block, and they are more 
likely to be detected together. Patterns of SNPs on a block are called haplotypes. HapMap 
delivers exactly a map of haplotype. Therefore anytime one find a tag SNP one might 
infer the existence of other SNPs. 
The first GWAS dates back to 2005 (Haines et al 2005) although the first big 
GWAS was published in 2007 by the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium. This was a 
study including 14,000 patients of different common diseases plus 3,000 shared control. 
As of 2013, almost 2,000 GWAS have been published.  
 
2. DATA-DRIVEN BIOLOGY 
 
In this section I reconstruct the structure of data-driven biology according to the tripartite 
structure I have identified in the previous chapter. Some parts of this chapter are 
available also in Ratti (2015). First, I show the kind of inference used within each phase 
of scientific discovery of data-driven biology. I provide a great deal of detail about the 
discovery strategies of both GWASs and cancer genomics. Next, I identify epistemic 
values playing a key role within each phase of discovery. 
 
2.1 The tripartite framework embedded in data-driven biology 
 
In my interpretation of the practices of contemporary biology, data-driven molecular 
biology fits particularly well in the tripartite framework proposed in the first chapter. More 
specifically, data-driven biology is composed of three discernible phases: 
 
a) Formulation of a set of competing hypotheses  
b) Elimination of false (or less probable) hypotheses, and development of more 
probable hypotheses 
c) Test (validation) of hypotheses not eliminated in phase (b) 
 
(a) and (b) bear resemblances to the ‘eliminative inductive’ framework (Norton 1995; 
Earman 1992; Kitcher 1993). My claim is that the first two phases of data-driven biology 
(namely hypothesis generation and prior assessment) are guided by a special kind of 																																																								
17 Linkage disequilibrium is the “is the nonrandom association between alleles at different loci. (…) Generally, 
loci that are physically close together exhibit stronger LD than loci that are farther apart on a chromosome” 
(Visscher et al 2012, p. 8). 
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eliminative induction called ‘eliminative inference’. This might sound strange, since 
eliminative induction is taken to provide also the necessary justificatory weight, thereby 
spanning the three phases. It has been argued that sometime eliminative inferences 
cannot properly establish the acceptability of a hypothesis (Forber 2011). Nonetheless, 
eliminative inferences provide a sort of evaluative criterion, though weaker than theory 
choice. Therefore, it seems that eliminative inferences might play also the role of theory 
pursuit, and not always the role of theory choice. However this argument should be 
discussed a little bit more. Hence before entering into the detail of data-driven practices, 
I would like to spend a few words on eliminative induction. 
 
2.1.1 Eliminative inferences 
 
Eliminative induction is a strange creature in the history of philosophy. In contemporary 
debates, it is also known as ‘induction by means of deduction’ (Hawthorne 1993), 
‘eliminative inference’ (Forber 2011), or ‘strong inference’ (Platt 1964). An early example 
of eliminative inferences might be found in Bacon and his methodology, based on the 
comparison of the table of presences, absences and degrees. Another famous example is 
the set of methods elaborated by Mill such as the method of agreement, the method of 
difference, the joint method of agreement and difference, the method of residues and the 
method of concomitant variation. All these methods start with a list of candidates for 
potential causes producing a certain phenomenon, and they all proceed by eliminating 
some of them. Finally, whatever remains is taken to be the true cause. Let us see first a 
standard picture of eliminative inferences. 
 One builds a space of hypotheses/theories/possibilities about a certain state of 
affairs by means of a set of background assumptions or premises. Then one uses 
observation/evidence to eliminate all the hypotheses in that space but one. It is the 
Holmesian way to truth namely that “when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever 
remains, however improbable, must be the truth”. As already emphasized, in the 
standard picture the eliminative step provides not only the evidence for the falsity of 
some hypotheses, but also the necessary justificatory weight for the remained hypothesis 
to be accepted. In other words, eliminative inferences guide theory choice. Depending on 
the author, each phase is carried out in a particular way. Earman (1992) and Norton 
(1995) think that the space of possibilities is built by taking into consideration the local 
features of the community of practising scientists, while according to Kitcher (1993) the 
set of hypotheses depends on the practices of the individual scientist. Earman (1992) and 
Norton (1995) accept both inductive and deductive procedures in the elimination step 
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while Kitcher (1993) opts in favour of a purely deductive elimination. However, some 
issues challenge the standard picture. 
 First, it is not entirely clear in which sense eliminative induction is “inductive.” To 
be inductive, sometimes it is said that an inference should be ampliative. However, it is 
not clear how eliminative induction is ampliative. One might say that the conclusion of 
eliminative induction goes beyond observation, because assumptions plus observation 
entails the conclusion. However, it is possible to put the eliminative argument in a pure 
deductive form, with assumptions forming one premise and observation forming the other 
one. I prefer to use the label ‘eliminative inference’ (Forber 2011) instead of eliminative 
induction because it is more neutral with respect to the supposed inductive nature of 
eliminative induction.  
 A second concern is the problem of unconceived alternatives (Stanford 2006). To 
put it simply, if serious hypotheses “are left out of the constructed possibility space, then 
eliminative inferences may produce misleading or mistaken theory choice” (Forber 2011, 
p 189). There is no clear solution for the issue of unconceived alternatives but as I will 
show, in some cases data-driven biology can avoid this problem. Related to this issue, 
there is the challenge that some tasks have an infinite number of hypotheses, such as 
determining the exact value of a physical constant. Forber proposes a pragmatic solution 
to this by claiming that “the infinite number problem can be overcome by imposing a 
finite partition on possibility space” (2011, pp 188-189). 
 On the side of the eliminative step, there are problems too. The first is testing 
holism (Duhem 1954). The idea is that no hypothesis alone can make contact with 
observations, in the sense that one needs a whole body background theory to confront 
theory with data. Since the network of statements embedded in a theory is vast, any 
conflict between theory and data might be reconciled by changing some elements in the 
network. However, this is not just a problem of eliminative inferences, but of any 
assessment of evidence and, to date, it has no clear solution. 
 Another problem – in my opinion the most important for the present work – is that 
evidence in science rarely produces tout court elimination. Often, evidence is of a 
probabilistic nature. Forber (2011) says that perhaps eliminative inferences do not 
directly establish theory choice, but rather they establish the boundaries for such a 
choice. In Holmesian terms, we might say that eliminative inferences do not identify the 
murderer, but rather a list of highly potential suspects for the murder. It also establishes 
that, in the initial list of suspects, some of them are likely to be innocent.  
This consideration fits very well with the tripartite framework of the first chapter. 
By various means we generate a universe of hypotheses and with the help of eliminative 
inferences we eliminate hypotheses that are very likely to be false, and we end up with a 
final set of hypotheses, that have to be strongly evaluated or corroborated by other 
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means. Therefore, if eliminative inference frames theory choice by providing a set of good 
candidates, and if theory pursuit/prior assessment/weak evaluation establishes which 
hypotheses are worth developing, then eliminative inferences are a type of theory 
pursuit/prior assessment/weak evaluation. Forber says that elimination becomes then 
part of the construction of the possibility space, rather than evaluation of evidence. In a 
sense, this is compatible with my perspective. Since for Forber evaluation of evidence is 
part of the justificatory phase, elimination is not part of this context, but of another one: 
The context of discovery, where we generate a final and complete set of hypotheses to be 
strongly evaluated.  
 In what follows, I shall apply to data-driven biology a version of eliminative 
inferences that is compatible with Forber’s perspective, namely that it is better to frame 
eliminative inferences as a process of prioritization of theories and hypotheses rather than 
theory choice. ‘Prioritization’ implies exactly the idea of an additional procedure aimed at 
providing more stringent evidence (or evidence of another kind) for what has been 
prioritized. Therefore, one might frame eliminative inferences embedded in the tripartite 
framework of the first chapter phases as follows: 
 
(a) The generation of a preliminary set of hypotheses from an established set of 
premises  
(b) The prioritization of some hypotheses and the elimination of others by means of 
other premises and new evidence  
(c) The search for more stringent evidence for prioritized hypotheses 
 
Let us now start to situate data-driven biology into this framework. In data-driven 
biology, hypotheses are usually conjectures about entities or activities that might causally 
contribute to the production of a phenomenon. The idea is that each entity can be 
thought of as being one cause (among many) that can contribute to the development and 
maintenance of a biological system. However, most of the phenomena investigated are 
produced by the interplay of several entities. Therefore in the initial universe of 
hypotheses there will be more than one true hypothesis. Premises take the form of 
‘background assumptions’ in providing valuable guidelines to build the initial set of 
hypotheses. Hypotheses prioritized in phase (b) should be validated in phase (c), in the 
sense that the way entities causally contribute to the phenomenon of interest should be 
clearly identified. The causal role of entities into the phenomenon of interest is framed in 
terms of the contribution of entities to the production of the phenomenon of interest.   
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2.1.2 Hypothesis generation  
 
Let us start with phase (a), namely hypotheses generation. In this phase background 
assumptions (or, as Norton calls them, ‘set of premises’) identify a set (a universe) of 
competing hypotheses extracted from a data set. Hypotheses are about the causal 
contribution of entities to the production or maintenance of phenomena.   
The first point to note is that phase (a) is not a hypothesis-free step. The 
impossibility of a completely ‘hypothesis-free’ scientific research is vastly acknowledged in 
the philosophy of science literature both in recent and less recent times (Hempel 1966; 
Popper 2002; Rheinberger 2011; Leonelli 2012b; Chapter 1 above). The general idea is 
that data cannot be gathered without the guidance of antecedent hypotheses because 
one would have no basis to identify relevant data without at least preliminary guidelines. 
Therefore data-driven research must make use of hypotheses of various kinds. This 
minimal requirement is inescapable. I will call these ‘tentative hypotheses’ background 
assumptions. 
Indeed, any data-driven research has certain background assumptions. However, 
these background assumptions play a weaker role than hypotheses or theories play in, for 
example, the standard hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method. In order to explain what I 
mean, I introduce the distinction (suggested in the context of the literature on 
exploratory experiments) between theory-driven and theory-informed. According to 
Waters (2007), an experiment is theory-driven (or hypothesis-driven) when 
theories/hypotheses influence the experimental design in order to answer to a specific 
question, like the test of theories or hypotheses themselves. Differently, an experiment is 
theory-informed when theories or hypotheses do not provide specific expectations or 
anticipations of the results that will be achieved, and experimental designs are not set up 
in order to generate a specific effect. ‘Theory-informed’ experiments are used not to test 
a pre-existing theory. Rather, the role of theories/hypotheses is to provide guidelines and 
suggest strategies aimed at generating significant findings about a phenomenon when a 
pre-defined theory is absent. Phase (a) in data-driven biology is theory-informed but not 
theory-driven. Background assumptions, by providing loose guidelines, define which data 
are relevant and which are not. In data-driven biology, background assumptions are not 
qualified to ‘test’ themselves (as experiments in H-D are designed to test the initial 
hypothesis), but rather data-driven biology makes use of the assumptions without 
questioning them. By providing guidelines to select relevant data, background 
assumptions also specify the kind of hypotheses that will compose the universe of 
hypotheses to be narrowed by eliminative inferences. Let us see how. 
GWASs make use of important background assumptions (Kitsios and Zintzaras 
2009). The first and foremost important assumption of a GWAS is the ‘common disease 
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common variant’ assumption. Simply stated, the assumption holds that common variants 
likely to cause a certain disease are to be found in most of the human populations that 
manifest the disease. This assumption is related to another one: Single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) are responsible genetic variants of diseases (or, at least, proxies 
to causal variants). As previously explained, SNPs are single nucleotide variants whose 
alleles are present in at least 1% of the population. In other words these two assumptions 
suggest precisely which facts a GWAS should be interested in in the first instance. The 
first assumption says that genetic variants are implicated somehow in a disease, and we 
should investigate them. The second assumption says that, among the types of 
variations, one should be interested in SNPs, and not in other types of variants. These 
two assumptions make GWASs theory-informed, in the sense that they supply an 
important background to select relevant data. However, by distinguishing relevant from 
non-relevant data, these background assumptions also draw the boundaries of a (finite) 
universe of competing hypotheses: All the SNPs might be, potentially, responsible for the 
disease. This means that researchers hypothesize that all the initial detected SNPs can be 
causal variants. In other words by using a SNPs array the initial universe of hypotheses of 
a GWAS is composed by millions of hypotheses (i.e. by millions of SNPs).  
The problem of unconceived alternatives here is an issue. As a matter of fact, 
SNPs are identified in a screening because there are other studies (such as HapMap) 
identifying a certain variant as a SNP. The problem is that once we do a screening we 
cannot know a priori whether we have detected all the SNPs, and hence whether we are 
missing some important variants that have an effect on the phenotype of interest. On the 
other hand, the problem of the infinite alternatives is not a concern: However high the 
number of SNPs detected might be, there is nonetheless a finite number of SNPs. 
Cancer genomics has background assumptions too. The first assumption is that 
cancer is a phenotype driven by mutations that accumulate in the genome through the 
entire life of an individual. Therefore, cancer genomics is interested in somatic (acquired) 
mutations, and not in germline mutations18. However cancer genomics is interested only 
in a subset of somatic mutations. These are the so-called driver mutations, i.e. mutations 
that drive cancer development in the first place, by providing selective advantages to the 
cells carrying them. This implies that cancer genomics will look for driver mutations within 
the set of relevant facts, i.e. somatic mutations. Although the interest in somatic 
mutations is clearly theory-informed, this assumption says nothing about which somatic 
mutations in a cancer sample will be driver or not. As in the case of GWASs, the 
background assumptions merely specify the space of hypothetical solutions to the 																																																								
18 This is an assumption of consortia (e.g. The Cancer Genome Atlas) in cancer genomics. However, other studies 
of molecular oncology might be interested in inherited mutations (e.g. studies in the famous heritable 
retinoblastoma), and not the ones acquired through individual’s life 
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particular scientific problem at hand, but they do not say which of the possible solutions is 
the right one. The initial (somatic) mutations detected, as in the case of SNPs in GWASs, 
represent the universe of hypotheses that will be narrowed by eliminative inferences. 
In the case of cancer genomics the issue of infinite alternatives is not harmful. As 
in the case of GWASs, however big is the set of somatic mutations, this would be 
nonetheless finite. Concerning the problem of unconceived alternatives the situation is 
more complicated. In principle, since we compare cancer samples either with a normal 
sample or with the Reference Genome, we should be able to detect all the mutations. 
However, in practice this might not happen. It can be the case that, for instance, we do 
not know that in the normal sample there is a somatic mutation that alone is not able to 
trigger cancer development, but that it has some effects in the phenotype. In this case, 
by comparing it to cancer sample (assuming that in the cancer sample there is the same 
mutation), we would miss that mutation because it would not count at all as a mutation. 
 A final comment is in order. What kind of inference is used in the hypothesis 
generation phase of data-driven biology? Unlike other biological disciplines, in data-driven 
biology the role of both analogical reasoning and intuition is particularly limited. In data-
driven biology hypotheses are neither generated by means of drawing analogies from 
neighbour fields nor there is place for intuitions or leaps of genius. Given the highly 
regimented nature of the construction of the initial universe of hypotheses, in data-driven 
biology we might say that hypotheses are somehow derived mostly by background 
assumptions. As I have shown, in GWASs or cancer genomics we generate hypotheses 
that are consistent with a corpus of knowledge about the nature of SNPs or somatic 
mutations. The role of background assumptions is then complemented with actual as 
observation of samples, in the sense that we generate hypotheses about variations if and 
only if we detect those variations. 
 
2.1.3 Eliminating and developing hypotheses  
 
In the second phase, eliminative inferences are used to narrow the finite universe of 
hypotheses (i.e. to eliminate false or less probable hypotheses). Hypotheses that are not 
eliminated by eliminative inferences are then developed. 
 
 2.1.3.1 Eliminating hypotheses 
 
In the previous section I explained that background assumptions in GWASs establish an 
initial universe of entities that may be responsible for a particular phenotype (the initial 
millions of SNPs). However, any epidemiologist knows that most of the SNPs cannot be 
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responsible for the phenotype. Hence, practitioners make use of a set of criteria and 
observations to eliminate SNPs that are not causal variants. Let us see which criteria are 
used. In a typical GWAS a group of individuals with the phenotype of interest is compared 
to another sample of individuals. The individuals of the second group are similar to the 
individuals of the first group, but they lack the phenotype of interest (e.g. diabetes). The 
core of the procedure is to see whether there is a significant difference between the two 
groups in the allele frequency for each SNP. When I say ‘significant’ I mean that it has to 
be higher than a particular threshold, called ‘significance level 19 ’. If the proportion 
between the frequencies in the two groups of a particular allele of a SNP exceeds the 
significance level in favour of the group with the phenotype of interest, then the variation 
is taken to be associated to the disease. Thus, elimination of SNPs is done by means of 
the ‘significance level’ plus the actual observation of the two groups of samples. 
I should stress an important point about elimination in GWASs. As I said, a SNP is 
correctly associated with the disease if the proportion of the frequency of a variation 
exceeds a significance level x. If a SNP (a hypothesis of the universe of hypotheses) does 
not do that, then it is discarded. But GWASs are local, meaning that results are very 
sensitive as to how the experiment is designed. In particular, sample size tremendously 
affects results. For instance, a SNP might not be associated to a phenotype x in a study 
with a sample size z, but it can be associated to x in a study with a bigger sample size. 
This means that the argument for eliminating entities from a universe of hypotheses is 
contextual to the particular data set considered. Therefore SNPs are discarded only in a 
probabilistic sense: If the proportion of a variation of a SNP does not exceed the 
significance level, then it has a lower probability of being causally relevant to the disease, 
and it is discarded from the universe of hypotheses. But the study, due to experimental 
design, might be wrong. This is why SNPs are not eliminated tout court. Rather they are 
not prioritized in a particular study with a particular data set. This is one of the limitations 
of eliminative inferences, namely that evidence is always statistical and it cannot provide 
sufficient evidence for accepting a hypothesis as well sufficient evidence to discard one. 
On the side of accepting a hypothesis, much more is required. 
 This preliminary statistical analysis could not be sufficient to eliminate spurious 
associations. Therefore, the first statistical analysis is complemented with other two kinds 
of statistical analyses. First, there is the so-called ‘technical derivation’. This is the re-
analysis of a GWAS samples using another platform. This, in principle, should purify the 
previous eliminative phase from technical errors that might lead to spurious associations. 
After this step, GWASs come out with a universe of selected hypotheses that has to be 
narrowed promptly in the so-called ‘replication’ (Hunter et al. 2008). In the replication 																																																								
19How to choose the significance level is a matter of debate and usually it varies according to the particular 
experimental design employed, sample size, etc 
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step, SNPs that have been so far resistant to the eliminative ‘axe’ are tested in additional 
samples to see whether SNPs are associated to the disease in the same way as shown 
above. This is an attempt to provide a stronger evaluation of hypotheses, but still not 
good enough for biology, as we will see.  
Recently GWASs have started to make use of other important ‘eliminative 
principles’ (Schaub et al. 2012; Boyle et al. 2012). These principles are biologically driven, 
in the sense that they are derived somehow from the body of knowledge in the field. The 
problem with GWAS results is that, while some SNPs fall within coding regions (and so 
their precise function can be hypothesized according to the genes that they target), many 
others lie in(?) non-coding regions. The functions of non-coding regions with respect to 
gene regulation are particularly challenging to determine. However, a ‘map’ has recently 
provided some hints. The ENCODE project (ENCODE 2012) has provided annotations for 
all the biochemical activities within the human genome almost at a nucleotide resolution. 
This means that it is possible to see whether SNPs that were not eliminated (that is, that 
are prioritized) in the previous phases, are situated in a non-coding region that “overlap a 
functional region or are in strong linkage disequilibrium with a SNP overlapping a 
functional region” (Schaub et al. 1749). If a SNP falls in a region of the genome, and the 
(biochemical) activity of that region has nothing to do with the phenotype investigated, 
then it can be eliminated from the universe of hypotheses. In other words, 
 
“ENCODE (…) does not only say ‘these are the parts to be considered’, but proposes, for each, very 
specific hypotheses to be investigated” (Germain et al. 2014, p 14).  
 
Hence many SNPs are eliminated from the universe of hypotheses either because they fall 
within a non-functional region of the genome, or because they are located in a region 
which function has nothing to do with the phenotype of interest. 
With all these procedures, variants that are spuriously associated to the phenotype 
of interest are eliminated, and the remaining SNPs correspond to the final universe of 
entities very likely to be responsible for the phenotype of interest. 
Similar procedures may be drawn for cancer genomics as well. In this field, the 
processes through which the set of somatic mutations is filtered out are called 
‘prioritizations’ (Raphael et al. 2014). But how does a scientist choose candidate driver 
mutations? There are several methodologies employed (Raphael et al. 2014; An et al. 
2014). As an example, here I focus only on one. As mutational processes converge to a 
common oncogenic phenotype, “the mutations that drive cancer progression should 
appear more frequently than expected by chance across patient samples” (Raphael et al 
2014, p 7). The reason is that, since driver mutations confer a growth advantage, they 
are positively selected. However, it is necessary to define what ‘more frequently’ exactly 
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means. This is why, in each high throughput screening, a background mutation rate 
(BMR) is calculated. BMR provides an example of eliminative principle for cancer 
genomics. As in the case of the ‘significance level’ idea, BMR guides elimination of 
somatic mutations with the help of actual observation, by means of comparison of cancer 
samples with either normal sample or the Reference Genome. Also here, observation is 
clearly theory laden. The idea behind BMR is that a mutation, in order to be a candidate 
driver mutation, should be present at a rate that is higher than BMR. If the mutation does 
not do that, then it is discarded. This means that the universe of somatic mutations is 
narrowed in the first instance by eliminating all those mutations that are below BMR. 
However, also cancer genomics is local, and its results depend on sample size. This 
means that somatic mutations above BMR are prioritized, while somatic mutations that 
are below BMR have less probability of being drivers. However, a study with a bigger 
sample size (and hence a different BMR) might show that a mutation discarded in one 
study should be prioritized20. Again here, the probabilistic nature of eliminative inferences 
arises.  
 The principle of BMR is complemented with the idea that candidate driver 
mutations are likely to target genes that are mutated at a rate higher than a BMR 
designed specifically for genes. In addition to BMR, when genes are concerned there is an 
eliminative principle that is biologically driven. In order to eliminate mutated genes (and 
as a consequence other mutations) a typical standard is to check whether genes mutated 
at a sufficiently high frequency significantly overlap with known cancer pathways (Vandin 
et al. 2012). Therefore one may say that, if a candidate driver gene does not overlap with 
a known gene pathway, then it is discarded. For example, Lawrence and colleagues 
(2013) eliminate several recurrent genes (and as a consequence also mutations) from the 
universe of initial hypotheses because these do not participate of any known cancer 
pathways (they have functions that, so far, are supposed to have nothing to do with 
cancer). Again, this is imperfect and only probabilistic. Nonetheless, with similar 
procedures, cancer genomics provides a final list of genes and mutations that are 
candidates for being drivers, and they are then validated experimentally in the next 
phase. 
 
2.1.3.2 Developing hypotheses 
 
Both in cancer genomics and GWASs, there is not just the elimination of less probable 
hypotheses. More probable hypotheses are developed as well. This is done especially in 
the second part of the eliminative process, i.e. the biologically driven process. In phase 																																																								
20 There are also cases of driver mutations that are not recurrently present, but it is rare 
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(a), hypotheses have the abstract form such as ‘the SNP x is associated to the phenotype 
y’ or ‘the somatic mutation x is associated to cancer y’. However, such an abstract type of 
hypothesis is of little use to biologists. These empty hypotheses should be filled with 
biological contents in order to be properly prioritized. This is done by means of 
comparison with biological databases or maps such as the ENCODE Project. 
One strategy to fill with contents abstract hypotheses is to speculate that a certain 
variant or somatic mutation influences gene expression or the exonic sequence of the 
gene itself. Then one identifies the function of the gene mutated or close to a certain 
variant, and proposes a specific hypothesis of how that particular function might influence 
the phenotype of interest. Therefore the initial abstract hypothesis is complemented with 
biological information that can provide clues on how to set up experiments to be done in 
phase (c). The use of databases is pervasive in this type of hypothesis development. 
Consider for instance GWASs. First, the fact that one can locate SNPs along the genome 
depends on maps developed by projects such as the Human Genome Project. Without this 
epistemic contribution, one would not be able to develop a hypothesis about which genes 
a SNP might target. Moreover, only with these ‘biological maps’ it is possible to say 
whether there are genes at all in a region of the genome, and to have a sort of ‘ID’. 
Finally you identify the function of the closest genes by consulting a database (although 
you might run an experiment). Without this information, one would not be able to 
hypothesize whether the gene targeted by a SNP might have something to do with the 
phenotype of interest. Therefore with the comparison of SNPs with maps and databases, 
one might develop the hypothesis ‘the SNP x has an effect on the phenotype y’ to the 
more precise hypothesis ‘the SNP x regulates (for instance) the overexpression of the 
gene MYC which in turn with the process z has an effect on the phenotype y’. The latter 
hypothesis clearly facilitates the design of a more precise experiment. Consider for 
instance Figure 2.1. This is a screen shot of the location of the SNP rs522444. With this 
kind of representation, information stored in biological databases might be of some help 
in reasoning on which genes rs522444 may possibly influence. 
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2.1.3.3 The phase of hypothesis-testing  
 
At the end of phase (b), we finally have well-developed hypotheses. The biological 
entities involved in these hypotheses are taken to play a causal role in the phenotype of 
interest. In phase (c), these causal roles are ‘strongly’ evaluated, tested, and validated. 
This is the ‘hypothesis-driven’ phase. Traditionally, in molecular biology scientists strongly 
evaluate a hypothesis of the kind, “the entity x has a causal role in the production of the 
phenomenon y” by discovering the mechanisms of production of y and the role of x in 
them. There are many rational paths that lead to the discovery of mechanisms (Bechtel 
and Richardson 2010; Craver and Darden 2013). I shall examine the mechanistic 
philosophy in the next chapter, but it should be noted again that Weinberg and other 
‘traditional’ molecular biologists clearly refer to these methodologies when they refer to 
the discovery strategies of ‘traditional’ molecular biology.  
The gold standard for hypothesis acceptance in molecular biology is a mechanistic 
description of how z is implicated in the phenomenon (with exceptions, see Boniolo 
2013). In order to derive such descriptions, there are several strategies. Strategies 
particularly close to the gold standard of molecular biology are, trivially, the experimental 
approaches. Craver and Darden (2013, especially chapter 8) present the general 
strategies used. These involve intervening on a specific component of a system. By 
observing the consequences of the intervention on an entity, its contribution to the whole 
system might be inferred. I argue that in data-driven molecular biology practitioners 
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move within the conceptual horizon of mechanistic descriptions (they sketch rough 
mechanistic explanations) and they use experimental intervention on a component to 
observe consequences. However, unlike traditional molecular biology who seek to 
understand also the mechanistic tiny details of the consequences of the intervention, 
data-driven biologists usually tend to collect just few experiments of this sort without 
going into much detail. In other words, data-driven biologists in the justificatory phase 
make use of particularly weak (and naïve) confirmation frameworks. 
 In GWASs, the work of most screenings usually finishes with phase (b) (see for 
instance Ripke et al 2013). However, practitioners know very well that “the confirmed 
signals emerging from GWAS scans and subsequent replication efforts are just that – 
association signals. The causal variants will only occasionally be among those” (McCarthy 
et al 2008, 365). This is why there is the urgent need “to obtain functional confirmation 
that the variants implicated are truly causal, and to reconstruct the molecular and 
physiological mechanisms” (McCarthy et al 2008, 366). There are studies (e.g. Pomerantz 
et al, 2009; 2010) that select SNPs associated to a disease in many GWASs and try to 
fully achieve (c). Freedman and colleagues (2011) provide a review of the strategies used 
(and strategies that should be used) in the so-called ‘post-GWAS’ phase (that is, phase 
(c)). Prominent among the strategies is the experimental manipulation of selected model 
organisms in order to implicate transcription units to the associated loci found in GWASs. 
This kind of strategy is the one used by data-driven biologists to fulfil phase (c) or, at 
least, to approximate its achievement. For instance Pomerantz and colleagues (2009) 
seek to understand the causal role of the variant rs6983267 in colorectal cancer 
pathogenesis. This variant has been associated with colorectal cancer by several GWASs. 
Pomerantz and colleagues are not simply driven by background assumptions: They are 
really ‘hypothesis-driven’ because they devise experiments in order to obtain a specific 
effect which in turn should provide evidence for the specific hypothesis ‘the 8q24 cancer 
risk variant rs6983267 has a causal role in colorectal cancer by deregulating its closest 
gene MYC’. Another article, again by Pomerantz and collaborators, analyzes the variant 
rs10993994 associated with prostate cancer risk by several GWASs. By in vitro analyses, 
Pomerantz and colleagues find out that rs10993994 actually influences the expression of 
two genes thereby increasing the risk of prostate cancer. Again, experiments have been 
devised in order to test the specific hypothesis ‘the variant rs10993994 has a causal role 
in prostate cancer by influencing its nearest genes’. Although these studies move with the 
conceptual horizon of mechanisms, confirmation of hypotheses rely on far fewer 
mechanistic details than in traditional molecular biology. 
 These considerations are more evident in cancer genomics. Also for cancer 
genomics, especially in the work of TCGA, screenings end with (b). If you consider the 
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growing list of publications of the TCGA21, most of the screenings are exactly aimed at 
providing comprehensive characterizations of various tumours and to generate a list of 
recurrent mutations and candidate driver genes. However, there is also a tendency to 
‘close a story’, in the sense that one generates (by means of exome or whole genome 
sequencing, or even with microarrays) a list of candidates, and finally she picks up one to 
be strongly evaluated (validation). For instance Zang and colleagues (2012), after 
sequencing 15 exomes of gastric cancer samples, come out with few candidate driver 
genes and, in particular for FAT4, they provide several experimental evidence that the 
gene is a cancer gene. For example, by silencing FAT4 in selected cell lines they observe 
a significant cell proliferation (a traditional hallmark of cancer), and an enhanced cellular 
invasion and migration (a distinctive feature of metastases). This line of evidence does 
not provide careful mechanistic descriptions, but at least it strongly suggests that the 
mutations of FAT4 may be drivers. Liu and colleagues (2014) analyse several gastric 
tumours, and they identify a particularly upregulated gene isoform of ZAK, that is then 
‘validated’ as FAT4 is. Another example is (Davis et al 2014), a study on chromophobe 
renal cells carcinoma that leads to the identification of TERT and its validation. Others use 
the data of TCGA to do phase (a) and (b) and then come out with (c). An example is the 
overexpression of MTBP in breast cancer detected in TCGA data sets and subsequent in 
vivo analyses of this candidate (Grieb et al 2014). All these ‘validations’ are not aimed at 
providing detailed mechanistic descriptions, but they move within the same conceptual 
horizon. 
 
2.2 Epistemic values in data-driven biology 
 
Now it is time to explicitly list the epistemic values influencing each phase of discovery in 
data-driven molecular biology. Epistemic values are those tendencies influencing theory 
choice – as well as hypothesis generation and prior assessment. To be sure, epistemic 
values do more than just influence theory choice: they basically establish those criteria 
that fill scientific inferences, which are actually empty and somehow formal. As I asked in 
the first chapter: Why should scientists select a set of hypotheses instead of another? 
According to which criteria are some hypotheses worth developing? And in which direction 
should we develop hypotheses? Which are the features of a hypothesis that makes it an 
acceptable hypothesis? These are questions that can be answered by referring to 
epistemic values, known also as cognitive values, constitutive values or virtues of a 
theory. 
																																																								
21 http://cancergenome.nih.gov/publications/TCGANetworkPublications 
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 Epistemic values, by definition, are more a matter of valuing than evaluating 
(McMullin 1983). We might establish quite precisely whether a particular hypothesis or 
theory satisfies a theoretical virtue such as coherence, but it is a completely different 
question whether an epistemic value is valuable per se. In rest of this section, I shall 
explain which epistemic desiderata are valued within each phase of data-driven biology. 
 
2.2.1 Epistemic values playing a role in all levels 
 
As with ‘traditional’ molecular biology, in data-driven biology the epistemic value of 
‘internal consistency’ is ubiquitous at all levels of inquiry. Internal consistency is a sort of 
prerequisite for any rational endeavour. In other words, internal consistency is a virtue 
that any scientific theory should necessarily embed. If a scientific theory or hypothesis is 
not consistent with itself, then anything can follow for the very simple principle of ex 
contradictione sequitur quodlibet22. Therefore, internal consistency is assumed at all 
levels of the structure of discovery (hypothesis generation, prior assessment, 
justification). 
 Another epistemic value playing a prominent role at all levels of inquiry both in 
traditional molecular biology and data-driven biology is empirical adequacy. The fact that 
the statements derived from a hypothesis must be consistent with observation is a 
prerequisite for any empirical science, and biology is an empirical science. These ideas 
might be found also in other traditional loci of philosophy of science, such as (Hertz 
1899). 
 
2.2.2 Epistemic values in hypothesis generation, weak evaluation and validation 
 
There are three key epistemic values influencing hypothesis generation.  
First, there is external consistency. As I have shown, in GWASs the fact that the 
initial detected SNPs constitute the initial set of hypotheses depends strictly on the 
background assumptions. I noted that hypothesis generation is theory-informed, in the 
sense that a theory forms the background and the space of possibilities where hypothesis 
generation moves. This means that the initial selected set of hypotheses depends on the 
existence of a certain corpus of notions, and that this initial set must be consistent with 
that corpus. If there were no corpus of notions, there would be no hypothesis generation. 
Hypothesis generation then should be consistent with some prerequisites in the form of a 
background theory (theory loosely conceived). In the case of GWASs, the set of initial 
hypothesis should be composed of SNPs, since background assumptions hold that to solve 																																																								
22 Assuming that we presuppose classical logics 
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the issue of finding the genetic basis of common diseases, we should look at SNPs. 
Therefore, the initial universe of hypothesis should not be formed by other types of 
variations. The same applies for cancer genomics. The set of hypotheses we initially 
select (being either mutations or genes) depends on the fact that mutations and genes 
are taken to be the entities to look for in molecular oncology. Therefore, the initial set of 
hypothesis should be consistent with the idea that mutations (and mutated genes) drive 
tumour progression. 
 The other two values in hypothesis generation are, as I have already anticipated, 
internal consistency and empirical adequacy. While internal consistency is pretty self-
explanatory, empirical adequacy should be explained a little bit in this context. We cannot 
select a SNP from a database of SNPs (e.g. dbSNP) as part of the initial set of hypothesis 
if that SNP is not detected in the screening. If we do this, we would derive the 
consequence that this SNP might play a role in the development of the disease under 
scrutiny but this will stand at odds with the observable fact that there the SNP is not in 
the data set. The same applies for cancer genomics. We cannot include a gene in the list 
of genes that possibly plays a role in the cancer we are studying if that gene is not 
mutated in my cohort. Again, we would derive the unpleasant consequence that that gene 
might be driver in contrast to the observation that the gene we are considering is not 
mutated at all. 
In weak evaluation, internal consistency again is a prerequisite, as well as 
empirical adequacy. Concerning empirical adequacy, in a GWAS we cannot continue to 
pursue the hypothesis that a SNP plays a role in disease development if that SNP allele 
frequency is below the statistical threshold of a GWAS. This would have the consequence 
of claiming that this SNP, while being spuriously associated to the disease, actually has 
features that cannot be ascribed to spuriously associated SNPs. The same applies for BMR 
and mutations/genes in cancer genomics.  
 Most important, external consistency plays a prominent role also in the phase of 
hypothesis development. Actually, the very possibility of the development of a hypothesis 
of the form “the SNP x plays a role in the disease y” or “the mutation x plays a role in the 
development of the tumour y” stems from an operation rooted in external consistency. 
The comparison of certain bits of data with functional annotations of biological databases 
is exactly a matter of external consistency. The idea is that we should develop the 
abstract hypothesis “the SNP x plays a role in the disease y” by providing suggestions on 
how the SNP actually does what it does. We do this by suggesting that the SNP can have 
a certain function. Annotations on databases such as RegulomeDB are clearly of some 
help: We fill the black boxes in abstract hypotheses by borrowing information from similar 
databases. Therefore the way hypotheses are developed is first of all consistent with the 
corpus of biological knowledge stored in biological databases, because the corpus of 
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knowledge represented by biological databases is exactly where useful information is 
extracted in the first place. We face a similar situation in cancer genomics where the 
recurrently mutated genes should overlap already known cancer pathways in order to 
suggest in what sense a gene might be driver. 
In hypothesis validation, internal consistency is (again) a landmark in this phase. 
However, the most important epistemic value in this phase is clearly empirical adequacy. 
The fact that complete hypothesis of the form ‘the 8q24 cancer risk variant rs6983267 
has a causal role in colorectal cancer by deregulating MYC’ or ‘FAT4 drives cancer 
progression by stimulating cell proliferation and enhancing cellular invasion and migration’ 
are considered acceptable is because we might derive observable consequences that can 
be corroborated by selected experiments. In other words, hypotheses must be consistent 
with observation, i.e. empirically adequate. 
  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I elucidated the structure of discovery of data-driven biology. I discussed 
the cases of cancer genomics and genome-wide association studies showing how their 
structure fits very well the tripartite framework elaborated in Chapter 1. I have 
highlighted the role of background assumptions in hypothesis generation, and the 
eliminative inference structure of hypothesis development. Finally I have listed the 
epistemic values guiding each phase of discovery. Throughout the chapter, I have also 
sparsely discussed the important role that biological databases play both in theorizing and 
in scientific practice, especially in identifying biological phenomena and entities of interest 
in data sets. In the next chapter I will discuss in depth the heuristic contribution of 
databases, pinpointing exactly the epistemic role of biological databases in the discovery 
strategies of data-driven biology.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL DATABASES IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
 
CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
In this chapter, I analyze the epistemic role that biological databases might possibly play 
in contemporary biological research. In particular, I claim that there are two main ways of 
using databases. First, databases are used as ‘evidence-enhancer’, i.e. the play a vital 
role both in elaborating claims about phenomena and in strengthening the case for data 
as being evidence for a phenomenon. Next, databases are explored with theoretical aims 
in mind. Through data mining, databases are explored to identify robust patterns of data 
in order to compile what Lindley Darden calls ‘the store of a field’. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 2, and in particular in the section on hypotheses development, I sketched an 
analysis of how, by means of comparison with data sets of biological databases, biologists 
might infer the existence of certain features/biological entities in their own data set. In 
this chapter, I develop this issue. How exactly do data sets of biological databases 
provide evidence for features of other data sets? What is the epistemological motivation 
supporting the reliability of this operation? Does this use of biological exhaust the 
epistemic role of databases in contemporary biology?  
In this chapter I claim that there are two main ways of using biological databases 
in contemporary molecular biology that should be distinguished because they serve 
different purposes. First, biological databases are evidence-enhancers in the sense that 
they play a prominent role in strengthening the case for data as being evidence for a 
phenomenon or for claims about a phenomenon. Second, biological databases are 
explored with theoretical aims in mind. In the section on hypothesis development of data-
driven biology, I showed that certain databases are mined in order to provide eliminative 
principles for hypothesis development, thereby transforming standard databases into 
maps. Here I argue that such operation of data mining, which I call exploration of 
databases, is an instance of exploratory experimentation (Waters 2007) and it is aimed to 
develop what Darden (2006) calls ‘store of a field’. 
This chapter should be conceived as an analysis complementing what I have 
already shown about data-driven biology in Chapter 2: Since databases are pervasively 
used in the discovery strategies of data-driven biology (but also in part in traditional 
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molecular biology), elucidating the epistemic moves that they allow is part of the analysis 
of the discovery strategies of contemporary biology. 
 
 
 
1. DATABASES AS EVIDENCE-ENHANCERS 
 
In this section I analyze how databases aid biologists (a) to infer the existence of 
phenomena in their data sets and (b) to elaborate claims about phenomena. My 
argument relies on the fact that data stored in databases are not data, but rather 
phenomena type (Teller 2010). By transforming data into phenomena type, databases 
enable the transformation of data into a basis of comparison for elaborating claims about 
biological phenomena and for identifying phenomena across different experimental 
contexts. Before delving into my main argument, I briefly specify what I mean by “data” 
and “phenomena”, and the kind of philosophical literature I refer to (1.1.1.). In section 
1.1.2 I discuss Leonelli’s (2009) position and I will argue that her analysis, at least for the 
use of primary databases, is unsatisfactory. 
 
1.1 Data, phenomena and claims about phenomena 
 
In an influential paper (Bogen and Woodward 1988) and several restatements and 
defenses (Woodward 1989; 2000; 2011; Bogen and Woodward 1992; 2005) Bogen and 
Woodward put forth a three-level picture of scientific theory (data, phenomena, 
explanations) based on the distinction between data and phenomena. 
Data have to be conceived as public records produced by measurements ‘in the 
wild’ as well as measurements within experiments. For instance, Hacking defines data as 
“uninterpreted inscriptions, graphs recording variation over time, photographs, tables, 
displays” (1992, p 48).  
 Data are evidence for phenomena. Phenomena are understood as features of the 
world that in principle can occur under different context or conditions – they are detected 
somehow as patterns or regularities23. Data then serve as evidence for both identifying 
phenomena and elaborating claims about phenomena.  
 Claims about phenomena take the form of systematic explanations. According to 
Woodward (1989) good explanations must meet, at least, two requirements. They have 
to exhibit the details of the patterns of dependency. Indeed, an explanation of the form 																																																								
23 The word ‘phenomenon’ has a long and rich history. Hacking provides a close examination of this history in 
(1983). However, here I restrict my use of the word ‘phenomenon’ to the meaning outlined in this section 
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‘when the gene x is overexpressed, so is the gene y’ is intuitively unsatisfactory. A 
systematic explanation needs to show in detail how the features of the explanandum (the 
phenomenon) depend upon factors appearing in the explanans. In molecular biology what 
is required is a detailed account of the causal mechanism producing the phenomenon 
(Darden 2006). A second feature of good explanations is their ability to systematize and 
unify; claims about phenomena should make reference “to factors, generalizations, or 
mechanisms which can figure in the explanation of a range of different phenomena” 
(Woodward 1989, p 400). Therefore scientists are not interested in data as data. Rather, 
they are interested in data to the extent that they exhibit some ‘phenomenal’ feature. 
 Data and phenomena differ in many respects. In particular, phenomena exhibit 
similar features in a wide range of situations, while data occur in the way they occur just 
in the particular experimental context in which they are generated. Gathering evidence 
for phenomena is challenging since we have to distinguish features of the phenomenon 
from features of the artifact (Woodward 1989, p 397). In other words, phenomena are 
‘evoked’ only in a particular data set with some experimental moves, and data would 
reflect also the particular and specific conditions of the experimental context24. 
If data depends on the experimental context where they have been generated, the 
evidential scope of data is limited – limited to the experimental context in which it has 
been generated. Leonelli (2009) captures this idea by saying that data are local while 
claims about phenomena are nonlocal. She takes a fact to be local when the evidential 
scope of that fact strictly depends on the context where it has been generated, while a 
fact is nonlocal when its evidential scope goes beyond that context. Data are local in the 
sense that researchers have to be aware of the experimental context of data in order to 
establish which claims their data set supports. The scope of data does not go beyond 
their experimental contexts, although the features of the phenomena they show might be 
found in other situations. 
However, data sets could be combined. By combining data sets, these become 
‘nonlocal’. Actually, there are two respects in which data can be taken as ‘nonlocal’. 
Consider the following two statements: 
 
1. The data set x and the data set y can be combined to enhance (or refine) a claim 
about a phenomenon z 
2. A data set x can enhance the evidence for the presence of the phenomenon z into 
the data set y 
 
																																																								
24 Famously, data are “idiosyncratic to particular experimental contexts, and typically cannot occur outside of 
those contexts” (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p 317) 
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As far as statement 1 is concerned, if we detect the features of a phenomenon z from a 
data set x, then we can formulate a claim about the phenomenon z on the basis of x. If a 
data set y is available, and from y we infer another feature of z, then we can elaborate 
another claim about z. We can combine the results of x and y in the sense that we can 
elaborate a claim about z that contains the features of z inferred from x and y. In the 
sense of statement 2, a data set is used as evidence for detecting a phenomenon in 
another data set. 
Biological databases are used not only in the sense of statement 1, but also in the 
sense of statement 2. In the next sections, I will show how primary databases realize 
statement 2, and how metadatabases accomplish statement 1. In both cases, data stored 
in biological databases are used beyond the initial experimental context where they have 
been generated, i.e. data stored in biological databases are nonlocal 
 
1.2 Leonelli’s proposal 
 
Sabina Leonelli offers an explanation of how biological databases expand the locality of 
data by describing how curators of databases standardize data sets (Leonelli 2009; 2010; 
2013; Leonelli & Ankeny 2012). Leonelli proposes that curators of databases are able to 
expand the evidential scope of data. Curators have the aim of integrating data into a 
common framework. She calls this strategy “packaging data”. This has the goal of 
transforming data in a way that can also be re-used as evidence for other phenomena.  
Packaging of data in a biological database requires (at least) two main activities. 
First, database curators gather data from publications or other databases (Leonelli and 
Ankeny 2012, p. 31). Data are the targets of the curators of databases. However, 
curators of databases are interested in just a small fraction of data that can be found in 
scientific articles or other databases. Curators strip away what is irrelevant to the topic of 
the database. For instance, if one is curating a database on DNA methylation, then she 
will select just those data in articles that are relevant to methylation. 
After selecting relevant data, curators annotate these through classificatory 
systems that aid the retrieval by users (Leonelli and Ankeny 2012, p. 31). Examples of 
labelling systems are the so-called bio-ontologies (Boem 2015), defined as formal 
systems of terms denoting biological entities or processes (Leonelli 2011, p. 333). Bio-
ontologies connect phenomena for which data function as evidence with “the terms used 
to formulate claims about those phenomena” (Leonelli 2009, p 742). Moreover, in order 
to grasp the relevance of data produced by someone else, databases should also include 
information about the production of stored data because, as emphasized above, these 
two processes affect the kind of data obtained. Thus, a user might be interested in seeing 
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whether the data production and interpretation tools being employed are compatible with 
the ones used to generate the small facts stored in the databases. For these reasons, 
curators devise another type of label for data called ‘metadata25’ (Leonelli 2010, p. 336). 
This means that a small fact is categorized according to the way it has been obtained  
(e.g. ISS, inferred from sequence similarity26). 
Through these classificatory systems and labels, curators de-contextualise and re-
contextualise data at the same time (Leonelli 2011). De-contextualisation makes data 
“extremely adaptable, […] by stripping them of as many qualifications as possible, leaving 
them free to travel as objects in search of a new interpretation” (Leonelli 2011, p. 338). 
However, by means of metadata, data are re-contextualised at the same time and hence, 
a user can assess the provenance of data at any time. With the operation of de-
contextualisation curators free data from their locality, opening up possibilities for the re-
use of data in other contexts. However, with re-contextualisation curators provide enough 
information to shed light on the specificity of data’s locality, thereby helping the user to 
re-use that data set in the proper context.  
In my interpretation, the evidential scope of data is not exactly enhanced 
according to this explanation. In Leonelli’s framework, data stored in databases are 
standardized according to the categories of a specific bio-ontology, but curators somehow 
provide information about the locality of data themselves. This information is useful for 
users in order to understand whether the locality of the experimental context of the users 
is compatible with the locality of the experimental context where data (stored in 
databases) have been generated. Therefore data stored in databases can be used in other 
contexts only if their original context is compatible with the new context where data need 
to be used. In other words, databases do not enhance the evidential scope of data, but 
they aid the recognition of compatible localities. 
 
 
 
1.3 Data, phenomena types and biological databases  
 
Leonelli’s explanation pinpoints how curators’ procedures aid the identification of 
compatible experimental systems. Here I want to show how databases enhance the 
evidential scope of data. The starting point of my argument stems from some 
considerations about the nature of data stored in biological databases. Let us start from a 
simple case of re-use of data stored in biological databases. 																																																								
25 Gene Ontology calls these labels ‘evidence codes’.	
26 ‘Inferred from sequence similarity’ means that the annotation has its basis on a sequence-based analysis. For 
example one may infer the function of a gene by the function of one of its orthologs.  
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 Imagine that one wants to do a knock-in. Knock-in refers to the technique of the 
insertion of a coding cDNA sequence into a genomic locus of interest27. In order to see 
whether the insertion has been successful, one sequences the DNA of the sample where 
the gene has been inserted, and checks whether the gene is actually in the specific locus. 
One way to verify the insertion is to use BLAST (Basic Local Alignment Tool), i.e. an 
algorithm designed to compare primary sequences of protein as well as DNA sequences. 
BLAST is connected to several repositories of nucleotides sequences. Through this tool 
one may compare the sequence of interest obtained through sequencing technologies 
with a repository of sequences stored in multiple databases.  
What exactly does one look for when comparing a sequence to a whole database 
of sequences by means of algorithms such as BLAST? In the simplest case of trying to see 
whether a gene of interest is actually in the selected genomic locus, one wants to identify 
a biological phenomenon in her data set. If phenomena are to be understood as features 
of the world that in principle can occur under different contexts or conditions, and they 
are detected as patterns or regularities (and hence they have some more or less stable 
features as Bogen and Woodward mean), then genes are phenomena. A gene x has 
sufficiently robust features (e.g. the sequence of nucleotides, though might slightly 
change, is quite uniform in a given species; if transcribed, can generate sufficiently robust 
gene products such as mRNA with a specific RNA sequence; etc) to count for a 
phenomenon. Therefore one compares a sequence to a library of sequences of a database 
by means of BLAST in order to establish whether the sequence she has found out is 
sufficiently similar to the established sequence of a specific phenomenon. Biologists, by 
using BLAST, are not interested in data (stored in databases) as data, but in a particular 
setting of data representing certain established features of a phenomenon.  
My claim is that data stored in biological databases are not data proper, but rather 
phenomena. However, they are a particular type of phenomena. 
 
1.3.1 Phenomena type and phenomena token 
 
A distinction made in the literature on data and phenomena is particularly useful to 
explain what kinds of phenomena are stored in biological (primary) databases. This is the 
distinction between phenomenon type and phenomenon token (Teller 2010). 
 Let us consider the melting point of lead, i.e. 327.46 °C. Actually, there is no 
general melting point of lead ‘out-there-in-the-world’, in the sense that this threshold 																																																								
27 This technique is used in disease modelling to create, for instance, transgenic mice and to see the 
consequence of the action of a particular gene product in a controlled context. A similar procedure is called 
transfection that is, the deliberate insertion of nucleic acids into a cell. In general, these are methods for 
introducing foreign DNA into a eukaryotic cell, by means of viruses or other ‘vectors’. 
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does not apply precisely in every circumstance. Depending on the particular 
environmental context and the particular causal factors at hand, the melting point of lead 
will change slightly, but just a little. This means that the melting point of lead is an 
idealization, in the sense that is a distortion or a simplification of a particular fact pursued 
in order to grasp some peculiar features of that fact that one will find in other similar 
facts. The idealized melting point of lead is called by Teller ‘phenomenon type’ while the 
occurrence of this type in the real world is called ‘phenomenon token’.  
Another simple example might be of some help. Consider the general fact that salt 
will dissolve when stirred into water. Consider then the specific event, hic et nunc, of salt 
dissolving when stirred into water. The former case is the phenomenon type of the 
phenomenon ‘salt dissolving when stirred into water’ because it represents the salt 
dissolving into water independently of the particular environmental context in which it 
happens. The latter is the phenomenon token of the type ‘salt dissolving when stirred into 
water’. Therefore an individual event is a token of a phenomenon type if it falls under it, 
where the type isolates certain core stable and regular features. Moreover, phenomena 
tokens are idiosyncratic to the particular context in which they occur. In other words, the 
occurrence of the phenomenon token is tied up in the complex details of its context; while 
phenomena tokens are events in the real world, phenomena types are idealized types 
involving simplifications and shortcuts of that natural event. A phenomenon token is an 
instantiation of a phenomenon type, and a phenomenon type is an idealization of a 
phenomenon token.   
But if a phenomenon type is an idealization of a phenomenon token, then what kind 
of idealization does Teller mean? He is not very specific. There are several types of 
idealizations (Cartwright 1983; McMullin 1985; Weisberg 2007; Weisberg 2013; Elliot-
Graves and Weisberg 2014) and my claim is that two specific types of idealization are 
used in different types of databases. In primary databases, biologists ‘store’ phenomena 
type idealized in a similar way as Galilean idealizers do (though with some remarkable 
differences), while in metadatabases a variety of minimalist idealization is put in place. In 
the case of primary databases, data sets are used to enhance the evidence for the 
presence of a phenomenon in other data sets, while in the case of metadatabases, data 
sets are used to refine claims about phenomena inferred from other data sets.  
 
1.3.2 Biological databases, phenomena types and Galilean idealization 
 
My main claim in this part of the chapter is that biological databases store phenomena 
types rather than data. Phenomena types are idealized types of real world phenomena. In 
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primary databases28, phenomena types are idealized, at first glance, in the Galilean 
sense. However, Galilean idealization can only in part make sense of the phenomena 
types stored in primary databases. 
In Galilean idealization a scientist represents a complex phenomenon of the world in a 
simplified and/or distorted manner in order to make the system more tractable29. Having 
obtained an adequate model, one can de-idealize (by eliminating the effects of the 
distortions) and go back to the target system (Weisberg 2007). Despite the distorted 
representation of a target system, in the long run Galilean idealization aims to give a 
complete and non-distorted representation of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Once one 
has a model (idealized in the Galilean sense) of a target system, the next step is to 
eliminate gradually the effects of the distortion to see if the model has captured ‘the 
essence’ of the real world phenomenon. Galilean idealizers aim at what Weisberg calls the 
representational ideal of COMPLETENESS. While this characterization of idealization fits in 
some respects with primary databases, it also differs in other important features.  
Consider the above example of gene knock-in. Once the gene is inserted into the cells 
of interest, one has to verify whether the insertion has been successful. One then 
sequences the DNA of the cells of interest, and aligns the results to the Human Reference 
Genome using BLAST. The phenomena type stored in the database of the Reference 
Genome are, for instance, sequences of nucleotides of genes or other biological objects of 
interest. The Reference Genome is a single consensus haplotype representing the 
sequence of each chromosome (Church et al, 2015) stored in a nucleic acids database. 
The first assembly of the human genome dates back to the work of the HGP consortium 
that ‘collapsed’ sequences from 6 individuals. The 19th rendition, named GRCh37 (GRC 
stands for ‘Genome Reference Consortium) is a “mosaic haploid genome derived from 
about 13 people” (Editorial Nature Methods 2010, p 331). Since it is a mosaic haploid 
genome, the Reference Genome is the sequence of no one, i.e. it is the sequence of 
neither the donors from which it has been obtained, nor the sequence of any other 
person. Rather, it is an idealization. It is a sequence representing a set of phenomena 
(e.g. genes, promoters, etc) according to specific criteria (e.g. sequences), which can be 
different with respect to the actual sequences existing in nuclei, as well as missing 
basically all the features of the environmental conditions that one may find in actual 
nuclei. This means that the Reference Genome is not incomplete – after all, it includes 
everything of the features of interest – but it is false. 
The Reference Genome could be preliminary conceived as a Galilean idealization, 
meaning that it is a distorted version of the genome sequence of any single person one 																																																								
28 Primary databases are databases storing sequences of nucleotides and amino acids		
29 Galileo used this notion of idealization when formulating the law of free fall by imagining a frictionless surfaces 
(first distortion) as well as perfectly rounded spheres (second distortion) in order to unveil the mathematical 
essence of the law of ‘free fall’. 
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may find in the real world. Since it is continuously updated, it could be said that builders 
of the Reference Genome aim to capture more and more details of the human genome, in 
particular through the increasing precision of the under-development sequencing 
technologies. In a very loose sense, we might say that builders of the Reference Genome 
aim at COMPLETENESS. However, this is just the perspective of builders. If we look at 
users, things get more complicated. In the literature on idealization, builders and users of 
idealization tend to coincide. Here, builders and users make use of idealization in distinct 
manners. The builder of the Reference Genome constructs a representation of the 
genome by following the ‘regulative ideal’ of getting closer to an accurate representation 
of real genomes. The situation of the user is indeed different. The user makes use of this 
idealized version of the human genome to identify specific phenomena hic et nunc. She is 
not driven by ideal of COMPLETENESS when using the idealized version of the human 
genome. In the case of knock-in, one compares the sequence of interest to the Reference 
Genome in order to see whether some sequence in the Reference Genome representing a 
certain phenomenon type (e.g. the sequence of a gene) are sufficiently similar to her own 
sequence. If this is the case, then it is possible to say that the sequence is a hint of a 
specific phenomenon (the gene one wanted to insert). Therefore, one checks whether the 
sequence x is a token of the phenomenon type gene y. In other words, one uses the 
Reference Genome to identify phenomena in the real world.  
How do we establish how sufficiently similar sequences must be? Clearly this is a 
pragmatic choice. But the beauty of an instrument such as BLAST is that it provides a 
precise measure of similarity, which in biological jargon is called ‘measure of sequence 
identity’. 
For instance, imagine one wants to knock-in the gene SETBP1. One then sequences 
the DNA of interest and she obtains the following sequence: 
 
AAGCGCGGGGCCGGCCGGGGCGCCCGCCGCTCGCCGCCGCCTCCGCGCGCCCGGGGGCCCCGGCGCCCCC 
CGAGCTGGGGCGGCCAGCTCGCGGCTCGCCGTTTGACAGATGCTCATCGCCATGGAGTTGCCGCAGCAGCACCTTTGGGG
GCTCGGGCGAGCGACGGGAGCCGGGATCTGAGCGAGCGCCGGGGCCAGCGGAGCCGGAGCCGCCGGGACATGGTTGCA
GATCTGATCTCTTCTGAACACCTCATCGTGTCTCCATCCCTGGGAATCTGACCCTAGCAACTGGACCACTTTGTTCTTGGAAT
TTTGGGTGTCCTCTTTTCTCACCTTTCCCTTTTCCCTTTTCCCCTTCCCCCTCCTGAGAACTCCGGAAGACTGTAGAGATTGTC
ATGGAGTCCAGGGAAACCTTAAGCAGCTCCCGGCAAAGAGGGGGCGAGTCAGACTTCCTGCCGGTCTCCTCAGCCAAGCC
CCCAGCTGCTCCTGGCTGTGCAGGAGAACCTTTGCTCTCCACTCCAGGACCTGGGAAGGGGATCCCGGTGGGCGGAGAGC
GCATGGAGCCAGAGGAGGAGGATGAACTAGGCTCAGGGCGGGATGTGGATTCCAACTCCAACGCGGACAGTGAGAAATG
GGTGGCAGGAGATGGTTTGGAAGAGCAGGAATTTTCTATCAAGGAGGCAAACTTCACAGAGGGAAGTCTGAAGCTAAAGAT
TCAGACCACAAAGCGGGCTAAGAAACCCCCAAAGAATTTGGAGAACTATATATGTCCACCTGAGATCAAGATCACCATCAAG
CAGTCTGGGGACCAGAAGGTGTCCCGTGCTGGAAAAAATAGCAAAGCCACGAAGGAGGAAGAAAGAAGCCACTCCAAAAA
GAAGCTCCTCACAGCCAGTGACCTTGCAGCCAG 
TGACCTCAAAGGATTTCAGCCACAGATTAAAGACTCCAGTAAGGAGGAAGTCTGGAAGAGAAGAGGAGGCCAAGGCATCCC
ATTCAAAAAGCAATTCCTGTCCCAGGAACGTGCCATGTGCTTCTCATGCCCCCGGAACCCATTCCCCGCAAAACCCGGTTCT
CTCACTCTTCCTTTTCACAGTGAACCTGCAGTCTGGGCACAAGAAGTATAACTTCGCATGGATTCTGCAAAGCCCACACCTGT
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GGTCATTCCCTGTTCTTTCCATTCAACAATGGAGACTTGCCCAAGATTGTAAACTAGTGAGTGACAGCATTTGGGCTTATGAT
CTTCTCTGCCTGCTAGCTAGACATTCTCTCTGGGTCTAAAAGATAATCCAAAAAGATCCAGCTTCACAATGCTGCCCTGAAGA
GATAATGCATTAGGCGGCCCTGATGCAGCATTCACTGTCTTCCAGGGCAGGCTTGATCCCATGAGTTTGCTTGCTCAGACGA
TCACTTAGGAAACACATGCCTTTACTCTCTAGGCCTTTTTTCTAGCTTGCCTTGTATCAGCTATGCCATGGATCTTTGCTCTCT
TACCCCATGCTATACAGAGTATGGGCTCCAAGCCACAGCTGGCCTGTCAAGTGTGTGTCGCTGGTCCACCATGGGATACATT
TAGAAACTTTTATAGCAATTTGACATTTTTGTGATATCCAAGCATGTGATTGTTTTCCTACGGATTTGTCTTATAGTATTTTACC
AAAGTTTCCACACAAAAAGTATGGATTAAGGACAAAGTATCTGGTCCTTCATCAAAGATCGTTTGATAAGCTCTGTTCTAGTT
AACCAACACTGAGCTTTCCTAGTTTTAATAAAAGAGTAGGATTTGGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
 
Then, she runs BLAST, she compares that sequence with the Reference Genome and she 
obtains the result shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
Now, there is a 99% identity of the query sequence to the sequence of SETBP1. For a 
biologist obtaining a 99% match means that her sequence is sufficiently similar to the one 
found in Reference Genome to claim that her sequence is a phenomenon token of the 
phenomenon type SETBP1. 
Therefore, the way users use the Galilean idealization of the Reference Genome is 
quite peculiar. Usually, Galilean idealization is used to make tractable a non-tractable 
problem. Once you have idealized and you get some sense of how the idealized model 
works, then you eliminate the idealization with the aim of going back to the target 
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system. The model then is a good model if it is similar enough (in certain respects) to the 
target system, in the sense that once you add details to your model, this fits the real 
world phenomenon in the respects you are interested in. For the user of primary 
databases the situation is reversed. It is the real world phenomenon (the phenomenon 
token) that should be similar to the ‘model’ (the phenomenon type). Let me be clear on 
that. 
A model is a “good” model (a representation is a “good” representation) if the 
model (representation) is sufficiently similar (according to some criteria) to what is 
modeled (represented). The idea is that a phenomenon token is a good phenomenon 
token if it is sufficiently similar to a phenomenon type. Better, one has identified a 
phenomenon if the supposed phenomenon is sufficiently similar to a phenomenon type. In 
other words, identifying phenomena in the immense sea of data in genomics – at least in 
sequences alignment – depends on a similarity relation with respect to an idealized type. 
Therefore the evidential scope of data stored in biological databases goes beyond their 
locality and applies also to other experimental contexts (at least in the case of Galilean 
idealization) because data in databases are phenomena type, and they are used as (one 
of) the condition sine qua non for establishing evidence for phenomena in other 
experimental contexts. In other words, a primary database (in this case the Reference 
Genome) enhances the evidence for the identification of phenomena in other data sets 
because it is a repository of phenomena types establishing the space of possible 
phenomena one may identify in wet labs data sets. 
 For the user, the path then is not to start from the real world as a benchmark to 
get an idealized type and finally to go back to the real world, but to start from the 
idealized type as the benchmark to get a token; the direction of fit is different from 
traditional Galilean idealization. 
 
1.3.3 Biological databases, phenomena type and minimalist idealization 
 
Data stored in biological databases can be also phenomena type idealized in the 
minimalist sense, though with a caveat. Minimalist idealization is, in Weisberg’s own 
words, “the practice of constructing and studying theoretical models that include only the 
core causal factors which give rise to a phenomenon” (Weisberg 2007). This type of 
idealization aims to identify the core causal factors producing a phenomenon30. A typical 																																																								
30 Minimalist idealization can take various forms and it can be linked to causal accounts of explanation. In a 
sense, minimalist idealization coincides with the notion of abstraction (Floridi 2008; Cartwright 1989; Ratti 
2014), that is, “we strip away (…) all that is irrelevant to the concerns of the moment to focus on some single 
property or set of properties, ‘as if they were separate’” (Cartwright 1989, p 187). Though Galilean idealization 
and abstraction might coincide sometimes, they clearly put in place two different operations. Galilean 
idealization is a deliberate distortion, while abstraction is an omission. Galilean idealization is false, while 
abstraction is simply incomplete. Moreover, minimalist idealization does not aim to COMPLETENESS. Strictly 
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molecular biology representation of a mechanism with arrows and boxes is a minimalist 
idealization because it contains only the (claimed) core causal factors producing the 
behavior of a particular biological system. The caveat is that databases can store 
phenomena type minimalistic idealized in the sense that they characterize phenomena in 
terms of features that could potentially make a contribution to causal stories. In this 
sense, databases aid to build and refine claims about phenomena. 
If we assume a causal account of explanation, then minimalist models aid (and 
drive) scientific explanation. For instance, if we take Strevens’ account of causal 
explanation (i.e. to give an explanation of a phenomenon is to give a causal history about 
why that phenomenon occurred, see Strevens 2004) then minimalist idealization becomes 
ubiquitous.  
In certain cases, data stored in biological databases might be considered as 
phenomena type idealized in a minimalist sense. In particular, this is the case of data 
stored in metadatabases that is, databases organizing in a more convenient form data 
about a certain object of inquiry (e.g. cancer genes, methylation, etc). These databases 
store data about specific aspects of biological phenomena that can aid the identification of 
potentially core causal factors and that are relevant to causal explanations. Since 
metadatabases store data related to certain features of phenomena and not others, 
metadatabases idealize biological phenomena in a minimalist sense.  
 Let us consider the case of querying for a well-characterized cancer gene (PTEN) in 
the metadatabase Networks of Cancer Genes 4.0 (NCG4) that I have collaborated to put 
in place. NCG4 (An et al 2014) is a metadatabase collecting data about systemic 
properties of cancer genes. Figure 3.2 shows what one finds by looking for information 
about this gene in NCG4.  
 
																																																																																																																																																																														
speaking abstraction is not really an idealization, but the pluralism put forth by Weisberg about idealization (that 
is widely accepted) tends to consider any modification on the representations of a target system for the purpose 
of better studying the target system itself as a case of idealization broadly conceived. I am aligned with this 
view. 
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The broad aim of a database such as NCG4 is to provide key information about ‘system-
level’ properties of cancer genes, i.e. genes playing a key role in cancer development. In 
other words, NCG4 provides information about some phenomena (genes). This 
information is interpreted data on the role of these phenomena in the development of 
cancer. Sensu latu, NCG4 provides information about the causal role of certain 
phenomena (genes) in other phenomena (varieties of tumors). For example in the section 
of NCG4’s page ‘details’ (Figure 3.2) one might see that some articles provide evidence 
for the driver role of this gene in 13 tumors. Next, NCG4 provides also data about the 
origin of this gene in the Last Universal Common Ancestor. This is important since several 
cancer genes have a Last Universal Common Ancestor origin. Moreover, NCG4 collects 
data also about the functions of the proteins synthesized by PTEN. Data about origin, and 
function can be turned into information that aid the formulation of explanations in terms 
of a causal story of the gene PTEN being a driver gene in a particular cancer observed hic 
et nunc. 
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The representation of PTEN provided by NCG4 is not just an aggregation of data. It 
is a phenomenon type idealized in a minimalist sense. It is a phenomenon type because 
the way it is represented does not correspond precisely to any of the phenomena PTEN 
one might find in the real world. It is a minimalist idealization because NCG4 provides 
only the information useful to fill black boxes in a causal story where PTEN might be 
involved, i.e. the phenomenon is represented by abstracting some features of interest. 
How does exactly a tool such as NCG4 aid the construction of causal story and in general 
claims about phenomena? Imagine a typical cancer genomics screening. Imagine that 
certain genes turn out to be significantly mutated (according to the BMR). The next step 
is to hypothesize which genes are likely to play a role in the development of cancer. Here 
comes the minimalist idealization provided by metadatabases. One could check NCG4 to 
see the functions, the origins and the networks of interactions of the genes that, from a 
statistical point of view, are more likely to be driver. For instance, Lawrence and 
colleagues (2013) compare the phenomena tokens they have identified (genes 
recurrently mutated) to their types - idealized in the minimalist sense (the functional 
characterization) – and they choose not to consider certain genes as being driver. This is 
because the minimalist idealization – by characterizing genes in terms of their 
contribution to causal explanations - excludes these genes from a possible causal story 
since their functions have nothing to do with cancer development (or, at least, they have 
nothing to do with what is so far known about cancer development). Consequently, 
people can hypothesize whether certain phenomena tokens they have identified might 
play a causal role in the cancer they are dealing with. In other words, metadatabases – 
by minimally idealizing data as evidence for phenomena – enhance the locality of data, 
thereby allowing their re-use across several and different context.  
 
1.4 Concluding remarks on the use of databases as evidence-enhancer 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I depicted the evidential role of databases. I showed how 
databases store phenomena type and not properly data, and that these phenomena type 
might be used as evidence to claim that one has identified in her own data set a specific 
phenomenon as well as to aid the construction of claims about phenomena; primary 
databases are subjected mainly to Galilean idealization, while metadatabases are 
prominently repositories of phenomena type idealized in a minimalist sense. Now I am 
going to sketch an analysis of another use of databases: Data mining, namely the 
exploration of biological databases which purpose is not completely clear.  
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2. Exploring databases 
 
There are many studies in big data biology that are not data-driven but are actually part 
of the heuristic strategies of data-driven biology itself. These studies use biological 
databases, but databases are not treated as evidence enhancers. Rather, they are 
increasingly used with a different purpose in mind. The studies I am talking about are a 
direct consequence of the emergence of big consortia like The Cancer Genome Atlas 
(TCGA), the ENCODE project or the 1000 Genomes Project. Some projects are designed 
explicitly to be maps (such as the ENCODE Project or the HGP), while others become 
maps only derivatively (e.g. TCGA). By joining forces from single scientific labs, big 
consortia are able to generate far more data than a single scientific lab. For example 
TCGA has sequenced, up to 2013, the genomes and the exomes of more than 3,000 
cancer samples (Ciriello et al. 2013). The amount of data generated by the 1000 Genome 
Projects is suggested by its name. ENCODE has recently characterized the biochemical 
activities across the human genome’s regions of several human cell-lines (The ENCODE 
Project Consortium 2012). Databases store these enormous data sets and, in the last few 
years, computer scientists have started to look for patterns in them. It is easy to find in 
journals like Nature or Science studies characterizing trends and patterns found in the 
data sets of TCGA, ENCODE or similar big science projects. Terms such as ‘comparative 
analyses’, ‘system-level characterizations’, and ‘emerging landscapes’ have become 
keywords. For instance, in the last two years the TCGA’s immense data set has attracted 
much attention and it has become the object of inquiry of many mining studies. Consider 
the study by Ciriello et al. (2013). The wealth of genomic data generated by TCGA, 
Ciriello and colleagues say, is an unprecedented opportunity to systematically analyse 
similarities, differences, patterns, and signatures intra and inter tumour types. The idea is 
to compare and to organise data and to find regularities that would not be detected with 
few samples. By grouping 3,299 tumours from 12 cancer types Ciriello et al find out (a) a 
trend that divides tumours into two big classes, one characterized by somatic mutations 
and the other characterized by copy-number variations (CNVs) and (b) within each major 
class, there are specific oncogenic pathways altered (Figure 3.3). The aim of the article is 
to reduce the complexity of thousands of molecular alterations discovered in thousands of 
tumours to a few hundred types and patterns, and categorize tumours on this basis. 
There are many similar studies. Some focus specifically on copy-number variations (Lì et 
al. 2012; Zack et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2012) or on somatic mutations (Kandoth et al. 
2013), while others on mutated genes (Tamborero et al. 2013) or on the analysis of 
trends in the functional annotations of the human genome (The ENCODE Project 
Consortium 2012).  I call these studies mining studies and I claim that they constitute the 
second main use of biological databases: The exploration of databases. 
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 Despite the growth of this kind of studies, neither their purpose nor what kind of 
practice they represent is entirely clear. In the next sections, I argue that these studies 
are used to form the kind of biological knowledge that forms eliminative principles. 
Moreover, the knowledge produced by mining databases can be used also to compile 
what Darden (2006) calls the store of a field. 
 
2.1 The Structure of Mining Studies 
  
The structure of these studies is straightforward. Roughly, a data set is explored with 
respect to data falling under one or more meta-data. A meta-data is a label ‘attached’ to 
a particular bit of data (or to a data set), and it is used to describe the datum itself. In 
other words, the metadata states what data is about. The idea of mining studies is that 
researchers look for patterns (i.e. robust regularities) in meta-data associations. For 
example, Kim et al (2012) mined the TCGA database looking for copy-number variations 
(CNVs). However, they do not look for regularities of CNVs with respect to their position 
along the human genome. Rather, they look for regularities with respect to another 
metadata, i.e. tumour type (defined by tissue of origin). Then, for each set of CNVs in 
each tumour type Kim and colleagues look for the genes located within the region 
amplified or deleted. These kinds of studies capture the disrupted pathways (and related 
disrupted functions in the cell) caused by CNVs alterations in thousands of tumour 
samples. By doing this, it is possible also to capture certain regularities and to say, for 
each tumour type, which are the biological processes that one might reasonably expect to 
find disrupted. In other words, it is possible to formulate ‘generalizations’ like ‘in lung 
cancer, CNVs deregulates the pathways x, y and z’. Ciriello and colleagues (2013) provide 
similar generalizations when they discover two macro-categories of tumours (one with 
somatic mutations and one with CNVs) and that each tumour type (again defined by 
tissue of origin) falls, more or less, either under the category of tumours with somatic 
mutations or under the category of tumours with CNVs. To sum up the structure of 
mining studies, despite the complexity of computational tools used and the astonishing 
amount of data analysed, is simple:  
 
(d) Scientists look for associations between different metadata labels in order to 
uncover macro-regularities  
(e) Macro-regularities (i.e. patterns) are, strictly speaking, predictions in the sense 
that they provide an expectation of what it is likely to be found in similar contexts 
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2.2 Differences between data-driven studies and mining studies 
 
Mining studies, despite being instances of big data biology, share few features with the 
data-driven biology screenings I described in the previous chapter. Data-driven biology 
and mining studies have in common the existence of background assumptions. However, 
in mining studies background assumptions play a substantially weaker role than in data-
driven biology. In mining studies, the only background assumptions present are: 
 
1. The theoretical basis of the computational tools used to identify associations 
2. The fact that pattern discovery is metadata-laden, meaning that it is possible to 
find associations only within the categories of a pre-existing taxonomy system x 
(e.g. Gene Ontology).  
 
In order to better understand what ‘metadata-laden’ means, imagine that the 
taxonomical system in which Ciriello et al. embedded their research classifies DNA 
mismatch repair and p-53 mediated apoptosis under the same label (Figure 3.3). Then, 
we would not be able to identify the patterns according to which DNA mismatch repair is 
not altered in ovarian cancer, while p-53 mediated apoptosis it is because we would 
classify DNA mismatch repair and p-53 mediated apoptosis as the same phenomenon. 
Therefore, it is the structure of metadata that provides the kind of patterns of data we 
can possibly detect.  
 Next, in mining studies the ideal of discovering mechanisms plays no role. What 
mining studies provide strictly speaking are predictions. While it is true that providing a 
mechanistic explanation also enables the formulation of predictions, the reverse is clearly 
false. Clearly I am assuming that, while mechanistic evidence is also a kind of statistical 
evidence, statistical evidence might not be mechanistic evidence. The fact that a SNP is 
shown to play a causal role in a mechanism that affects diabetes enables the formulation 
of the prediction that, whenever I find the SNP, there is a high probability of finding 
diabetes. However, having merely the association of the SNP with diabetes provides no 
mechanistic evidence that can explain the correlation. Douglas in (2009) says that the 
relation between explanation and prediction is a functional one31  in the sense that 
predictions are valuable because they force us to test our explanations. In the case of 
data-driven biology, the reverse is true: Predictions (the hypotheses survived to 
eliminative induction) provide the cognitive path to mechanistic explanations. This can be 
true also for mining studies. The association of ovarian cancer and alteration (through 
CNVs) of p-53 mediated apoptosis is a prediction that also suggests an experimental path 																																																								
31 Actually, “explanations provide the cognitive path to predictions, which then serve to test and refine the 
explanation” (Douglas 2009, 454).  
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to uncover mechanisms. However, what I shall argue in the next section is that the kind 
of predictions established by mining studies does not suggest directly a path to uncover 
mechanisms. Rather, they provide something subtler. 
  
 
 
 
 
2.3 Mining studies elaborate generalizations 
 
What is the role of predictions provided by mining studies? What kind of role do they play 
in contemporary biological research? There is not much literature in philosophy of science 
about predictions as there is, for example, of scientific explanations. Actually, most of the 
literature on prediction is ‘explanation-laden’, and it is focused on the differences between 
explanation and prediction (Douglas 2009; Hanson 1959; Scriven 1959).  
However, predictions may be seen also as generalizations (Shmueli 2010). The 
reason is that the function of scientific generalizations “is to provide reliable expectations 
of the occurrence of events and patterns of properties” (Mitchell 1996, S477). Hence, 
generalizations are somehow predictions.  
Generalizations uncovered by mining studies play, in my opinion, a subtler role 
than traditional predictions or expectations. My thesis is that generalizations derived from 
mining studies might provide some of the eliminative principles used to narrow the 
universe of hypotheses generated in the early phases of data-driven biology. Let us see 
how. 
Consider GWASs. Above, I have said that one late eliminative step is to provide a 
preliminary functional characterization of SNPs by looking at ENCODE data (Germain et al 
2014). If a SNP either does not overlap to a functional region or it overlaps with a region 
which function is not related to the phenotype of interest, then the SNP is eliminated from 
the universe of hypotheses. Thus, ENCODE annotations - by making generalization on the 
functions of human genome’s regions - have provided a way to develop eliminative 
principles to narrow the universe of hypotheses of GWASs. Let me provide an example. 
RegulomeDB32 (Boyle et al. 2012; Schaub et al. 2012) is a public database guiding the 
interpretation of regulatory variants in the human genome. The database integrates many 
sources of functional annotations, including ENCODE data. Each variant is classified 
according to a score. The score provides to the user a quantification of the confidence 
that a variant is likely to influence transcription factor bindings, expression quantitative 																																																								
32 http://www.regulomedb.org/ 
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trait loci, etc. For instance, variants that falls within category 1 are likely to affect protein 
binding and expression of a gene target while variants of category 2 are likely to affect 
only protein binding. Imagine that a researcher makes a GWAS for prostate cancer. She 
narrows the universe of hypotheses through the statistical eliminative principles 
illustrated above down to 2 SNPs. These are rs902774 and rs966321. ENCODE 
annotations found in RegulomeDB provide useful information for eliminating one of these 
two variants. The researcher through RegulomeDB will discard rs966321 because this 
variant falls in a region not associated to any biochemical activity. However, RegulomeDB 
provides important information for rs902774 that leads to formulate a specific hypothesis 
to be tested in the last phase of the discovery structure of data-driven biology. Not only 
this SNP falls in a functional region, but there is also evidence (score: 2a, i.e. the highest 
score for category 2 in RegulomeDB) that rs902774 falls in the binding site of the 
transcription factor CTCF and that it negatively influences the binding site of the 
transcription factor. Since the SNP is functional by influencing negatively a transcription 
factor (and this can have influences in the expression of genes regulated by CTCF), the 
researcher will prioritize rs902774 in the phase of hypothesis justification. In other words, 
through ENCODE annotations one is able to prioritize a SNP in particular, and to eliminate 
another from its universe of hypotheses. Hence, ENCODE generalizations of the form ‘this 
particular region of the genome is biochemically active in such and such a way’ are able 
to provide useful principles to be used in order to interpret SNPs. By analysing large 
cohorts of data, mining studies provide empirical generalization that can be used to 
prioritize certain hypotheses instead of others. 
Similar considerations may be drawn for cancer genomics. As Raphael et al (2014) 
emphasize, the challenge in cancer genomics is to identify driver mutations and to 
understand their effects on pathways and cellular processes. The idea is that if certain 
genes are mutated, then (in light of functions and the pathways genes participate in) they 
might be good proxies for driver mutations. As emphasized in the literature (Raphael et 
al. 2014; Vandin et al. 2011) there are tools that, by grouping genes in terms of functions 
and pathways, may be of some help in restricting the universe of driver genes. However, 
how do we decide whether a pathway is relevant to cancer? A mining study like Ciriello et 
al. (2013) provides useful hints. Through the generalizations provided by Ciriello and 
colleagues, data-driven biologists obtain a list of cancer-specific pathways to be checked 
during the narrowing of the universe of hypotheses. Let us see this through a specific 
example. Consider Figure 3.3.  
 
	78	
 
 
This figure is taken from Ciriello and colleagues’ article. It is a visual summary of the 
patterns they have identified. Let me show how to use this ‘map’ by means of an 
example. Imagine that a physician has a patient affected by colon cancer (ultramutators 
variety). The physician then decides to genotype the tumour of the patient in order to 
grasp the genomic features of the tumour. A guide on what to look for in the genome is 
provided by Figure 3.3. First, if the tumour is colon cancer ultramutators (column b, 
COADREAD-ultra) variety, then it is a M1 tumour (column a). Next, somatic driver 
mutations should be located in selected genes like ATM, APC or PTEN and other genes 
that are located in the same pathways (column c). Hence the physician will look only 
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certain genes and not others (column c). Equally, in order to understand which are the 
altered pathways and altered cellular processes, the study of Ciriello et al provides an 
interesting source of criteria to prioritize only certain pathways and processes (in this 
case, chromatin organization, PI3K-AKT signalling, etc, as shown in columns d and e). 
To sum up, the associations found by Ciriello et al might be considered as a pre-
determined genes-and-pathways set that any researcher should compare with her list of 
mutations, genes and copy number variations. For instance, if certain genes do not 
overlap with the gene set provided by the generalization provided by Ciriello and 
colleagues, then they should be eliminated from the universe of hypotheses. In this 
sense, generalizations drawn through mining studies provide new eliminative principles or 
complement existing ones. 
 
2.4 Mining studies, store of a field and exploratory experiments 
 
In the previous section I argued that mining studies elaborate generalizations aimed at 
creating or complementing eliminative principles for data-driven biologists. Following this 
line of reasoning, we might say that mining studies are driven by a desire to find hints on 
how to look at an enormous amount of data when there are no specific expectations 
guiding observation. To put mining studies in a broader category of experimentation, we 
might say that mining studies are exploratory experiments. 
For instance, exploratory experiments are “driven by the elementary desire to 
obtain empirical regularities and to find out proper concepts and classifications by means 
of which those regularities can be formulated” (Steinle 1997, S70). This is exactly the 
goal of mining studies, which aim to obtain patterns of data, extract generalizations and 
elaborate new classificatory frameworks. Exploratory experiments, Steinle goes on, 
emerge in periods of scientific development when a well-formed theory about certain 
phenomena is missing. Needless to say, the so-called ‘big data’ biology is still at its 
infancy and only recently scientists have started to uncover preliminary generalizations. 
Steinle also adds that exploratory experiments are not theory-free but rather they are 
somehow constrained by guidelines. Similarly, mining studies are constrained by 
metadata labels and the computational tools employed to discover associations of various 
sorts. O’Malley (2007) argues that exploratory experiments deal with complex interacting 
systems. This is the case of mining studies and explorations of genomes. As it is now 
widely shared, genomes are highly complex entities. Moreover, O’Malley adds that 
exploratory experiments constitute a broad inquiry based on multiple experiments and 
their relationships. As the examples above have shown, this is clearly the case of mining 
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studies. For example, mining the data-set of ENCODE means mining the relationships 
between data coming from 1,649 experiments.  
If mining studies are exploratory experiments, and if they provide useful 
generalizations guiding scientific inferences, then mining studies seem to provide the 
terrain to form a sort of background knowledge for an entire discipline. They are like 
textbooks of a field (e.g. Alberts et al 2014), being a primary source for that field. In a 
sense, exploring databases through mining studies might be conceived as the practice of 
forming what has been called in the literature ‘a store of a field’ (Darden 2006). Darden, 
when talking about mechanisms as composed of both entities and activities, claims that 
“[f]or a given field at a given time, there is typically a store of established or accepted 
components out of which mechanisms can be constructed” (2006, p 51). In molecular 
biology, examples of components are genes or proteins. In the store of a field there are 
also accepted modules, which are organized complex of the entities of a field. Examples 
may include nucleosome, ribosomes, etc. The notion of a store of a field is not well 
developed but there are some features that can be straightforwardly identifiable. First, 
the existence of a store in a field puts important constraints on discovery strategies. If a 
molecular biologist has to discover a certain mechanism, the starting point of her 
research will be to consider certain entities and modules that she will combine to 
elaborate a mechanism description. But there are a limited number of types of entities 
and modules, which are exactly what form the store of molecular biology. Therefore, the 
way she will develop a mechanistic description depends on the nature of the store of her 
field – that is, the availability of specific entities, activities and modules. Another 
important feature is that these stores are usually given in a propositional form in 
textbooks like the famous one written by Bruce Alberts and colleagues (2014). In such 
textbooks practitioners describe, for instance, the biology of the cell and they describe 
how different entities interact to produce certain established biological phenomena, or 
how entities are combined to form specific modules. But there are also richer stores 
provided by leading reviews, which assume the kind of knowledge established in 
textbooks. In molecular oncology two examples of leading reviews are the famous series 
of reviews by Hanahan and Weinberg (2000; 2011) and the Vogelstein and colleagues’ 
Cancer Genome Landscapes (2013). Hanahan and Weinberg’s review provides constraints 
on how to build a mechanistic description of established processes related to cancer, like 
the evasion of apoptosis. Clearly, the description depicted by Hanahan and Weinberg are 
not taken to be exhaustive, in the sense that, while moving across the space of 
possibilities that they provide, one can add additional details thereby enriching the 
mechanistic description of the evasion of apoptosis. The review by Vogelstein and 
colleagues (2013) is another example of leading review compiling a store of a field. They 
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assemble the latest results in molecular oncology, a description of the main entities 
involved in cancer development, how they combine together to form modules, and so on.  
But how exactly does one compile such a store? In the case of leading reviews and 
textbook one must scrutinize the literature, select accepted results, and organized them 
in a coherent framework. 
 My claim is that mining studies, and hence the whole practice of the exploration of 
databases, aims at building a store. However, this is a different kind of store. I would like 
to conceive stores with respect to the kind of constraints that they provide. In the case of 
textbook (as well as leading reviews), we may talk about low-level constraints, in the 
sense that textbooks provide just the condition sine qua non to elaborate mechanistic 
description in, for instance, the molecular biological field. Textbooks will tell you which 
are the minimal units to consider when exploring the biological realm. Then there are 
medium level constraints. These are modules: (again) textbooks and leading reviews 
provide scientists with a guide as to how combine entities in a certain way and not in 
another. Results provided by mining studies somehow assume low-level constraints 
(defined in the categories of, e.g., Gene Ontology) as well as medium-level constraints, 
and they provide an additional layer of constraints, which I call high-level constraints. By 
detecting patterns in big data sets, mining studies come out with a sort of regimented 
procedure for ‘theory choice’ (using this expression in a very broad sense) which guide 
discovery literally step-by-step as shown in the case of the physician analysing colorectal 
cancer. These high-level constraints limit the degree of freedom for the process of data 
analysis, thereby regimenting the whole process of discovery. In a sense, once you have 
certain initial features of the phenomenon you are analysing, the process of discovery 
descend almost consequentially with the use of high-level constraints. Given Figure 3.3, if 
one is analysing colorectal ultramutator variety, then the specific entities and activities - 
as well as modules and pathways - can be immediately identified, and not guessed 
among a space of possibilities by means of experiments. With high-level constraints, the 
space of possibilities is particularly tied. 
Therefore, mining studies provide this sort of high-level constraints. While 
textbook or reviews provide stores by scrutinizing hundreds of articles, the practice of 
building a store of a field by means of the exploration of databases is achieved by means 
exploratory experimentation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I tried to make sense of the epistemic role of biological databases in 
contemporary research. I scrutinized their use, and how we can understand their use 
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according to the notion of idealization, which is central in scientific practice and 
theorizing. My aim was to explain from an epistemic point of view what the use of 
databases might allow and to fill a conceptual gap in the literature in the philosophy of 
biology.  
Accordingly, I classified the uses of databases in two main varieties. First, 
databases are evidence-enhancers, namely that they are used to reinforce evidence for 
identifying certain phenomena in data sets and to aid the formulation of claims about 
phenomena. In another sense, databases are subjected to exploratory experiments, and 
they are mined in order to identify robust regularities leading to generalizations, which 
are then used as high-level constraints for building what Darden (2006) calls the store of 
a field.  
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CHAPTER 4 
STRATEGIES OF DISCOVERY OF TRADITIONAL MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY 
 
CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
 
In this chapter I identify the structure of discovery of what I call ‘traditional’ molecular 
biology. First, I identify clearly what I mean by ‘traditional’ molecular biology. Next, I 
analyze a strand of the existing literature on discovery in molecular biology, namely the 
so-called mechanistic philosophy. Next, I show how molecular oncology – a sub-field of 
molecular biology – follows the same strategies identified by the ‘mechanistic 
philosophers’ in molecular biology. Finally, I show how my tripartite framework fits 
molecular oncology and how the received view of discovery strategies in molecular 
oncology can be understood through my framework.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I identify the discovery strategies of traditional studies in molecular 
biology.  
This work is motivated by a controversy between scientists supporting data-driven 
biology as a novel set of scientific methodologies to uncover biological phenomena, and 
‘traditional’ molecular biologists claiming that their ‘traditional’ strategies constitute (and 
will continue to be) the only right scientific method for biology. This is exactly a 
controversy over methodologies and discovery strategies. Therefore, in this work I am 
comparing data-driven and ‘traditional’ discovery strategies in order to see whether the 
controversy lies exactly at this level. After having discussed discovery strategies of data-
driven molecular biology, I now turn to ‘traditional’ molecular biology. In particular, I shall 
be focused on molecular oncology and in general on the molecular studies on cancer 
stemmed from the development of the so-called ‘oncogene paradigm’ (Morange 1998). 
There are two reasons for doing this. First, in Chapter 2 my analysis concentrated on 
data-driven studies on cancer by scrutinizing case studies from cancer genomics and 
GWASs. Therefore, it would be appropriate to compare how different discovery traditions 
tackle the same type of phenomena. Next Robert Weinberg, who is arguably a pioneer in 
molecular oncology, has taken a prominent part in the controversy motivating this work. 
Therefore, by analyzing one of his latest works as a case study (Guo et al 2012), I discuss 
his conception of ‘the right methodology for molecular biology’.  
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 Before starting, it is better to grasp exactly what I mean by ‘molecular biology’, a 
concept that is far from clear. 
 
1.1 What is molecular biology? 
 
Defining molecular biology is a hard task. We might start from a very broad and common 
sense definition. One may say that molecular biology is the study of the biological realm 
at the molecular level. This is clearly too broad, and it seems to encompass much more 
than what people usually think. As Morange says, molecular biology cannot be just the 
description of biology in terms of molecules, because if this were the case, then even 
Pasteur would count as a molecular biologist (1998, p 1). 
Some have proposed to see molecular biology as being unified by the notion of 
mechanism. To put it very simply, mechanisms “are entities and activities organized such 
that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to termination 
conditions” (Machamer et al 2000, p 3). According to Darden and Tabery (2009) the 
notion of ‘mechanism’ is the cornerstone to generate a clear and precise picture of 
molecular biology, at least from a philosophical (that is, conceptual) and historical point 
of view. However, this looks both imprecise and vague (in the technical sense of being 
susceptible to borderline cases). Strangely enough, Darden herself (Craver and Darden 
2013) depicts the ‘mechanistic tradition’ as encompassing far more than traditional 
molecular biology. Actually, Darden and Craver say explicitly that the search for 
mechanisms is one of the biggest achievement of science, and that scientific activity as a 
whole (whatever this means) should be organized to advance mechanistic knowledge, 
and not only at the biological level. They also stress that this ‘big project’ dates back at 
least to the Scientific Revolution. The notion of mechanism, then, is not a peculiarity of 
molecular biology. Actually mechanisms are pervasive in basically all biological fields. 
From neuroscience to ecology, the project of discovering mechanisms is ubiquitous. 
Therefore we cannot say that the idea of discovering mechanisms unify conceptually and 
historically the field of molecular biology. Rather, one may say (though I do not agree) 
that mechanisms unify biology. But the notion of mechanism goes well beyond biology. 
For those who are unfamiliar with the history of science, even in the last few years there 
is much talk about mechanisms in physics, as for example the so-called ‘Higgs boson 
mechanism’. 
Another strategy is to argue that molecular biology is a hybrid. As many have 
argued, molecular biology seems to be the encounter of two different disciplines, i.e. 
genetics and biochemistry. However, it is not merely the sum of these disciplines. To 
quote again Morange, molecular biology is “a new way of looking at organisms as 
	 85	
reservoirs and transmitters of information” (1998, p 2). It seems that most molecular 
biological studies are focused on the notion of biological information (Floridi 2010), in 
particular on the code written in the DNA that then serves as a blueprint for making 
proteins. Information here is to be understood in a metaphoric sense. In particular, it is a 
metaphor helping researchers to give a rationale for conceptualizing a certain class of 
problems. Therefore we might say that molecular biology is a set of techniques borrowed 
from biochemistry and genetics, unified by a metaphor-heuristic, applied to the discovery 
of mechanisms at the molecular level. 
However, this definition is not historically accurate. While it is true that early 
molecular biologists make use of techniques borrowed from genetics and biochemistry, it 
is also true that molecular biologists soon developed their own peculiar techniques. 
Therefore we should add a historical axis to our characterization of molecular biology. 
Fortunately, there is a consensus on the brief history of molecular biology. According to 
Morange (1998), the conceptual tools of molecular biology were forged between 1940 and 
1965, while the ‘consequent operational control’ was put forth between 1972 and 1980 
with the era of so-called ‘gene technology’ (Rheinberger 2007).  
Therefore we may say that molecular biology is a discipline developed throughout 
three decades (1940s, 1950s and 1960s) from the combination of a set of techniques 
borrowed from biochemistry and genetics and unified by the informational metaphor-
heuristic. In the 1970s and 1980s molecular biology matured with the development of 
gene technology. The whole set of techniques is applied to the discovery of mechanisms 
at the molecular level.  
2 DISCOVERING MECHANISMS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
 
After the characterization of molecular biology, the question is: Which are the discovery 
strategies of this discipline?  
Gross (2013) concentrates his analysis of discovery strategies on the idea of 
(epistemic) complexity, a concept borrowed from Rheinberger (1997b). Epistemic 
complexity refers to the fact that biologists, when investigating a phenomenon, are 
usually in a situation of incomplete information and limited experimental access. This 
means that the complexity is not necessarily referred to the phenomenon itself, but 
rather to the scientific task. In a situation of limited access there can be a great deal of 
possible ways in which the phenomenon could be organized that are consistent with 
current knowledge. According to Gross (2013), asking questions about discovery 
strategies in molecular biology means asking questions about how molecular biologists 
reduce and attack epistemic complexity and more specifically how the search for 
mechanisms constitutes the way molecular biologists attack epistemic complexity. The 
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landmark work on mechanisms to be considered here is Discovering Complexity by 
Bechtel and Richardson (1993; 2010). Strategies of discovering in science are said to be 
mechanistic when scientific discovery is analogous to the attempt of explaining the 
working of an engineered machine. In a typical mechanistic explanation, relevant parts, 
relevant activities and their organizations are depicted and arranged into a chain of 
reasoning to show how parts and activities produce the functioning of the machine.  
‘Mechanism’ should be understood as a metaphor grounding a set of heuristics. By 
‘heuristics’ I mean strategies or ‘rules of thumb’ (Langley et al 1987; Wimsatt 2007; 
Gross 2013) aimed at reducing the epistemic complexity of a scientific problem. Since an 
epistemically complex problem can have many possible solutions, heuristics strategies are 
used to reduce the list of solutions to that problem.  
 In the next sub sections of section 2 I will first characterize more in detail the 
notion of mechanism (Machamer et al 2000) and what does it mean to explain a 
phenomenon by discovering mechanisms (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). Then I will 
introduce several strategies identified for discovering mechanisms33 in particular Bechtel 
and Richardson’s characterization (2010) and Darden’s work (Darden 2006; Darden and 
Craver 2002; Craver and Darden 2013). Next, I will show these heuristics in action in the 
well-discussed historical case of the discovery of protein synthesis.  
2.1 Mechanisms and mechanistic explanations 
 
The concept of mechanism plays a key role in scientific activity. In molecular biology, the 
concept is used to describe (and explain) phenomena such as DNA replication, protein 
synthesis, cell differentiation, etc. However it is not entirely clear what mechanisms are or 
– better – to my knowledge there is no consensus among biologists about what exactly 
mechanisms are. It seems that thinking about mechanisms should include some discourse 
on relevant biological parts, their activities, and their organization. I will not fall into the 
metaphysical temptation of discussing whether mechanisms are real and what is the best 
way to characterize them; rather, I employ ‘mechanism’ as a metaphor-heuristic used to 
attack epistemic complexity in molecular biology. Therefore I will employ a particular 
notion of mechanisms that is instrumental to the strategies of discovery elucidated for 
molecular biology: Mechanisms “are entities and activities organized such that they are 
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to termination conditions” (Machamer 
et al 2000, p 3). Entities include macromolecules such as nucleic acids, proteins, and RNA 
molecules while activities include electrochemical activities as biochemical signaling, cell 																																																								
33 Actually, most of the debate on mechanisms is focused more on the metaphysics of mechanisms that is, what 
mechanisms are out-there-in-the-world. It would be interesting to show how the heuristic-metaphor has 
become a metaphysical program, but this task is well beyond the scope of the present work. 	
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fusion, etc. Molecular biologists then attack epistemic complexity of biological phenomena 
by decomposing phenomena of interest in entities and activities in the attempt of finding 
out how these entities and activities produce phenomena themselves. One might say that 
talking about ‘discovery of mechanisms’ implies some sort of metaphysical commitment 
to the reality of mechanisms. However, here I refer to ‘discovery of mechanisms’ by using 
the word ‘mechanism’ just instrumentally (and hence without any metaphysical 
commitment), where ‘mechanism’ is merely something about the phenomenon of interest 
that could in principle explain the existence of the phenomenon itself.  
Here comes explanation. Since the interest of science is to explain the natural 
world, and mechanism are taken to explain biological phenomena, does the discovery of 
mechanisms provide some sort of explanation of biological phenomena? There is a 
tendency among philosophers – originated in Salmon (1984) - to elaborate a specific 
notion of scientific explanation tailored around the concept of mechanism (see for 
instance Machamer et al 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). In particular, Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen point out that “the terms biologists most frequently invoke in explanatory 
contexts is mechanism. That is, biologists explain why by explaining how” (2005, p 422). 
Therefore mechanistic explanations explain in the sense that they show how a particular 
phenomenon is produced. In other words, a mechanistic explanation creates a causal 
story. Models then are explanatory when they describe mechanisms, i.e. “to give a 
description of a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that phenomenon, i.e. to 
explain how it was produced” (Machamer et al 2000, p 3). 
 But when exactly is a mechanistic explanation a good explanation? This should be 
linked to the notion of ‘productive continuity’ (Darden 2006; Darden and Craver 2002). In 
a nutshell, a good mechanistic explanation must show how each stage of the mechanistic 
chain produces the next one, i.e. improving the quality of an explanation means filling 
gaps in a chain connecting set-up and terminations side of the causal chain. 
 
2.2 Strategies for discovering mechanisms (i): decomposition and 
localization 
 
As many commentators argue, the concept of mechanism provides a heuristic to tackle 
scientific problems. This concept lays out the task involved in the sense that  
 
“the scientist must identify the working parts of the mechanisms, determine what operations they 
perform, and figure out how they are organized so as to generate the phenomenon” (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005, p 432) 
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According to Bechtel and Richardson (2010) there are two basic mechanistic strategies for 
discovering mechanisms: Decomposition and localization. Again, these are mechanistic in 
the sense that they are understood in analogy with the functioning of an engineered 
machine. But decomposition and localization are instances of two more general strategies 
to isolate components of a system: Analytic and synthetic strategies. Analytic strategies 
identify relevant components of the system that are likely to play a non-negligible role in 
the production of a certain phenomenon by, for instance, intervening physically on those 
parts to determine what each part does. Analytic techniques include inhibitory strategies 
(i.e. determine the contribution of a system’s part by inhibiting its activity) and excitatory 
studies (i.e. extra stimulation on an part’s activity to determine an identifiable surplus). 
Synthetic strategies start with the hypothesis that the whole functioning of a system 
might be performed by a set of component operations. After that, one tries to assign 
operations to specific parts of the system. Synthetic strategies are used pervasively in the 
field of Artificial Intelligence (AI).  
Analytic and synthetic strategies are complementary in the sense that some 
analytic strategies (such as inhibitory techniques) can provide evidence for certain 
synthetic models, while synthetic models might provide a framework to interpret 
analytical studies. According to Bechtel and Richardson (2010) one prominent way of 
interplaying analytical and synthetic strategies – especially in the discovery of 
mechanisms – is the combination of decomposition and localization.  
Decomposition is a kind of heuristic allowing the decomposition of a complex 
explanatory task into a set of more manageable tasks. In particular, it assumes that the 
whole activity of a system is the result (the sum) of a set of subordinated functions. In 
this sense, decomposition is genuinely synthetic. Localization then is the assignment of 
different activities to specific components or parts of the system. Therefore localization 
assumes decomposition into subordinated functions.  
What is exactly the starting point for decomposition? The first step is to understand which 
system is responsible for the phenomenon we are investigating. Bechtel and Richardson 
call this task the identification of the locus of control. This ‘locus’ is the ‘place’ where we 
think a certain phenomenon occurs. Identifying the right locus of control is a demanding 
task since it involves the identification of the right level of organization, the boundaries of 
the system itself and it has important consequences on how we decompose the system. 
For instance, in studying respiration it was far from being clear how this process actually 
occurred, until it was found out that the locus of control of respiration – where respiration 
happens – is the cell (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, Chapter 3 Section 4). The initial task 
of the identification of the locus of control implies the ‘segmentation’ of a system from its 
environment (see Figure 4.1). 
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The next step then is to identify how the system performs what is required to perform. In 
other words, now the task is to go deeper into the mechanism underlying the behavior. 
This is provided by direct or simple localization. In particular, direct localization proposes 
a hypothesis of how the system can be decomposed into a set of components (Bechtel 
and Richardson 2010, p 63). Again, here there are contentious assumptions about the 
system, namely that it can be easily decomposed; that activities are not distributed 
among several parts, so that each activity can be assigned to one part; that by computing 
all parts’ activities we will obtain the whole behavior we are investigating. Direct 
localization is similar to the task of identifying the locus of control, but with a substantial 
difference. What is different is the level of analysis. If identifying the locus of control 
requires the segmentation of a system from its environment, direct localization requires 
the segmentation of the system itself into components somehow relevant for the 
explanatory task. 
Therefore, direct localization is placed within the system, and hence it is at a lower 
level of analysis than the level of determining the locus of control. Both determining the 
locus of control and direct localization are the results of the interplay between 
decomposition and localization. In the case of the locus of control, scientists decompose 
the activities of nature and localize some of them in a system, while in the case of direct 
localization we treat the locus of control as a set of components susceptible to the 
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decomposition strategy, and then we localize activities within components. This again can 
be shown with a diagram taken from Bechtel and Richardson’s book (Figure 4.2). 
 
 
While direct localization can provide strong evidence (for instance, by means of inhibitory 
or excitatory strategies) that a particular component is responsible for the behavior of a 
system, this is not enough to describe the exact mechanism explaining the phenomenon 
of interest. It localizes some components but it does not explain how. To explain how, we 
need a lower level of analysis. Without going too much into details, what is crucial here to 
point out is that again decomposition and localization come into play in going lower. In 
particular, localization has to demonstrate that entities or processes perform functions 
identified in decomposition, which is more than direct localization. Actually, direct 
localization is only - in Bechtel and Richardson’s own words - an insufficiently constrained 
localization. This is important, as we will see in Chapter 5. As an example, at the time of 
first edition of Bechtel and Richardson’s book (in 1993), some researchers claimed to 
have identified genetic markers on chromosome 11 of the human genome correlated to 
manic depression in the Amish community of Pennsylvania. This is a claim of direct 
localization. However, the evidence - Bechtel and Richardson continue - is purely 
	 91	
correlational and it gives no clue on whether certain genes are causal agents or simply 
markers. 
A different case, again reported by Bechtel and Richardson (2010), is about 
Alzheimer’s disease where localization and decomposition go deeper, by claiming that 
perhaps amyloid proteins are involved in the development of the disease. This evidence is 
stronger, since it suggests at least a possible mechanism. It should be emphasized that a 
good localization is one that suggests strategies to go deeper in another localization. But 
when exactly a mechanistic explanation is complete? In my humble opinion, Bechtel and 
Richardson do not suggest when the level of analysis is sufficient to provide a good 
mechanistic explanation. It seems that there is no ending in going lower and lower in the 
level of analysis, and that there are no good mechanistic explanations, but just some that 
are better than others. Darden’s work partially can make sense of this problem 
(Machamer et al 2000; Darden 2006, Craver and Darden 2013; Darden and Craver 
2002). 
 
2.3 Strategies for discovering mechanisms (ii): schema instantiation, 
backward/forward chaining and anomaly revision 
 
In an impressive number of works, Lindley Darden has investigated the strategies for 
discovering mechanisms (see for instance Darden 2006; Machamer et al 2000; Darden 
and Craver 2002; Craver and Darden 2013). According to Darden, there are four different 
stages in discovering mechanisms: characterizing the phenomenon, constructing, 
evaluating and revising a mechanism schema. As in Bechtel and Richardson’s 
characterization34, scientific discovery is here depicted as a piecemeal process, from an 
unconstraint sketch, to a more elaborated and constrained mechanistic description. 
‘Constraint’ here is a keyword. Also in decomposition and localization, there are a number 
of constraints that limit the way the problem space can be decomposed and 
conceptualized.  
According to Darden, when we start to discover mechanisms, how we characterize 
the phenomenon to be explained constrains the on-going mechanistic description. In 
other words, “characterizing the phenomenon prunes the space of possible mechanisms 
(because the mechanism must explain the phenomenon) and loosely guides the 
construction of this hypothesis space (because certain phenomena are suggestive of 																																																								
34  In Bechtel and Richardson’s work, there are at least three kinds of constraints: (a) Phenomenological 
constraints, i.e. the way a phenomenon is characterized has clearly important consequences on the mechanistic 
descriptions that can be possibly elaborated; (b) operational constraints, i.e. available experimental techniques 
influence the way we conceptualize a decomposition task; (c) physical constraints, i.e. the background 
knowledge about the physical realization of lower-level components 	
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possible mechanisms)” (Craver and Darden 2013, p 52). Characterizing a phenomenon 
means employing the language of a given field with all its explanatory concepts and the 
store of entities and activities of that field. All these resources then can be combined to 
elaborate mechanism scheme. For instance, in the case of cancer genomics described in 
Chapter 2, the phenomenon ‘cancer’ is characterized in terms of accumulation of somatic 
mutations and how the phenomenon is explained is by means of those somatic mutations 
and not, for example, by means of structural variations. The characterization of the 
phenomenon is the starting point of the discovery process. Consider a simple example. If 
one seeks to understand how two populations of cells communicate with one another, one 
might consider different scenarios (conceptualized from background knowledge of the 
field) such as an interaction among cell-surface proteins, paracrine mechanisms, etc. 
Therefore the starting point of the discovery process is populated by several possible 
mechanisms. The store of the field and the characterization of the phenomenon frame the 
discovery process. This is exactly a heuristic, in the sense of a way to attack the 
epistemic complexity of a problem space by limiting the possible configurations of the 
problem space itself. 
 Another important concept playing a key role here – especially in determining the 
quality of a mechanistic description – is the concept of productive continuity. As I have 
already mentioned, the quality of an explanation lies in filling the gaps in a causal chain 
connecting set-up and termination sides of the causal chain itself. The idea is that a good 
mechanistic description must show all the steps – with no gaps – of the production of a 
phenomenon 35 . With the characterization of the phenomenon and the concept of 
productive continuity as a gold standard, scientists can start the discovery of 
mechanisms. There are several strategies that can be used which are not exclusive. 
 Schema instantiation is the first strategy. One starts with a very abstract 
characterization of the mechanism, full of black boxes, and then she looks for 
components fitting placeholders. In this way, the mechanism schema is made less 
abstract by instantiating it. Where do abstract characterizations come from? One source 
is, again, previous knowledge in a field. One may hypothesize the type of mechanism 
involved and take a pre-existing framework as the starting point of her schema. There are 
many types of mechanisms that one may consider, such as transport mechanisms, 
control mechanisms, replication mechanisms etc. Darden (2006) makes the example of 
explaining some adaptations. In this case, we will look for a selection schema, thereby 
considering a stage of variant production, then a selective interaction challenging the 
variants, and finally a differential benefit for some of the variants. Other sources 
employed are analogies. One can draw ‘analogies’ from neighbouring fields. Alternatively, 																																																								
35 Clearly there is a problem here: Are we sure that we are able to include, in principle, all the entities 
contributing to the mechanism? 
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a source of analogies is the history of science. Once the schema is sketched, then one can 
start looking for entities and activities playing a specific role in the abstract schema. The 
idea is that one has to fill black boxes in a piecemeal fashion as soon as evidence for the 
components playing a specific role is found. 
 Another strategy guiding mechanism discovery is modular subassembly. This 
strategy requires more ingenuity than schema instantiation, since it is mainly reasoning 
about how mechanism components might be combined. The idea is that “[o]ne 
hypothesizes that a mechanism consists of (perhaps known) modules or type of modules. 
One cobbles together different modules to construct a hypothesized mechanism” (Darden 
2006, p 286). It goes without saying, discovering ‘modules’ has important consequences 
on how future discovery strategies based on modular subassembly might be organized. 
One famous example of ‘module’ is Pax6 and a group of related genes playing an 
important role in eye formation in invertebrates. Therefore, knowledge of a conserved 
module such as the one of Pax6 will aid the construction of a plausible target mechanism 
of eye development in a new species (Craver and Darden 2013, p 75). 
 If schema instantiation provides the overall framework for a mechanism and 
modular subassembly proposes working components, the strategies of backward and 
forward chaining provide a finer grain analysis. These strategies enable scientists to 
reason about one part of the mechanism on the basis of other parts of the mechanism. 
Forward chaining uses earlier stages of mechanisms to reason on what might happen at a 
latter stage. Backward chaining is the opposite of forward chaining in the reasoning 
direction. In forward chaining one looks for ‘activity-enabling’ properties to reason 
forward in the productive continuity of the mechanism, while in backward chaining one 
looks for ‘activity signatures’ to reason backward. Craver and Darden (2013) provide the 
example of the finding of a hydrogen bond in a later stage of mechanism that somehow 
implies the existence of polar molecules with weak charges that have been neutralized in 
a prior stage of the mechanism. 
 Through the use of these strategies, mechanism sketches have to be evaluated 
and accordingly revised. Different types of anomalies can provide clues on how to 
evaluate and revise a hypothesized schema (Darden 2009). For instance, there are 
compositional anomalies, indicating that a certain entity, because of its composition, 
cannot accomplish what is taken to accomplish in the productive continuity of the 
mechanism. Another anomaly is the temporal anomaly: when something occurs more 
rapidly than expected by the sketch of the mechanism. Both anomalies indicate “the need 
for a change during the historical development of our understanding of the mechanism” 
(Darden 2009, p 50). Anomalies can be revealed by inhibitory and excitatory strategies, 
as “[p]oking and prodding an experimental system may reveal the presence (or absence) 
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of component entities and activities that then will need to find a place in a more 
articulated sketch” (Darden 2006, p 291). 
 To sum up, discovering mechanisms in Darden’s perspective is a piecemeal and 
gradual process of refining incomplete sketches, and scientists fill gaps in sketches by 
consulting the store of a field, by combining modules, by reasoning backward/forward, by 
playing with experimental systems and by correcting anomalies. In the next section, we 
will see all these strategies in-the-making in the case study of the discovery of protein 
synthesis. 
 
2.4 Using heuristics: the discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis 
 
The discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis has been widely discussed by 
historians of science and philosophers of science. Darden and Craver (2002) use the 
history of this discovery as a perfect instantiation of the use of strategies for discovering 
mechanisms. There are three main reasons why this episode is a good case study. First, 
while it is not the case that any episode in discovering mechanisms in molecular biology 
should embed all the heuristic strategies so far identified, the discovery of the mechanism 
of protein synthesis seems to encompass at least three very important strategies 
(schema instantiation, forward/backward chaining and anomaly revision). In other words, 
it is a good example to show strategies of discovery. The second reason lies in the fact 
that it was a groundbreaking discovery, catalyzing many other discoveries in the 60s and 
70s. Third, the discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis is also particularly 
interesting for the history of molecular biology, since it is the result of the joint effort of 
two disciplines (genetics and biochemistry), it represents a remarkable strengthening of 
the shift from the protein paradigm to the nuclei acid paradigm, and it was radically 
informed and guided by the informational metaphor. For all these reasons, several 
commentators analyzed this episode (see for instance Burian 1996; Kay 2000; Morange 
1998; Rheinberger 1997; Darden and Craver 2002). 
To put it in very simple terms - and to abstract from particulars I am not 
interested in - the protein synthesis (or at least the formation of the primary structure of 
proteins) works as follows. The conceptual starting point of the mechanism is the DNA 
double helix. In the nucleus, one strand of the DNA double helix is used as a template to 
synthesize a pre-messenger RNA (pre-mRNA). Next, pre-mRNA is subjected to a chemical 
process called splicing, where some bases are removed (introns) from the template and 
the remaining are assembled together (exons) to form mRNA. At this point mRNA is said 
to include the coding sequence, which is a sequence of units of three nucleotides called 
codons as well as other untranslated regions at both ends of the transcript. The mRNA 
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then moves to the cytoplasm. In the cytoplasm a complex of macromolecules called 
ribosomes binds to the mRNA at what is called the start codon. The recognition of the 
start codon is accomplished by  another RNA molecule called transfer RNA (tRNA). There 
are then others tRNAs which function as sort of adaptor molecules which actually link the 
triplets of mRNA to specific amino acids. In this way, tRNAs guide the association 
between codons and amino acids - thereby forming polypeptide sequences - until the stop 
codon. The outcome of this process is a sequence of assembled amino acids forming the 
primary structure of proteins. 
The history of the discovery of such a mechanism (except for the part on splicing) 
is based on the efforts of two different groups of scientists. On the one hand, the 
biochemistry group of Paul Zamecnik was trying to grasp the mechanism for assembling 
polypeptides. On the other hand molecular biologists the likes of James Watson and 
Francis Crick were trying to understand the genetic code and how the order of DNA bases 
is related to the order of amino acids in proteins. Zamecnik described these efforts as the 
building of a tunnel, where “digging is going on from two sides of this mound of 
uncertainty, in the hope of meeting in the middle” (1962, p 47). The idea was somehow 
to connect the hereditary message of the gene and its expression by means of the role of 
RNA that was increasingly becoming important both for molecular biologists and 
biochemists.  
The biochemistry group was reasoning from the end of the mechanism of protein 
synthesis36. It is a typical backward chaining “from peptide bonds to the mechanisms of 
polypeptide assembly, focusing on chemical reactions and energy requirements for such 
strong covalent bonds to form” (Darden and Craver 2002, p 5). They were focused on in-
vitro studies, employing a sort of decomposition and localization interplay by identifying 
the locus of control in the cell, decomposing it into parts, and analyzing the function of its 
parts. Therefore they started with a specific store of entities and activities organized 
around chemical structures and reaction schemes of small molecules like peptides and 
covalent bonding reactions. They were trying to understand energetic intermediates 
between free amino acids and their linkage in polypeptides. Accordingly, they were filling 
black boxes of chemical mechanism scheme and equations, which were their starting 
points (i.e. instantiated scheme). The intermediate between free amino acids and their 
linkage turned out to be aminoacyl adenylate, but they also recognized macromolecular 
complexes in the cytoplasm made of RNA and proteins (that they called microsomes) 
where the polypeptide synthesis took place, as well as another soluble RNA lighter than 
microsomes’ RNA. However, it was not entirely clear the role of RNA. Here there is not 																																																								
36 Clearly ‘the end of the mechanism’ has to be understood in an epistemic sense 
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only backward chaining, but also decomposition and localization. As a matter of fact, how 
the phenomenon was characterized - with known properties of polypeptides and in 
general the store of entities and activities - imposed important constraints on how the 
possible mechanism was understood, which entities they were expecting to fill black 
boxes, and how they were trying to localize them.  
The molecular biologists were reasoning forward from DNA to ordered amino acids 
sequences in proteins by means of a scheme based on the informational metaphor. 
Watson and Crick transformed a biological problem into a problem of information theory, 
thereby thinking in terms of macromolecules and their informational content. The 
informational metaphor came from a suggestion of the astrophysicist George Gamow who 
suggested to Watson and Crick that, in order to understand how the order of DNA bases 
correspond to the order of amino acids in proteins, the problem did not need to be 
conceived in terms of biochemical reactions, but rather as a coding problem. Therefore 
they started reasoning forward from DNA by decomposing the problem of protein 
synthesis in terms of information-transfer activities, trying to localize the entities involved 
in this information transfer.   
Biochemists and molecular biologists used different techniques and 
conceptualizations. Biochemists started with proteins, while molecular biologists started 
with DNA. Biochemists traced the flow of energy, while molecular biologists traced the 
‘information flow’. While biochemists were agnostic on the role of RNA, molecular 
biologists made several attempts to grasp its role into the phenomenon they were 
investigating. At first, since the structure of DNA was important in understanding many 
things about DNA, analogously they tried to determine the structure of RNA in the same 
way. It is a typical example of using neighboring fields by analogy to develop a 
mechanism schema. However, this attempt was unsuccessful. Then Crick elaborated the 
so-called ‘adaptor-hypothesis’. According to this hypothesis there are 20 adaptors (one 
for each amino acids), each of which can specifically bind to a coding template of RNA. 
Zamecnik heard about this conjecture, and he linked it to the discovery of the smaller and 
soluble RNA, that was also found to bind to amino acids. This small soluble RNA came to 
be called transfer RNA. 
 With the characterization of the mechanism centered around tRNA, it was still 
necessary to grasp how information was transmitted from DNA to RNA templates. Pardee, 
Jacob and Monod discovered this by means of the so-called PaJaMo experiment. In 
reasoning forward Pardee, Jacob and Monod discovered a temporal anomaly in the 
productive continuity of an early mechanism schema of protein synthesis elaborated by 
Watson and Crick. They were investigating the insertion of the gene for the enzyme of B-
galactosidase into a bacterium, and they observed that as soon as the gene entered the 
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bacterium lacking that gene, the enzyme started to be synthesized too early. At that 
time, scientists believed that such a synthesis would take much longer, because of the 
need to assemble microsomes from scratch. In particular, if the ribosomal RNA “had to be 
synthesized on the incoming DNA (the functional gene), and then the ribosomal particle 
had to be assembled, one would not expect the very rapid initiation of protein synthesis” 
(Darden and Craver 2002, p 15). Therefore, they hypothesized the existence of another 
type of RNA carrying information from DNA to microsomes. This turned out to be the 
messenger RNA. The story is not over, and I have neglected details of other groups 
working on the same mechanism, but for the purpose of showing how heuristic strategies 
work this is enough. 
 Let us now identify concepts and heuristics playing a key role in this story (Darden 
and Craver 2002). Backward and forward chaining, as well as decomposition and 
localization, have been already emphasized: Molecular biologists were reasoning forward 
to DNA, while biochemists were reasoning backward from polypeptides. Productive 
continuity has been characterized in two ways. Molecular biologists proposed productive 
continuity in terms of information transfer (preservation of linear order from DNA bases 
to amino acids passing through mRNA), while biochemists conceptualized productive 
continuity in terms of flow of matter and energy represented in terms of chemical 
equations. These two senses were then integrated in the end. Schema instantiation took 
place in two ways (see Darden and Craver 2002, pp 20-21 for the details of the scheme). 
Biochemists start with schemes taken from chemical reactions and equations of the form 
of 
1. Amino acids + ATP = other centrifuge fractions è activated aa complex 
è protein  
while molecular biologists start in terms of information flow: 
2. DNA è helical RNA è protein 
 
And they tried to fill black boxes in these simple schemes accordingly. 
To sum up, in this episode we find most of the heuristics that have been 
discussed. Decomposition and localization, the store of fields and analogies played a key 
role in setting the starting points of both molecular biologists and biochemists, while 
schema instantiation and backward/forward chaining as well as anomaly revisions were of 
paramount importance to develop the final mechanism description. Now that I have 
explained strategies of mechanism discovery in molecular biology, I can turn to molecular 
oncology, and try to see the relation between Darden’s (or Bechtel and Richardson’s) 
discovery strategies and my framework of discovery in order to compare ‘traditional’ 
molecular biology to data-driven molecular biology. 
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3. TRADITIONAL MOLECULAR ONCOLOGY 
 
In this section, I analyze what I call ‘traditional’ molecular oncology from three different 
angles. First, I will describe a case study (Guo et al 2012) taken from Weinberg’s lab 
following the narrative of scientific experiments as it appears in the original article. Next, 
I identify Bechtel and Richardson as well as Darden’s discovery strategies in the case 
study. Finally, I reconsider these strategies and the case studies in their relations to the 
tripartite framework depicted in Chapter 1, considering what happens within each phase 
of discovery, the inferences used and the epistemic values guiding the whole process. But 
before starting, it is worth to spend few words on the history of molecular oncology. 
 
3.1 Complexity, simplicity and complexity again: The strange case of 
molecular oncology  
 
Molecular oncology developed around the oncogene paradigm (Morange 1998, Chapter 
19). The stabilization of this paradigm took place between 1975 and 1985 and it was 
based on the idea that cancer, whatever it is exactly, “is the result of the activation, by 
modification of over-expression, of a highly conserved family of genes called oncogenes” 
(Morange 1998, p 219). An oncogene is a gene that, when overexpressed, has a direct or 
prominent role in tumor initiation or development. Oncogenes are usually coupled with 
tumor suppressor genes, which are genes that prevent cells from entering in a neoplastic 
state. In my understanding, when we talk about ‘the oncogene paradigm’ both oncogenes 
and tumor suppressor genes are included. In Chapter 19 of Morange’s book (1998) one 
may find the historical details about the decade between 1975 and 1985 but I think that, 
in order to introduce molecular oncology, Weinberg’s essay (2014) Coming Full Circle – 
From Endless Complexity to Simplicity and Back Again is a more tantalizing source for at 
least two reasons. First, since Weinberg is essential in the controversy motivating this 
work, and since the case study of traditional molecular oncology I am going to employ is 
from Weinberg’s lab, introducing this field through his eyes seems more coherent with my 
plans. Next, Weinberg does not focus only on historical details, but rather on how the 
complexity of cancer has been epistemically attacked. 
 In his essay appeared on Cell (2014), Weinberg traces the history of molecular 
oncology from the point of view of the emerging generation of scientists in the 1970s. At 
that time, the mechanisms of cancer development were completely unknown, and senior 
professors seemed to be fine with that. The younger generations of biologists, of which 
Weinberg was part of, endorsed a reductionist approach to the biological problem, 
claiming that the biology of cancer could have been understood in terms of few molecular 
mechanisms. Older professors disagreed, claiming “that cancer was really much too 
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complicated to be understood through simple molecular mechanisms. Indeed, they 
portrayed our reductionism as simplistic if not simple-minded” (Weinberg 2014, p 267). 
The real history of the rise of the oncogene paradigm dates back exactly at 1971, when 
President Nixon’s War on Cancer was declared, and an impressive flow of money were 
redirected to cancer research. To tell the truth, this ‘war’ was strictly rooted on the 
conviction that cancer was ultimately a disease of viruses infecting the genome. But by 
the mid-1970s the search for human retroviruses developing cancer turned out to be 
rather unsuccessful. Another idea was increasingly gaining recognition, namely that 
cancer was a disease of identifiable genes somehow able to overrule the far vaster 
genome of normal cells pushed into neoplastic states. The so-called Varmus-Bishop 
discovery (Stelhein et al 1976) of the src proto-oncogene was a step towards the 
stabilization of this idea. This discovery showed that, in rodents, normal cells carrying a 
specific gene that could be ‘kidnapped’ and modified by a retrovirus, could be 
transformed into cells in a neoplastic state. Moreover, Weinberg and his fellows were 
‘energized’ (his own word) by some works of Bruce Ames correlating carcinogenic potency 
of a chemical species to its mutagenic activity. This suggested that cancer cells could be 
conceived as mutants, and that mutant genes were capable of driving malignant cell 
proliferation. Here came the idea that the birth of a malignant cell could be the result of 
few molecular events. Therefore in the mid-1970s, everyone started to improve the 
ability to introduce transforming genes (oncogenes) via transfection into normal cells. 
 The birth of molecular oncology shows some of the strategies depicted in the 
previous sections. First, it is shown that in the 1970s people were looking for a way to 
attack the complexity of cancer. People first looked for a locus of control, identified with 
the genome. Then, people tried to do a direct localization, first focusing on retroviruses, 
and then establishing a correlation between specific genes and malignant cell states. The 
problem “how do we explain cancer?” was decomposed into a problem of localization of 
few genes responsible for tumor development. From this conjecture, the development of 
molecular oncology is just a logical consequence, namely the effort of going deeper into 
the mechanistic details of how specific genes were actually forcing normal cells to enter 
neoplastic states. 
 In 1982, Weinberg’s group and others (Shih and Weinberg 1982; Pulciani et al 
1982; Goldfarb et al 1982) isolated through cloning a transfected human bladder 
carcinoma gene. This human oncogene was a homolog of the Ras oncogene discovered by 
tumor virologists. By 1982, some results fueled two important (and misleading) 
convictions guiding decomposition and localization in molecular oncological research. First 
that in order to transform normal cell into cancer cells, a single specific gene was enough. 
Therefore, the decomposition of the phenomenon ‘cancer’ was (conceptually) based on 
the direct localization of a key entity – a specific gene. Instantiating a schema, and then 
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reasoning forward and backward were thought as being relatively easy task if based on 
just one entity – a specific gene. Next, this discovery was misleading also because the 
bladder carcinoma oncogene differed from its normal counterpart by only a single point 
mutation. Therefore cognitive strategies put in place to elaborate mechanistic descriptions 
looked much easier since they could have as starting point just a single point mutation. 
 In the next few years, several articles undermined these convictions. In 1983 it 
was discovered that two mutant genes – collaborating with one another – were 
responsible for tumor initiation. But this was for rodents. The corresponding human cells 
required five distinct mutant genes. 
 Next, it was time for a debate about oncogenes and tumor suppressors: Which one 
is really responsible for cancer? It was soon revealed that both are equally important in 
tumor development. Vogelstein’s pioneering work on colorectal cancer (Vogelstein et al 
1989; Fearon and Vogelstein 1990) showed that the more colorectal tumors progressed, 
the larger the number of somatic mutations affecting both oncogenes and tumor 
suppressors was. The 1980s and the 1990s were years devoted to show how complex the 
phenomenon of cancer development was, and the repertoire of oncogenes and tumor 
suppressors grew exponentially. 
 Despite the emerging complexity of cancer, Hanahan and Weinberg tried to reason 
both analytically and synthetically to grasp (or to idealize) some sort of order beneath the 
chaos of cancer. In particular, they tried to identify some commonalities, namely some 
phenotypes common to all neoplastic states, which can be used as heuristics to analyze 
and to categorize tumors. In a famous critical review (Hanahan and Weinberg 2000) six 
hallmarks of cancer were identified, and in 2011 two more were added (Hanahan and 
Weinberg 2011) as well as two enabling capabilities of the hallmarks themselves. Figure 
4.3, adapted from Hanahan and Weinberg (2011), provides a visual summary. 
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It is very important to stress that the type of categorization provided by Hanahan and 
Weinberg provides a series of schemes or modules that can be used both for schema 
instantiation and modular subassembly, or that can be used to reason forward and 
backward from any point in mechanism description. Actually, for each hallmarks there are 
genes likely to be responsible for tumor initiation, types of mechanisms put in place or 
pathways to explore. Therefore reconstructing mechanisms of cancer can take advantage 
of such ‘store’ of entities, activities, modules and types of mechanisms. While Hanahan 
and Weinberg’s work does not aim at explaining cancer complexity, it is nonetheless 
useful to attack the epistemic complexity as it is usually done in the tradition of 
discovering mechanisms. 
 In this section I have introduced the history of molecular oncology from the point 
of view of Weinberg, and his concerns about how we can attack the epistemic complexity 
of elaborating mechanism descriptions of cancer behavior. As I hope it is clear, molecular 
oncology practitioners tend to identify the locus of control in the genome, they localize 
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relevant parts in genes and mutations, they instantiate mechanism schemes and they try 
to reason forward and backward with the use of modules. In the next section, I discuss a 
case study taken from Weinberg’s lab (Guo et al 2012). 
 
3.2. Traditional Molecular oncology in the making 
 
In (Guo et al 2012) Weinberg’s group tries to get insights into the mechanism of 
induction and maintenance of adult stem cells and they find out that the mechanism they 
depict promotes tumorigenic and metastasis-seeding abilities in human breast cancer 
cells.  
Adult stem cells are undifferentiated cells residing with differentiated cells in 
various tissues or organs. These cells can differentiate into the major types of cells of 
tissues and organs where they are located. They are aimed at repairing and maintaining 
the tissue or organ where they reside.  
Weinberg’s group found out that two transcription factors (TFs) – Slug and Sox9 – 
act cooperatively to induce the adult stem cell state in mammary stem cell by activating 
distinct autoregulatory gene expression programs. Moreover, they showed that co-
expression of the two TFs promotes some typical cancer’s hallmarks in human breast 
cancer cells. Actually in this article Weinberg’s group showed much more, but these two 
results are enough. This is because here I am not (only) interested in the final results, 
but rather in how they set their starting point, and how they arrived at their conclusions 
about the cooperation of Slug and Sox9 in determining mammary stem cell state and 
human breast cancer. Here are the essential conceptual and experimental steps of this 
study. 
 
1. Weinberg’s group drew from two previous set of evidence the aims and the 
methods of their study. First, previous studies have shown how master TFs play 
key roles in determining cellular states, including stem cell states. However, for 
adult stem cell such evidence was missing. Therefore Weinberg’s group decided to 
go deeper into this issue, in particular for epithelial tissues. They chose mammary 
gland as experimental system because this contains a small subpopulation of cells 
with robust stem cell activity. This means that the mammary gland (in murine) 
was considered as a powerful system to understand the mechanism they wanted 
to uncover, as well as providing stringent test for stemness. Next, Weinberg’s 
group and others showed in previous studies that there is a surprising connection 
between epithelial-mesenchymal transition (EMT) program and the mammary 
stem cell. The idea was that the passage of both normal and neoplastic mammary 
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epithelial cells through EMT confers on the resulting cells some important features 
shared with mammary stem cell. In other words, EMT program drives mammary 
epithelial cells into mammary stem cells. Therefore, here Weinberg’s group sought 
to understand the genetic pathway cooperating with the EMT program enabling 
such transformations. 
2. Weinberg and his collaborators used different populations – sorted accordingly – of 
primary murine mammary epithelial cells. They measured the expression of 
mRNAs encoding ten TFs previously described as being implicated in EMT program 
and they find out that only Slug was significantly expressed in the mammary stem 
cells enriched population. Therefore, Weinberg’s group started to analyze the idea 
of Slug as being implicated in the maintenance and induction of adult stem cell 
state. They expressed Slug into mammary epithelial cell to investigate the role of 
this TF in inducing mammary stem cell state. They did this by various technical 
means those details are not of interest here. 
3. They found out that Slug was not able to induce the formation of mammary stem 
cells from differentiated luminal cells. Therefore they hypothesized that probably 
Slug requires another TF to do this. To identify the cooperating factor(s), they 
selected eight TFs known to play various roles in either embryonic or adult stem 
cell biology, and are also known to cooperate with Slug in early developmental 
processes. They discovered that Sox9 is likely to cooperate with Slug in forming 
organoids37. If Slug and Sox9 are implicated in transforming differentiated luminal 
cells into organoids, this means that they could be implicated in the transformation 
of luminal cells into adult stem cells which in turn can also give birth to other cell 
types. Therefore, they took this as preliminary evidence that Slug and Sox9 
together can at least induce mammary stem cell state. 
4. Weinberg and his colleagues expressed Slug and Sox9 together to see whether 
they convert differentiated luminal cells (as well as other differentiated epithelial 
cells) into mammary stem cells. Moreover, they knocked down either Slug or Sox9 
to check whether the continued coexpression of the two TFs is required to 
maintain mammary stem cells. They were successful.  
5. Since the cooperation of the two TFs was shown to be required for induction and 
maintenance of mammary stem cells state, Weinberg and his collaborators sought 
to understand how exactly this happens. First they found evidence that Slug and 
Sox9 activate distinct – but complementary – biological programs. They 
discovered that in differentiated luminal cells Slug upregulates the expression of 
mRNAs encoding five of six basal cell-associated TFs, while forced Sox9 expression 
of genes associated with luminal progenitors. In other words, Slug and Sox9 																																																								
37 Organoids are multicellular complexes containing various cell types 
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upregulate the gene expression of both basal cells and luminal progenitors. 
Therefore, while Slug regulates the basal lineages program, Sox9 has a key role in 
the luminal program and these two programs are known to be required for 
mammary epithelial cells to enter and reside in the mammary stem cells state.  
6. They also found out that, when ectopically expressed Slug and Sox9 are turned off 
after some days, the gene expression programs they promote remain active. This 
is because ectopically expressed Slug and Sox9 also induce the expression of their 
paralogs promoting the stabilization of an autoregulatory network that contributes 
to the maintenance of the stem state.  
7. The final mechanism, as far as I understand, is as follows. Slug and Sox9 in 
differentiated luminal cells activate two typical gene expression programs typical 
of basal cells and luminal progenitors which in turn promote the entrance and the 
maintenance of the typical mammary stem cell state. After some time, Slug and 
Sox9 also activate paralogs promoting an autoregulatory network which is able to 
maintain the mammary stem cell state. 
8. Finally, Weinberg’s group seeked to understand whether a similar mechanism act 
also in human breast cancer stem cells and they find evidence that Sox9 and, in 
part, Slug are required for maintaining robust tumorigenicity. 
 
Let us now try to identify, step by step, some of the strategies discussed in previous 
sections within this case study. 
 
1. In this step, Weinberg identified the locus of control and he set up a typical 
decomposition strategy coupled with schema instantiation. The locus of control 
here is the experimental system, in the sense that in order to understand the 
maintenance of adult stem cell, he chooses the mammary gland for all the reasons 
previously listed. Decomposition comes along the fact that, in order to study the 
determination of the mammary stem cell state, Weinberg decomposed the whole 
activity into a particular set of sub-activities: The activities pertaining gene 
regulation. At the same time, here comes schema instantiation, as the idea of 
focusing on TFs regulatory activities is coupled with a whole literature having some 
sort of ‘ready-made’ modules, entities and additional activities to be considered 
when dealing with such regulatory activities. Moreover, the previously shown 
connection between the EMT program and mammary stem cell is a precious source 
of knowledge to set up an initial set of possible mechanisms governing the 
phenomenon of interest. 
2. This is a phase of localization and forward chaining. Localization is done basically 
in two ways. First, from the literature Weinberg’s group considered a set of TFs 
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that could possibly play a role in the induction and the maintenance of the stem 
state. Then, a series of inhibitor and excitatory strategies were put in place to 
localize which of these TFs is likely to play a key role. When they focused on Slug, 
they started reasoning forward playing with inhibitory and excitatory strategies 
again to get insights on its role. 
3. In this phase anomaly revision and localization played a key role. Anomaly revision 
is important, since the hypotheses related to Slug did not seem to be consistent 
with experimental results. Here there is a compositional anomaly forcing Weinberg 
and his collaborators to modify their initial hypothesis. They then speculated that 
Slug could cooperate with one or more TFs, and they sought to localize them. By 
drawing again from the literature, they selected a set of other TFs and they 
discovered that Sox9 could be Slug’s ‘collaborator’.  
4. Here localization by means of forward chaining is fundamental. Accordingly, from 
the result of phase 3 they reasoned forward speculating the effects of the 
cooperation of Slug and Sox9 and they verified whether their localization 
hypothesis was corroborated by experimental results. 
5. Here again is a matter of forward reasoning. After having clearly localized Slug and 
Sox9 as key regulators, they sought to fill black boxes (understood as genetic 
pathways) in their flow of reasoning. They put in place a typical forward chaining 
by reasoning on the possible genetic programs activated by Slug and Sox9 and 
they found out that these genetic programs while being strictly distinct, they are 
complementary. 
6. Next, they considered another anomaly, namely the fact that sometimes while 
ectopic expression of Slug and Sox9 is turned off, the gene expression programs 
they promote remain active. Therefore, they slightly modified their hypothesis 
according to the observations that Slug and Sox9 activate a robust autoregulatory 
network that maintains active the gene expression programs. 
7. They finally came out with a mechanism description able to fill (most of) black 
boxes considered in schema instantiation, and that seemed to make sense of 
productive continuity. 
8. They hypothesized also that a similar mechanism can be active also in human 
breast cancer stem cells. Here drawing analogies from a close field is particularly 
relevant.  
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3.3 The tripartite framework and epistemic values in traditional 
molecular biology 
 
Let us now see how this picture is related to the tripartite framework elaborated in 
Chapter 1. The first phase is hypothesis generation, i.e. the generation of one or more 
hypotheses about a certain phenomenon or state of affairs. These hypotheses are in a 
very abstract form and they are usually created by means of a combination of intuition, 
creativity, analogies, knowledge of a certain field, background assumptions etc. In the 
second phase (named weak assessment, prior assessment, theory pursuit, etc) adding 
new evidence develops hypotheses. Here there is a twofold movement: On the one hand 
hypotheses that turned out to be false or less probable are discarded, while more 
promising hypotheses are further developed, making them less abstract. Here eliminative 
inferences and retroduction are likely to play a key role. In the third phase (called 
‘justificatory phase’), confirmation in all its forms is prominent, and final hypotheses are 
subjected to more stringent tests. Now, step by step, let us how these three phases can 
be identified in Weinberg’s case study, and which inference are used. 
 
1. In this step, Weinberg’s group set up some of the background assumptions that 
are fundamental in order to generate an initial set of hypotheses about the 
phenomenon under scrutiny. First, they assumed that the aspects of the 
phenomenon they wanted to explain depend on TFs regulatory activity. Moreover, 
hypotheses depended on the previous knowledge about the connection between 
the EMT program and mammary stem cells. 
2. Here there is hypotheses generation, as well as prior assessment. Weinberg’s 
group generated a set of hypotheses drawn from the literature about TFs 
regulation in induction and maintenance of the stem state. Hypotheses are of the 
form of ‘such TF regulates mammary stem cell state’. Next, it started prior 
assessment. Weinberg and his collaborators provided evidence that only one of the 
hypotheses members of the initial universe of conjectures was promising, namely 
the hypothesis that Slug can play a role in the phenomenon of interest. 
3. This is a fundamental turning point in prior assessment. The hypothesis ‘Slug 
regulates mammary stem cell state’ is developed, by adding new evidence, into 
‘Slug and Sox9 cooperate to regulate mammary stem cell induction and 
maintenance’. 
4. Similarly to step 3, Weinberg and collaborators collected evidence to develop the 
primary hypothesis. 
5. Again this is a phase of prior assessment, with a push towards the mechanistic 
details of the hypothesis, now becoming ‘Slug and Sox9 in differentiated luminal 
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cells activate two typical gene expression programs typical of basal cells and 
luminal progenitors which in turn promote the entrance and the maintenance of 
the typical mammary stem cell state’. 
6. Final formulation of the hypothesis, namely ‘Slug and Sox9 in differentiated 
luminal cells activate two typical gene expression programs typical of basal cells 
and luminal progenitors which in turn promote the entrance and the maintenance 
of the typical mammary stem cell state’. Here more stringent evidence for the 
whole hypothesis was added (justificatory phase). Moreover, another hypothesis is 
added, namely that ‘Ectopically expressed Slug and Sox9 activate paralogs 
promoting an autoregulatory network which is able to maintain the mammary 
stem cell state when they are turned off’. 
7. Here more stringent evidence for the whole hypothesis was added (justificatory 
phase) 
8. The hypothesis is transferred into a different field, and subjected to prior 
assessment and justification 
 
Therefore, it seems that hypothesis generation is guided by a heterogeneous set of 
background assumptions. These include previous knowledge in a specific field (in the case 
of TFs regulation), as well as analogies from close fields (as in the case of the final 
mechanism transferred to breast cancer). Prior assessment is driven mostly by 
eliminative inferences (when TFs are eliminated from the initial set of hypotheses), but it 
should be pointed out that also retroduction plays a prominent role. For instance, when 
the hypothesis about Slug seems to be undermined, Weinberg reasoned that their 
previous evidence could actually make sense only by postulating the existence of a 
partner in regulation. This is a striking case of abduction/retroduction. On the other hand 
here the justificatory phase – and how the final mechanism is evaluated – makes use of 
methods and strategies which are not different in principle from the ones of hypothesis 
development. Therefore one might say that here there is no difference between weak and 
strong evaluation. However, I would say that differences between weak and strong 
evaluation in such intertwined mechanistic constructions are fuzzier than in data-driven 
biology, where hypotheses development and justification are strictly separated. This is 
not to say that there is vagueness everywhere. Actually, there is a sense in which 
mechanism descriptions are strongly evaluated. Once a molecular biologist has elaborated 
a rich mechanistic description, the fact that no further anomalies emerge from 
experiments (and hence evidence that can undermine productive continuity) can be taken 
as a test that the mechanism description is sufficiently detailed and complete. This is a 
sort of final hypothesis testing, something that can close a ‘scientific story’ or a narrative. 
But we do not know that we are doing such a strong evaluation until we see that 
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productive continuity is met and no anomalies emerge. Therefore, we recognize strong 
hypothesis testing only retrospectively. Therefore, if one makes some technical mistakes 
in doing such experiments and further anomalies emerge, then this final set of 
experiments would not be recognized as a strong hypothesis testing, while in data-driven 
biology we are always aware that we are in the justificatory phase. In other words, 
justificatory phase in traditional molecular biology and data-driven biology are quite 
different because in traditional molecular biology the justificatory phase is recognized only 
retrospectively. Moreover, there is also another retrospective way in which a mechanism 
description can be put at test in a strong sense. A good mechanism description should 
also make sense of the observations done to construct the description itself.  
 It is easy to show how in general strategies identified by Bechtel, Richardson and 
Darden have counterparts in my tripartite framework. For example, hypothesis generation 
can be thought as the initial stage of decomposition, when a phenomenon is decomposed 
into subset of activities. Decomposition implicitly generates also a list of possible entities 
that can be responsible for the activities, usually drawing from existing literature. This is 
also the case of the constraints imposed by the nature of the phenomenon under 
investigation. How we understand the phenomenon comes along with a set of possible 
hypotheses about the organization of the phenomenon itself. Therefore decomposition 
and how we understand the nature of the phenomenon correspond, roughly, to the phase 
of hypothesis generation. Localization strategies, as well as forward/backward chaining 
and anomaly revisions, are all ways of ‘weakly’ evaluating an initial hypothesis, as well as 
means of developing conjectures. Finally, as I have just said, when in an experiment (or a 
set of experiments) no further anomalies emerge and productive continuity seems to be 
met, mechanism descriptions are taken to be strongly evaluated, but only retrospectively.  
 Now let us move to the identification of epistemic values in traditional molecular 
biology. Epistemic values are criteria influencing hypothesis generation, prior assessment 
and theory choice. Moreover, they establish those criteria that fill the content of scientific 
inferences, which are empty and somehow formal. Questions that can be answered by 
invoking epistemic values include: Why should scientists select a set of hypotheses 
instead of another? According to which criteria some hypotheses are worth to be 
developed? And in which direction should we develop hypotheses? Which are the features 
of a hypothesis that makes it an acceptable hypothesis? Now I identify the main epistemic 
values playing a role in traditional molecular biology. 
 In the phase of hypothesis generation the value of external consistency is 
particularly relevant. The way we choose a schema to instantiate, the consultation of the 
‘store’ of the field, the use of ‘ready-made’ modules to build a sketch of the mechanism 
are all based on the idea that we should base our research to previous knowledge, that 
entire disciplines are the background assumptions we should employ as a starting point 
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and that, eventually, we must be consistent with this enormous corpus of knowledge in 
order to generate hypotheses. In the phase of prior assessment both external consistency 
and empirical adequacy are prominent. As a matter of fact, to localize entities – and 
therefore to eliminate or develop hypotheses for example about the role of TFs – one 
needs clearly to compare her hypotheses to observations. If hypotheses are not 
empirically adequate, they have to be modified accordingly or tout court eliminated. But 
there is also interplay between empirical adequacy and external consistency. In the case 
of Slug for example, the main hypothesis is modified and developed not only with 
observations that Slug alone is not sufficient to maintain stem cell state, but also by 
exploring literature on Slug and other TFs, thereby playing the card of external 
consistency to modify the hypothesis. In the justificatory phase, empirical adequacy also 
is prominent, since the final mechanism is weighted against (a) previous data generated 
during the construction of the mechanism description and (b) new data generated for 
testing the mechanism itself. Internal coherence, as in data-driven biology, is ubiquitous. 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have analyzed the structure of discovery of what I call ‘traditional 
molecular biology’. First, I have introduced the field of molecular biology. Next, I have 
described the received view on discovery in molecular biology – based on the heuristic 
strategies to construct mechanism descriptions – and I show how they have been applied 
by philosophers to the history of the discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis. 
Then, I have turned to molecular oncology. I have introduced the field by means of 
Weinberg’s analysis of the reductionist saga of the oncogene paradigm. I have also 
analyzed a case study of molecular oncology ‘in the making’ taken from the work of 
Weinberg’s lab. I have then developed a twofold analysis. On the one hand, I have shown 
how this case study can be embedded in the typical discovery strategies elucidated by 
mechanistic philosophers. On the other hand, I have shown how this case study can be 
also embedded in the tripartite framework elaborated in Chapter 1. Several inferences are 
put in place. In particular, hypothesis generation in molecular biology seems to be rooted 
in the use of analogies and derivation from background assumptions while prior 
assessment is based on an eliminative inferences framework. However, as I have noted, 
also retroduction can play an important role. In the justificatory phase, though more 
difficult to be identified than in data-driven molecular biology, confirmation is prominent. 
Finally, I have identified the epistemic values guiding inferences within each phase of 
discovery. In the next chapter, I shall finally compare data-driven and traditional 
molecular biology. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN ‘TRADITIONAL’ AND DATA-DRIVEN 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
 
Chapter abstract 
In this chapter I will compare the discovery strategies of traditional and data-driven 
molecular biology in light of the conceptual tools presented in Chapter 1. A preliminary 
result of this comparison will be that at the level of inferences and of traditional epistemic 
values the disagreement between traditional and data-driven biologists seems to be 
misleading. I will show that data-driven molecular biology is just a more regimented 
version of the strategies of discovery of traditional molecular biology. Still, the typical 
models elaborated by the two communities are substantially different as they value 
different desiderata. For this reason, I will go back to the analysis of epistemic values, 
and identify a particular category of values, which I shall call quasi-epistemic. I will then 
show how traditional and data-driven biologists actually endorse two different quasi-
epistemic values (depth and generality, respectively) and, in the conclusion, I will argue 
that this difference can explain the disagreement between the two traditions.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapters I analyzed the structure of discovery of traditional (Chapter 4) 
and data-driven (Chapter 2) molecular biology by means of a tripartite framework for 
discovery developed in Chapter 1. I am now in the position of comparing the two 
approaches and to understand at which level the controversy motivating the present work 
lies. Repetita iuvant: There is a lively debate opposing two factions. On the one hand, 
there are scientists such as Robert Weinberg, Bruce Alberts and Sydney Brenner claiming 
that ‘hypothesis-free’ and sequencing technologies-based methodologies are not properly 
scientific and they are not effective and successful as traditional ‘hypothesis-driven’ 
approaches. On the other hand, practitioners as Todd Golub, Bert Vogelstein and Eric 
Lander argue that a data-driven and genomic approach is not only genuinely scientific, 
but it fosters drug discovery innovation by revealing biological insights that more 
traditional approaches would fail to uncover. There are clearly two different (though 
intertwined) aspects of the debate. On the one hand there is an epistemological problem, 
namely that there are two different approaches to molecular biology, and that these 
approaches generate two different kinds of knowledge, one of which is in principle inferior 
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to the other independently of the outcomes. On the other hand, there are empirical 
claims, e.g., that traditional molecular biology is more successful (in terms of scientific 
results) than data-driven molecular biology. Here I am going to analyze just the 
epistemological side of the controversy. However, I would like also to list few facts 
showing that – in molecular oncology – the cancer genome approach has generated 
insights that ‘traditional’ approaches did not provide. 
 There are some fundamental insights that came out directly of the massive 
projects of molecular oncology such as TCGA (Garraway and Lander 2013; Vogelstein et 
al 2013). First, there is the discovery that recurrent mutations in IDH1/2 could link 
genetics and cancer metabolism (Figueroa et al 2010; Lu et al 2012). A second 
fundamental insight is that mutations can disrupt chromatin remodeling and DNA 
methylation in many cancers (Dolnik et al 2012). Next, it has been found out that 
mutations disrupting RNA splicing occur in many cancer types (Ellis et al 2012; Biankin et 
al 2012). Other insights come from studying particular kinds of tumors. For instance, 
many mutations disrupt Notch signaling in head and neck cancer (Stransky et al 2011), 
or mutations can deregulate squamous differentiation in lung squamous cancer (TCGA 
2012). Moreover, cancer genomics screenings fostered the development of models of 
tumor evolution like punctuated progression as well as single catastrophic structural 
events. It is important to stress that all these insights came out of cancer genomics 
screenings that have the same discovery structure depicted in Chapter 2 and that many 
of these insights have to do especially with big numbers, meaning that these studies 
reveal trends across many types of cancer. Now the question is straightforward: Is this 
kind of knowledge – generated in that particular way - inferior in principle with respect to 
the knowledge that traditional approaches can possibly generate? But this question 
presupposes another more fundamental question: What is the difference between 
traditional and data-driven biology that make the approaches mutually irreducible? To 
answer these questions, first I make a step-by-step comparison of inferences and 
epistemic values within each phase of discovery of the two approaches. Next, I draw 
some conclusions on my analysis, arguing that the two approaches are not, at first 
glance, irreducible and that data-driven biology is a more regimented and standardized 
version of traditional molecular biology. Finally, I will identify the real reason for 
disagreement in the endorsement of a special category of epistemic values. 
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2. A COMPARISON OF DATA-DRIVEN AND ‘TRADITIONAL’ 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
 
In this section I compare data-driven and traditional molecular biology. There are two 
levels where the comparison takes place. First, there is the level of inferences used within 
each phase of discovery. Second there is the level of traditional epistemic values 
endorsed within each phase of discovery. Table 1 compares inferences used in data-
driven and traditional molecular biology, while Table 2 focuses on epistemic values. Let us 
start with Table 1.    
 
 
 
Hypothesis generation in data-driven and traditional molecular biology shares 
important features. Hypotheses are not generated, say, ‘out of the blue’ but they are 
mostly derived from the knowledge of the field. For data-driven biology it is relatively 
easy to show this. GWASs are based on the hypothesis that SNPs can have an effect on 
the development of common diseases including some types of cancer (e.g. prostate 
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cancer). From this bit of knowledge, GWASs practitioners can hypothesize that the SNPs 
detected by SNP arrays might be implicated in the development of the disease they are 
studying. Clearly, the generation of hypotheses does not entirely depend on background 
knowledge. It is unreasonable to think that, even before starting a GWAS, an 
epidemiologist can actually think that all the SNPs so far discovered can have a role in the 
disease. Actually, the universe of hypotheses is formed just after SNPs are detected. 
However, it is worth stressing that previous knowledge about SNPs actually sets out the 
very possibility that a type of study such as a GWAS might be even conceived. Therefore, 
in a sense we might argue that the existence of the hypothesis generation done in such 
and such a way in GWASs depends prominently on previous knowledge. In cancer 
genomics the situation is similar. The very fact that we endeavor to form a universe of 
hypotheses just after initial phases of sequences having certain features (e.g. we focus on 
somatic mutations) depends mostly on the previous knowledge accumulated claiming that 
cancer is (in many cases) the result of the accumulation of somatic mutations. Without 
this piece of knowledge, there will not be any initial universe of hypotheses, even if we 
owned the most incredible next-generation sequencing platform.  
In traditional molecular biology things are a little bit more complicated. In the case 
of the article of Slug and Sox9, Weinberg’s group derived the hypothesis that TFs might 
play an important role in determining and maintaining cellular states in adult stem cells 
from previous studies showing that kind of evidence for other stem cell states. From this, 
they derived the hypothesis that a similar mechanism might work also for adult stem 
cells. This kind of hypothesis is derived from previous knowledge, but the real inference is 
pursued by a mechanism of analogy. The idea is that as in certain types of stem cells 
there is such and such a mechanism, then we hypothesize that this might work also for 
adult stem cell. When they hypothesized a similar mechanism in breast cancer stem cells, 
they transferred their findings into a close field in order to derive a novel hypothesis. Also 
in the episode of the discovery of the mechanism of the protein synthesis, analogy and 
derivation from previous knowledge are ubiquitous. Zamecnik started his research by 
reasoning on the biochemical knowledge accumulated about polypeptides trying to 
hypothesize how they can be possibly assembled. Watson and Crick started their inquiry 
by reasoning on what they found about the double helix structure of the DNA and by 
using the analogy of the coding problem. Therefore it seems that hypothesis generation in 
traditional molecular biology is richer than in data-driven approaches. 
There are some differences too in the two approaches to prior assessment or 
hypothesis development. In data-driven biology prior assessment is a composition of the 
elimination step of eliminative inferences and a development of hypotheses by means of 
consultation of databases, which should be seen as a way to consult prior knowledge of a 
field. In GWASs while statistical analyses eliminate less probable hypotheses, the use of 
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databases linked to big science projects such as ENCODE are a way to develop very 
abstract hypotheses such as “The SNP x has a role in the phenotype y” to “The SNP x has 
a role in the phenotype y by deregulating the gene z”. The same case can be made for 
cancer genomics by replacing ‘SNP’ with ‘somatic mutation’. In traditional molecular 
biology things get more complicated, but they do not stand differently. If you consider the 
episode of the discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis, some hypotheses are 
developed and others are eliminated by adding new evidence, though the eliminative 
process is not as systematic as in data-driven projects. In the case of the article on Sox9 
and Slug, once Weinberg and colleagues have derived a set of hypotheses by previous 
studies of the form “TFs x, y and z regulates mammary stem cell state”, they used 
experiments to gain evidence of the fact that some of these TFs are not implicated in the 
phenomenon of interest, as well as putting details on the role of one of the TFs. But they 
used retroduction as well. In particular, when they do not know how to interpret 
concordant and discordant evidence about the role of Slug, they reasoned that one way of 
making sense of their data is to modify slightly their initial hypothesis. This is exactly a 
kind of abductive inference. In a sense, retroduction is present in data-driven biology as 
well. I mean that we make sense of statistical analyses by claiming that certain somatic 
mutations and SNPs exceed a particular statistical threshold because they are implicated 
in the phenomenon of interest in such and such a way. However, this step is less 
‘creative’ than in traditional approaches. One of the criticisms to retroduction was that 
hypotheses (the premises) seem to come out of nowhere, while in data-driven biology 
there is a sort of ‘assistant’ (the database) guiding the refinement of hypotheses. Again, 
the regimented nature of data-driven biology makes this approach far more systematic 
than the traditional one. 
Finally, justification takes place quite differently in the two approaches. In data-
driven biology justification is a sort of low-level confirmation called ‘validation’, namely 
that practitioners provide some stringent experimental evidence that the entities 
identified in the previous phases actually play a role in a certain phenotype. In traditional 
approaches, as I have shown in Chapter 3, strong hypothesis testing is identified only 
retrospectively, in the sense that the fact that no further anomalies emerge from 
experiments (and hence evidence that can undermine productive continuity) is taken as a 
test that the mechanism description is sufficiently detailed and complete. Therefore, 
justificatory phases in the two approaches are quite different.  
Let us now move the comparison to the level of epistemic values (Table 2). 
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It goes without saying, internal consistency is pervasive at all levels of both approaches.  
In hypothesis generation the only difference between the two approaches lies in 
valuing empirical adequacy by data-driven molecular biologists. As I have shown, in data-
driven molecular biology the initial set of hypotheses depends on the consistency with the 
previous knowledge about SNPs, somatic mutations and certain phenotypes, but the 
members of the universe are ‘negotiated’ via empirical adequacy, in the sense that one 
has actually to detect a certain mutation by means of next-generation sequencing or SNP 
array to say that that mutation is a candidate for being implicated in the phenotype of 
interest. On the other hand, in ‘traditional’ molecular biology, one can generate a 
hypothesis merely by reasoning on previous studies, without having to connect 
hypotheses to evidence produced in her own lab. However, one can say that in a sense 
there is empirical adequacy too, since previous studies draw their conclusions from 
observations.  
Next, the two approaches in weak evaluation and justification endorse the same 
kinds of values, namely external and internal consistency and empirical adequacy. As I 
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have shown for both data-driven and traditional molecular biology, elimination and 
development of hypotheses rest on both the contrast of hypotheses to actual observation, 
as well as on the comparison with previous studies or knowledge to refine biological 
claims. The phase of justification is based on how hypotheses fit actual observations and 
therefore it is guided by the desideratum of empirical adequacy. 
 
2.1 Where is exactly the disagreement? 
 
It seems that there are only four differences between the structures of discovery and in 
how the two approaches attack epistemic complexity. The first two are related to 
inferences, namely that ‘traditional’ molecular biology uses analogies to generate 
hypotheses and retroduction in prior assessment while data-driven biologists do not. The 
third is the endorsement of empirical adequacy by data-driven molecular biology in 
hypothesis generation. Finally, there is a difference in the way practitioners are aware of 
being in a justificatory phase. Should we say that the controversy is simply motivated on 
the basis of these differences? Actually, we might say that data-driven molecular biology 
employs an assembly-line version of the traditional approach. If we come back for a 
moment to decomposition and localization, everything becomes clear. 
 The first two phases of discovery of data-driven molecular biology can actually be 
subsumed into the ‘mechanistic’ perspective, in the sense that data-driven biologists 
attack epistemic complexity in a way that is completely compatible with the ones depicted 
by the mechanistic philosophy. Consider again the crucial distinction made by Bechtel and 
Richardson (2010) between localization and decomposition. These two strategies are 
considered as a starting point in mechanistic discovery. Decomposition “assumes that one 
activity of a whole system is the product of a set of subordinated functions” (2010 p 23) 
while localization tries to identify the entities that may play the subordinated functions. 
Clearly, there can be interplay between the two strategies especially in data-driven 
molecular biology. We may say that the particular problem x and the kind of solutions 
implied by the background assumption y1, y2,…, yn, lead to the assumption that the 
system investigated is somehow decomposable into subordinated functions. Accordingly, 
the system at hand is divided into several subcomponents z1, z2,…, zn  (e.g. SNPs in a 
GWAS, somatic mutations in cancer genomics) that are claimed to be responsible for the 
subordinated functions, whatever these are. After the eliminative steps of eliminative 
inferences, some of the zs are retained as strongly associated with the phenomenon 
under investigation.  
The interplay between decomposition and localization as I have just shown for 
data-driven molecular biology might be conceived in parallel to some remarks made by 
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Darden and Craver (2013). In discovering mechanisms, one looks immediately for entities 
or activities that might be involved in the phenomenon of interest. But the quest for 
mechanisms starts with a preliminary characterization of the phenomenon (precipitating 
conditions, modulating conditions, etc). From this preliminary idea about a phenomenon, 
one decomposes a system into parts, and then she identifies some as relevant. This is 
exactly the same in data-driven molecular biology. Again, given the preliminary 
characterization of a phenomenon x, and the kind of solutions implied by the background 
assumption y1, y2,…, yn, (where x and ys form the characterization of the phenomenon 
under scrutiny) the system at hand is divided into several subcomponents z1, z2,…, zn  
(e.g. SNPs in a GWAS, somatic mutations in cancer genomics) and some zs are retained 
as being relevant parts of the mechanisms producing the phenomenon. 
 Therefore, it seems that the discovery strategy of data-driven molecular biology is 
somehow compatible with the epistemic perspective provided by mechanistic philosophy. 
I am also tempted to say that data-driven molecular biology provides merely a 
particularly interesting version of the discovery strategies of molecular biology. The 
interesting part is that the data-driven approach provides a set of quite mechanical 
procedures to go through decomposition and localization. Data-driven molecular biology 
seems to be a sort of assembly-line instantiation of molecular biology, and it is just more 
efficient than traditional approaches. It is exactly what Dulbecco (1986) said when he was 
conjecturing about the cancer genome: Having a ‘map’ of the genes mutated can foster 
the discovery of cancer genes in a more efficient way than trial-and-error or piecemeal 
approaches. However, while data-driven biology promotes efficiency, its approach does 
not deviate from the general guidelines provided in the traditional loci of the literature on 
the discovery of mechanisms. This last remark has an important consequence. If both 
cancer genomics and GWASs are compatible with the discovery of mechanisms as 
described by ‘mechanistic philosophers’, and if the ‘mechanistic philosophy’ illustrates the 
research strategies employed also in traditional molecular biology, then cancer genomics 
and GWASs (supposed to exemplify a new methodology for molecular biology) are neither 
in opposition to ‘traditional’ molecular biology, nor radically new. Therefore, the epistemic 
perspective provided by ‘mechanistic philosophy’ can still make sense of many of the so-
called data-driven biological studies. It seems that we should conclude that the 
controversy motivating the present work is completely misguided and misleading.  
However, the attenuation of the conflict is just illusory. If we consider just 
inferences and traditional epistemic values within each phase of discovery the conflict is 
weakened; but if we look at the complete models, findings, hypotheses or research 
outputs of the two approaches, there are some remarkable differences. Weinberg-like 
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model38 are particularly detailed and the decomposition and localization strategies seem 
to be extended ad libitum, providing mechanistic details until the slightest anomaly is 
removed. On the contrary, data-driven models seem to be quite ‘skinny’, with few 
mechanistic details but with an impressive statistical power. When in Chapter 4 I was 
discussing Bechtel and Richardson’s notion of direct localization, I have emphasized that 
this task lies at a lower level than the identification of the locus of control because it 
segments the system on the inside rather than from the environment. However, Bechtel 
and Richardson also note that direct localization cannot really provide a detailed 
mechanistic description of why certain entities are involved in the development of a 
biological phenomenon. As a matter of fact, it is an insufficiently constrained localization, 
and it provides just correlation. It is very difficult to understand when localization is 
sufficiently constrained, but the take-home message of Bechtel and Richardson is that we 
can always go downward with localization and decomposition and the more we go 
downward, the better it will be for the mechanistic model. Data-driven biology seems to 
elaborate models that are insufficiently constrained. But data-driven models are 
insufficiently constrained from the traditional molecular point of view, and they are 
sufficiently constrained from another point of view. The desideratum of ‘sufficiently 
constrained model’ lies elsewhere; in particular it lies in the fact that their models must 
be projectable to more samples as possible. For a data-driven biologist the fact that a 
SNP seems to be implicated in the development of diabetes in 6,000 patients is more 
significant than finding the exact mechanism of action of that SNP in just a couple of cell 
lines. Therefore, we are back to epistemic desiderata: Data-driven and traditional 
molecular biologists seem to value different fundamental desiderata for their models. In 
order to pinpoint exactly this intuition, we should come back to the topic of epistemic 
values and try to understand precisely which kinds of values are at play besides 
traditional epistemic values such as internal/external consistency, empirical adequacy or 
simplicity.   
 
3 EPISTEMIC, COGNITIVE AND QUASI-EPISTEMIC VALUES AND 
THEIR ROLE IN THE CONTROVERSY 
 
In the first chapter I introduced the topic of epistemic values. I provisionally defined 
‘epistemic values’ as epistemic desiderata and listed some traditional criteria for theory 
choice working as values. In a scientific context, an epistemic desideratum is said to be 
‘epistemic’ because it is likely to promote those characters of science that make science 																																																								
38 For the sake of simplicity, here I use “models,” “hypotheses” and “theories” as synonymously. A more precise 
approach would be to say that hypotheses are usually statements and theories are families of models. However 
I take a hypothesis, a theory or a model in the very basic sense of being a x which refers to a portion of the 
world, where this x is aimed at representing the portion of the world of interest in some sense to be specified. 
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the type of knowledge usually seen as “the most secure knowledge available to us of the 
world we seek to understand” (McMullin 1983, p. 18), while it is a ‘desideratum’ because 
it is something one believes will help to achieve that kind of knowledge, if adequately 
pursued. The core of McMullin’s article (1983) was to show that theory appraisal is a 
procedure much closer to value judgement than to some rule-governed type of inference, 
and by ‘value judgement’ he means exactly “the criteria of [theory] choice function not as 
rules, which determine choice, but as values which influence it” (1977, p. 331).  
However, the topic of science and values is – as one may expect – much more 
complicated. There is for instance a lively debate on the relation between scientific 
inferences and non-epistemic values (such as ethical and political values) stemming from 
an influential article by Rudner (1953) where he shows how non-epistemic values are 
embedded, inevitably, even in the internal procedures of science. This article also 
anticipates the contemporary debate on the role of non-epistemic values in scientific 
reasoning (Douglas 2000; Hempel 1965; Rooney 1992) as well as some strands of the 
philosophy of risk analysis. However, here I want to focus just on the so-called epistemic 
values. 
 
3.1. Re-introducing epistemic values 
 
The idea of ‘values’ in an epistemic sense as playing a role within the procedures of 
science is introduced explicitly by Kuhn (1977). However he does not mean values in an 
ethical sense. Kuhn’s move is provocative. The fact that there are desiderata in theory 
choice is uncontroversial. Kuhn’s move is to argue that criteria of theory choice work as 
values instead of being embedded in an unambiguous procedure governed by strict rules. 
His starting point on this issue is the final part of his The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962), where he writes that decisions of theory choice are not like proofs. 
The topic of theory choice is usually discussed by considering the typical and standard 
characteristics of a good scientific theory. Kuhn names five criteria: Accuracy (empirical 
adequacy), internal and external consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. In 
Chapter 2 and 4 I have mostly taken into consideration some of these traditional criteria, 
without inquiring whether there can be other. If theory choice were a matter of proof and 
algorithms, then one would be able to apply these criteria without difficulties. However, in 
the application of these criteria - Kuhn continues - there are several problems, and a clear 
algorithm of theory choice is lacking. First, criteria are imprecise, in the sense that 
individuals usually do not agree on how these should be applied to concrete cases. Next, 
these criteria are repeatedly in conflict with one another, e.g. accuracy or scope (Kuhn 
1977, p 357). Kuhn analyzes some examples in the history of science where conflicts 
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between uses of these criteria undermine the linearity of procedures of theory choice. 
Copernicus’ system was far from being more accurate than Ptolemy’s until Kepler 
drastically revised it, 40 years after Copernicus’s death. Therefore, Kuhn says, there must 
be other reasons on the table to provisionally save and choose the heliocentric astronomy 
instead of Ptolemy’s system. Another example is the phlogiston theory that matched 
experience in some areas better than oxygen theory, which in turn worked better in other 
areas of experience. Here the problem is: How do we decide which area of experience is 
more important for a criterion such as empirical adequacy? Kuhn’s main point is that “the 
criteria of theory choice with which I began function not as rules, which determine choice, 
but as values which influence it” (1977, p 362). In other words the five criteria mentioned 
by Kuhn cannot dictate theory choice, but they are values (in the sense of maxims or 
norms) having a remarkable (but not conclusive) effect on theory choice. McMullin (1983) 
then refers to these values as ‘epistemic’ because they are supposed to be truth 
conducive. ‘Truth-like’ character is a sort of regulative ideal determining what should be 
counted as an epistemic value and what should be not (Rooney 1992). 
 Another seminal conceptualization of the issue of epistemic values stems from 
Longino’s distinction between constitutive and contextual values roughly corresponding to 
the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction (1990; 1996). Constitutive values are taken to be 
those desiderata of good explanations, data, procedures, as well as hypotheses or 
theories. They are considered as desirable properties within scientific communities and 
they are generated from an understanding of the goals and aims of science. But, ideally, 
constitutive values have to be independent from ‘contexts’ and should be valued (or at 
least recognized as constitutive values) by all scientific communities. Another way to 
describe constitutive values is that desiderata such as accuracy, internal/external 
consistency and the like could be thought as “explicating what ‘best’ means in inference 
to the best explanation” (Longino 1996, p 44). Instead, contextual values are those 
values embedded in the social and cultural environment where science is actually done. 
These should be understood as political, ethical and cultural values.  
 
 
 
3.2 Are epistemic values in data-driven and traditional biology truth-
conducive? 
 
Stemming from these traditional positions, some problems related to epistemic values per 
se arise. First, it is not clear what McMullin means by ‘truth’ or Longino by ‘the aims of 
science’. If truth or the aims of science are taken to be the cornerstones for 
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discriminating epistemic and non-epistemic values and in general to identify epistemic 
values, then something more should be said about truth or aims. Second, some are 
suspicious about the epistemic nature of epistemic values. In the literature, epistemic or 
constitutive values are sometimes said to be ‘cognitive values’ (Laudan 1984; 2004). In 
particular, Laudan (2004) argues that epistemic values in science such as scope, 
generality and the like are not really epistemic. Laudan disputes that features associated 
to acceptable theories such as explaining known facts in a domain, or explaining different 
facts and so on are really associated to epistemology tout court in the sense of being 
truth-conducive per se. In particular, when speaking about ‘rules of thumb’ such as 
‘saving the phenomena’ or ‘consilience of inductions39’ (which are clearly ubiquitous in 
theory appraisal), Laudan adds that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a 
theory or a hypothesis that a theory or hypothesis maximizes any of these attributes. The 
fact that a theory cannot explain a fact is not an argument against its veracity. Therefore 
these virtues, Laudan continues (2004, p 18), are not really epistemic. Instead they deal 
with the breadth and the range of theories rather than their truth. Laudan calls these 
virtues/values ‘cognitive values’ because these criteria refer exactly to scientists’ 
expectation about good theories that are not related to worries about their veracity. As 
Van Fraassen (1980), Laudan thinks that a theory does not have to be true to be good. 
Nonetheless, cognitive values “are constitutive of science in the sense that we cannot 
conceive of a functioning science without them, even though they fail to be intelligible in 
terms of the classical theory of knowledge” (Laudan 2004, p 19). Laudan makes an 
interesting argument by considering Kitcher’s ‘explanatory unification’ (1993). Every 
unifying theory T, Laudan says, must clearly entail non-unifying counterparts T1, T2,…, 
Tn. All these non-unifying counterparts must be true if T is true. If T and its counterparts 
are all true but scientists regards T as better than its counterparts this is because for a 
virtue (the virtue of explanatory unification) that is non-epistemic, since counterparts do 
not possess it but they are not false or less true (whatever this means). Ergo, 
explanatory unification is not really epistemic.  
In my analysis of epistemic values in data-driven and traditional molecular biology, 
I mentioned internal consistency, external consistency, and empirical adequacy. Let us try 
now to apply Laudan’s argument on these three values. The theoretical ‘virtue’ of internal 
consistency is not really epistemic, in the sense that is not truth-conducive per se. 
However, we should admit that if a theory is not internally consistent, it is non-sensical. 
While internal consistency does not make a theory true, its absence indicates a serious 
problem for the theory at hand. In the empirical sciences, a similar analysis may be 
drawn for empirical adequacy. The absence of empirical adequacy points to serious 
problems of the theory in the first instance. Empirical adequacy is not truth-conducive per 																																																								
39 ‘Consilience of induction’ is the convergence of evidence toward a strong conclusion 
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se, but its absence indicates that a theory has serious problems. Therefore empirical 
adequacy and internal consistency are not really epistemic, but they should be conceived 
as indispensable virtues that a theory should embed in order to, at least, not to be 
considered false before or after any process of theory appraisal. Of course, a theory that 
is internally consistent and empirically adequate could turn out to be false anyway (as 
most theories are), but we cannot know this a priori. However, if a theory is not internally 
consistent and empirically adequate, such theory is not worth a second look.  
Things stand differently for external consistency. If a theory is not externally 
consistent, this is not a hint of its falseness. A theory can be true even if it is not 
consistent with a bigger theory in its own field, especially because the bigger theory can 
be false. In general, external consistency does neither point to falseness nor to veracity. 
This criterion is more pragmatic in nature. For instance, if I elaborate a theory that seems 
to be true but is not consistent with the rest of the knowledge of the field, then things will 
get hard in defending my theory against criticisms, because critics will interpret the lack 
of coherence with the knowledge of the field as an attack to the whole field. If I elaborate 
a theory that is consistent with the rest of the field I am working, then the theory will 
attract fewer criticisms. We have seen both in data-driven and in traditional molecular 
biology that external consistency aids to generate and develop hypotheses, by drawing 
analogies or simple derivation from previous knowledge. Therefore, external consistency 
is also strategic (as well as pragmatic) in the sense that it aids strategies of discovery.  
 
3.3 A taxonomy of cognitive values 
 
The argument so far is that what have been traditionally called ‘epistemic values’ should 
not be called ‘epistemic’ because they are not directly truth-conducive. Rather, they 
should be called ‘cognitive values’ because they are related to scientists’ expectations of 
features that a good theory should embed independently of its veracity. 
 The ‘cognitive values’ identified in data-driven and ‘traditional’ molecular biology 
should be divided in two groups. First (Group 1), there are criteria (empirical adequacy 
and internal consistency) whose absence indicates a serious epistemic problem. Second 
(Group 2), there are pragmatic and strategic values (e.g. external consistency). It is no 
surprise that data-driven and traditional molecular biology endorse the same values of 
the first group, because both tend to elaborate models that meet the minimal 
requirements for a theory not to be non-sense. It is no surprise either that both data-
driven and traditional molecular biology embed external consistency – though in different 
phases of discovery – because the consistency of models with the knowledge of a field is 
a distinctive trait of the discovery strategies of molecular biology. Values of the first 
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groups are minimal requirements, while external consistency is a value applied to 
theories and models alone. The lesson to be drawn here is that differences between data-
driven and traditional molecular biologists do not point to any of values of Group 1 and 2. 
Both traditional and data-driven endorse the minimal requirement for an empirical theory 
to be evaluated, i.e. internal consistency and empirical adequacy. Moreover, they both 
value external consistency, for pragmatic and heuristic reasons. 
Differences in models of data-driven and traditional molecular biology point to 
another group of values (Group 3). Such values deal with theories/models and the kind of 
evidence one looks for in order to elaborate what she takes to be a good model. For 
instance, a mechanistic model is a good model if it points to many molecular details. 
According to traditional molecular biologists, data-driven models are not good models 
because they are not focused on enough molecular details. In this sense, the virtue of 
‘model rich in molecular details’ that mechanistic models must embed is a criterion 
establishing in what respects a model/theory have to be similar to a portion of the world, 
as well as establishing the portion of the world itself we should be interested in. In order 
to embed the virtue ‘model rich in molecular details’ into a model, one has to investigate 
certain portions of the world by looking for molecular interactions and processes. In other 
words, values of Group 3 influence the type of evidence a scientist will look for in 
elaborating models and how a model should be similar to a specific portion of the world. 
Therefore, cognitive values behind models of data-driven and traditional molecular 
biology are values of theories/models in relation to portions of the world. 
 Now we have three groups of cognitive values: Minimal requirements, strategic, 
and values of theories/models when in relation to the portion of the real world that 
models have to be similar with. Douglas (2014) also groups cognitive values in three 
distinct sets. Though her first set corresponds to my Group 1, the other two are quite 
different from Group 2 and Group 3. Douglas’ second set of values is one of pragmatic 
and strategic values as mine of Group 2. However, unlike Douglas, I do not attribute any 
epistemic import to these values. Her third set contains values applied to theories in 
relation to evidence. However, my Group 3 encompasses much more than ‘evidence’. As 
a matter of fact, values of Group 3 set the way a model should be similar to some 
portions of the world.  
To sum up, from my analysis emerges the existence of three distinct groups of 
cognitive values. First (Group 1), there are values which are minimal criteria for an 
adequate science. Absence of values such as internal consistency or empirical adequacy 
indicates a clear epistemic problem. In a sense, these cognitive values are the only 
epistemic values, at least indirectly. Failing to embed one of these values is a sign that a 
theory is false in any possible sense. Without these values, a theory cannot enter into the 
following phases of theory appraisal. These values do not contrast a theory with evidence 
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but they actually make the case that, if a theory does not embed them, then that theory 
cannot be compared to any evidence because of its inconsistent nature.  Group 2 is 
composed by values which are strategic or pragmatic in nature and they are applied to 
theories alone. Finally (Group 3), there are values being desiderata of models/theories 
when applied to models/theories in relation to the portion of the world they have to 
investigate. I call these virtues quasi-epistemic values, in the sense that they provide a 
particular kind of genuine epistemic contribution. Quasi-epistemic values are particular 
desiderata of a model/theory when in relation with a portion of reality, in the sense that 
they are the kind of criteria we look at in order to establish a relation of similarity of a 
model to a certain state of affairs (Weisberg 2013). The label ‘quasi-epistemic’ stresses 
the modesty of my proposal with respect to McMullin’s one: Quasi-epistemic values are 
not interested in Truth, but rather in particular truths, and they direct models and 
theories towards particular aspects of the real world. My claim is that data-driven and 
traditional molecular biology, while being similar with respect to inferences or epistemic 
values of Group 1, they substantially diverge in the endorsement of quasi-epistemic 
values (Group 3). Let us see this in detail. 
 
3.4 Generality and depth as fundamental quasi-epistemic values of data-
driven and traditional molecular biology respectively 
 
Quasi-epistemic values are virtues of a theory considered in relation to a portion of 
reality. These values behave differently from values I have identified for the three phases 
of discovery highlighted in Chapter 1. My claim here is that quasi-epistemic values are not 
just criteria we value in judging a final hypothesis or theories against evidence. In a 
sense, quasi-epistemic values constitute a sort of background guide throughout the whole 
process of discovery. If we value above all predictability, then we will generate, develop 
and strongly evaluate hypotheses or models that will contain more predictability features 
independently from the actual inferences and epistemic values of Group 1 and 2 
employed in hypothesis generation, hypothesis development and strong evaluation. 
 Here my analysis departs substantially from Douglas’ view. The aim of Douglas’ 
article (2014) is to provide an epistemic foundation for why some cognitive values are 
pervasively listed. In other words, Douglas wants to pinpoint epistemic reasons why some 
cognitive values are so important. This concern stems from the idea that “some set of 
values is (by and large) what has been important to scientists in their practice, and that 
should be good enough for philosophers of science” (Douglas 2014). While this line of 
research is valuable, my idea is that such a foundational analysis can be a limiting factor 
in identifying cognitive values themselves, especially quasi-epistemic values. The fact is 
that theoretical virtues should not be restricted to the traditional lists made by McMullin 
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or Kuhn. Longino (1995) tries to contrast the typical list of cognitive values with an 
alternative list drawn from feminist studies of science. Therefore here I do not want to 
limit my analysis of the identification of quasi-epistemic values to the list made by 
Douglas40. But how do I identify quasi-epistemic values that set the aims and the scope of 
data-driven and traditional molecular biology? This is straightforward: I will look at those 
desirable properties that a complete theory or hypothesis should have within the 
communities of data-driven and traditional molecular biologists.  
 Let me start from traditional molecular biology. As I emphasized, the aim of 
molecular biology is to elaborate detailed descriptions of mechanisms. Mechanisms are 
entities and activities organized in such a way that their interactions produce a biological 
phenomenon. Molecular biologists are thus interested in the molecular details to fill black 
boxes in a mechanism sketch. We have seen in the episode of the discovery of the 
mechanism of protein synthesis that scientists were mainly interested in filling the gaps in 
the productive continuity of their models. Also in Weinberg’s article, it is clear that his 
group tries to make sense of a certain phenomenon by identifying the details of the 
molecular interactions of several entities, identified through multiple experiments. If we 
look at this idea of ‘identifying molecular details’ in light of the interplay between 
decomposition and localization the aim of molecular biologists turns out to be clear. Each 
round of decomposition and localization is exactly an attempt to go lower in the level of 
analysis. Anytime a molecular biologist designs an experiment is actually using the 
strategy of decomposition and localization to go deep into the molecular details. The more 
molecular details a mechanistic model has, the better it is. But if we need to go lower in 
the level of analysis to get molecular details, and if we need a progressive downward 
decomposition/localization, then the criterion to develop models in traditional molecular 
biology is what I would like to call depth. The desire and the will to go in depth with 
decomposition and localization is the aim of traditional molecular biology, and we value a 
model as sufficiently adequate if it goes sufficiently in depth in molecular details. By 
valuing such models, we think that the relation connecting a truth-bearer (the 
mechanistic model) to the portion of reality is one focusing on molecular details, and the 
deeper we go, the better our model approximates to truth. To summarize, the quasi-
epistemic values par excellence of traditional molecular biology is depth. This makes 
sense also if we consider productive continuity (Darden 2006): A good mechanistic 
description (and hence a good explanation) must show exactly how each stage of the 
mechanistic chain produces the next one, i.e. improving the quality of an explanation 
means filling gaps in a chain connecting set-up and terminations side of the causal chain. 
This means that we should look for more molecular details to reach productive continuity, 																																																								
40 To tell the truth, Douglas explicitly says that her list is not meant to be exhaustive 
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and hence we should go lower in the level of analysis with the interplay between 
decomposition and localization. 
Let us now move to data-driven biology. As I have already stressed, from a 
traditional molecular biology point of view data-driven biologists seem to elaborate 
insufficiently constrained models. It seems that data-driven biology level of granularity 
stops at the level of direct localization, or just after that. Therefore from Weinberg’s point 
of view, data-driven biologists elaborate models which simply fail to be similar enough to 
the portion of reality that molecular biology is interested in. From this perspective, such 
models are simply sloppy. However, data-driven biologists are clearly interested in 
something else. If you consider GWASs, there is the perception that practitioners are 
interested in the statistical power of their results, so that their findings can possibly be 
applied to as many patients in the real world as possible. A similar situation applies to 
cancer genomics. The aim of consortia like TCGA is to do screenings with an increasing 
statistical power so that their findings (e.g. the identification of driver mutations) can 
potentially apply to as many cancer genomes as possible. If the aim of data-driven 
biology is to apply their models to more objects in the world, we may say that they value 
generality. The concept of ‘generality’ in the literature on scientific models is pervasive. I 
find particularly useful the characterization of the concept of ‘generality’ made by Michael 
Weisberg, especially in (Weisberg 2007; Matthewson and Weisberg 2009). In a 
preliminary sense, generality can be understood as “a measure of how many phenomena 
a model or set of models successfully relate to” (Matthewson and Weisberg 2009, p 180). 
Of course, one should need to specify exactly what is the model-world relation. One may 
mention isomorphism (van Fraassen 1980), partial isomorphism (da Costa and French 
2003), or other notions of similarity. Of course I cannot enter in this debate. I just want 
to argue that data-driven biologists are interested in elaborating models that relate to as 
many phenomena as possible, independently of the notion of similarity model-world they 
have in mind. However, Weisberg distinguishes between two types of generality, and this 
distinction turns out to be very useful for the purpose of this chapter. Accordingly, 
generality can be understood as the measure of how many actual targets our models 
relate to (a-generality) or as a measure of how many possible targets our models could in 
principle relate to (p-generality). Studies such as GWASs or cancer genomics screenings 
elaborate models that have a high measure of a-generality. But the important point here 
is the statistical power. The idea of data-driven biologists is that, the more samples we 
have, and the more statistically robust our findings (targeted mutations, genes, etc) are, 
the more promising a mutation or a gene can be as a target for drug discovery studies. In 
other words, the more a-general a model is, the more p-general it might be. Therefore 
data-driven biologists are focused on increasingly big numbers because they want to 
achieve a high measure of a-generality as they think that, the more a-general, the more 
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p-general, and the more p-general means that they are unveiling some robust and crucial 
components of complex phenomena such as tumors or chronic diseases. This is the 
attitude guiding and shaping their context of discovery. 
 Now the controversy turns clear. Traditional and data-driven molecular biologists 
have similar discovery structures and inferences because data-driven biology is a more 
regimented version of the traditional strategies. They also endorse similar epistemic 
values of Group 1 because these values should be endorsed by any scientific 
theory/hypothesis/model. They value also external consistency (Group 2) because this 
pragmatic desideratum is a hallmark of the molecular biological tradition. Therefore, 
focusing the analysis just on this group of values is uninteresting. However, the real 
disagreement lies in the endorsement of different quasi-epistemic values, which shapes 
the whole process of discovery and also explains why these communities elaborate 
different models.  
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I compared the discovery strategies of traditional and data-driven 
molecular biology. Drawing from my analyses on Chapter 2 and 4 based on the tripartite 
framework elaborated in Chapter 1, I have compared inferences and (preliminary called) 
epistemic values within each phase of discovery of the two research traditions. However, 
a preliminary result was that differences in inferences and traditional epistemic values 
could hardly motivate the heated disagreement between traditional and data-driven 
molecular biologists. Moreover, it seemed that data-driven biology was merely a sort of 
assembly line version of traditional molecular biology. 
 Next, in analyzing models and final hypotheses of the two sides, I pointed out that 
data-driven and traditional biologists seem to value different desiderata or 
representational ideals. Therefore I had a closer look at the issue of epistemic values. In 
scrutinizing traditional and more recent loci of this literature (Kuhn 1974; McMullin 1983; 
Longino 1990; 1995; 1996; Laudan 1984; 2004; Douglas 2014) I have emphasized (a) 
that “epistemic” values are not really epistemic, (b) that there is a broader group of 
values called ‘cognitive values’ and the group of epistemic values is just a relatively 
uninteresting subgroup of it, (c) that cognitive values can be divided in epistemic, 
pragmatic/strategic and a third group and (d) that the third group is composed by values 
understood as desiderata of theories evaluated against evidence, which I have called 
quasi-epistemic values in order to highlight the modesty of my proposal with respect to 
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McMullin’s one. I have also emphasized that the cognitive values I have identified in 
Chapter 2 and 4 are mostly epistemic, and since these values are endorsed necessarily by 
any scientific theory/hypothesis/model then they are not so relevant to identify 
differences between research strategies. I then argued that the disagreement of the two 
sides lies in the endorsement of different quasi-epistemic values. I have made the cases 
that traditional molecular biologists tend to value depth, while data-driven practitioners 
are more focused on a-generality because they think that a-generality can be a shortcut 
for p-generality. 
 To conclude, now it is possible to understand the nature of the disagreement. 
When Weinberg says that data-driven approaches cannot really achieve the typical results 
of molecular biology he is arguably right. Since data-driven biologists are interested in 
generality, their interplay of decomposition and localization will stop at a coarser-grained 
level of analysis, i.e. at a level of direct localization. While in the mechanistic tradition 
direct localization can just provide correlation and it is taken to be insufficient for 
elaborating mechanistic details, in the developing data-driven tradition mechanistic 
details are not so important, in the sense that once we have reached a sufficiently high a-
generality, then we are entitled to infer p-generality which is the most important criterion 
for theory choice in this context. On the other hand data-driven biologists would appraise 
negatively an article such as the one of Weinberg’s group analyzed in Chapter 4, because 
their results apply to few cell lines and few patients. In other words, Weinberg’s group 
has elaborated a model that is insufficiently constrained from the point of view of data-
driven biology because it scores low in a-generality and, as a consequence, in p-
generality. Therefore the disagreement is motivated by the fact that each community 
applies its prominent desideratum to the results of the opposed community, which are 
shaped by a different quasi-epistemic value. In other words, there is a problem of 
communication because traditional and data-driven biologists use the same words (e.g. 
reliable results, reliable models) but with different meanings (e.g. ‘a reliable model is one 
that goes sufficiently deep in the mechanistic details’ versus ‘a reliable model is one that 
has a high measure of a-generality’). 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
 
1. Summary of the main arguments 
 
The disagreement between traditional and molecular biologists lies exactly in the type of 
insights that both ‘traditions’ actually achieve, and which types of insights are the best for 
biology or for the progress of biology. Data-driven and traditional molecular biologists 
endorse different criteria of theory choice or, as I called them in Chapter 5, different 
quasi-epistemic values. This type of disagreement is, at first sight, impossible to be 
disentangled. As in the controversy opposing Bohr and Einstein, here two different 
communities disagree on the very notion of ‘virtue’ of a scientific theory.  
One might say that this is just an armchair discussion. After all, the most 
important thing in science is, trivially, to do science. This type of consideration discloses a 
quite naïve conception of science, something detached from the complexity of research 
agendas. The truth is that the controversy motivating the present work is not just a 
technical quarrel between rich academics debating from their ‘ivory towers’. There is 
something more on the table, something that can make the difference in the ‘main 
street’. Especially in the field of molecular oncology - where the (translational) link 
between basic and applied research is essential - the controversy is about which kinds of 
insights can better serve the aim of biomedicine. And since the label ‘biomedicine’ is a 
bottomless pit where a significant part of molecular biologists take money to do basic 
research, then the controversy between data-driven and traditional molecular biologists 
becomes significant because, instead of asking “What is the best methodological approach 
to molecular biology?”, one might ask “What is the best methodological approach (serving 
the aims of biomedicine) that we should fund?”. This is exactly what Bruce Alberts 
(2012), implicitly, asked in his The End of Small Science. Therefore there are several 
open questions coming out of my analysis. Before going deeper into this, let me sum up 
the main clams of my dissertation chapter by chapter. 
The title of this dissertation is The Context of Discovery of Data-driven Biology. 
Now it should be clear that by ‘context of discovery’ I mean the sum of the three phases 
constituting my framework of discovery, the types of inferences used within each phase, 
the cognitive values endorsed, and in particular the quasi-epistemic values guiding the 
whole process. Since my aim was to compare the discovery strategies of two different 
research traditions (or, at least, two different research traditions according to a specific 
received view) in Chapter 1 I have analyzed the debate on discovery in science in the 
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philosophy of science starting from the distinction between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification. Clearly my notion of ‘context of discovery’ has nothing to do 
with the notion of ‘context of discovery’ put forth by philosophers such as Reichenbach. In 
the first chapter I made an historical and critical reconstruction of the debate on scientific 
discovery in philosophy of science arguing that discovery in science is a process 
composed of three phases: Hypothesis generation, hypothesis development and strong 
evaluation. My argument relies on the fact that these three phases are the minimum set 
of phases that a scientist goes through when discovering. Of course, there might be other 
sub-phases as well. However, for the sake of my argument I wanted just to identify the 
main epistemic moves in discovery. From this, my plan was to identify these three 
epistemic phases in both traditional and data-driven molecular biology in order to 
compare the two approaches on a common ground. 
In Chapter 2 I have analyzed the structure of discovery of data-driven biology. I 
have grounded my analysis on two classes of case studies, namely genome-wide 
association studies and cancer genomics screenings. My findings on this matter is that 
data-driven molecular biology has an eliminative inferential structure, complemented by a 
comparison of data with data stored in biological databases in order to develop 
hypotheses not eliminated by statistical evidence. After the phase of hypothesis 
generation (that is strictly connected to background assumptions theoretically informing 
practitioners), an initial universe of abstract hypothesis of the form “the 
SNP/mutation/gene x has a causal role in the phenotype y” is narrowed by means of 
statistical analysis. After that, the universe of remaining hypotheses is then scrutinized by 
means of a computational analysis in order to develop hypotheses of the form “the 
SNP/mutation/gene x has a causal role z in the phenotype y”. Clearly, the ‘z’ is very 
important, since if ‘z’ has nothing to do with the phenotype of interest (I have made the 
example of olfactory receptor genes and lung cancer), then the hypothesis is discarded. 
Finally, in the validation phase, experimental evidence is provided in order to strongly 
evaluate well-developed hypotheses. Although data-driven molecular biologists do not 
elaborate detailed mechanistic descriptions, they nonetheless move within the epistemic 
horizon depicted by mechanistic philosophers. In particular, data-driven molecular 
biologists provide strong statistical evidence for direct localizations of various sorts. Next 
I have identified the cognitive values guiding each phase of data-driven molecular 
biology.  
Chapter 3 should be conceived as complementary to Chapter 2. Since in Chapter 2 
I have discussed sparsely the epistemic importance of biological databases in data-driven 
discovery strategies, in Chapter 3 I have analyzed the epistemic status of databases in 
detail. In one sense, biological databases are idealized tools used to identify relevant 
phenomena in a data set by means of comparison: Biological databases are evidence 
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enhancers. In another sense, biological databases are explored with theoretical aims in 
mind, namely to compile highly constrained theoretical stores of the biological field. 
In Chapter 4, I turned to ‘traditional’ approaches in molecular biology. First, I tried 
to delineate aims and scope of what is called ‘molecular biology’. I have then limited my 
analysis of molecular biological discoveries to the mechanistic strategies used to attack 
the epistemic complexity of the molecular realm. I reconstructed Bechtel and 
Richardson’s epistemological analysis of mechanistic discovery (2010) as well as Lindley 
Darden’s (2006; Craver and Darden 2013) indispensable mechanistic philosophy 
(especially the epistemological side). I have then illustrated these strategies by discussing 
the history of the discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis. Since in Chapter 2 I 
discussed cases related to cancer studies, and since one of the main characters of the 
controversy motivating this work is Robert Weinberg, in Chapter 4 I turned my attention 
to molecular oncology. I have discussed the origin of the molecular biological approach in 
oncology (Weinberg 2014) and I have analyzed an article coming out of Weinberg’s lab 
(Guo et al 2012). I have shown how this study fits very well both Bechtel and 
Richardson/Darden’s approaches, as well as my tripartite framework. Finally, I identified 
the main cognitive values driving such discovery strategies. 
In Chapter 5 I compared ‘traditional’ and data-driven molecular biology. However, 
in the first instance the analysis has turned out to be disappointing. The preliminary result 
has been that the few differences in inferences and epistemic values could hardly 
motivate the controversy. However, at a finer-grain level of analysis something turned 
out to be of some interest. While the data-driven approach is a sort of assembly-line 
version of the discovery strategies depicted by so-called mechanistic philosophers, it 
seems that data-driven biologists restrict the interplay between decomposition and 
localization to the level of direct localization. Therefore, here is a hint of the 
disagreement. According to a traditional molecular biologist, results provided by data-
driven molecular biologists are insufficiently constrained localization, and this judgement 
can take the form of ‘correlation is not enough to establish the details of a mechanisms or 
causal production’. However, from the point of view of a data-driven biologist, it is exactly 
the kind of result provided by traditional biologists that are insufficiently constrained. One 
can elaborate the most detailed mechanistic description for a biological phenomenon, but 
if that description is derived only from the analysis of a couple of cell lines or a few 
samples, then the statistical power of this description is insufficient. Therefore it seemed 
that there are different criteria of theory choice at hand here. For these reasons, I 
analyzed more in detail the topic of epistemic values than I did in Chapter 1 and I have 
elaborated – by means of some modifications of the received view in literature, in 
particular (Douglas 2014) – a taxonomy of criteria of theory choice that have been called 
in the last few years cognitive values. Cognitive values are different if we identify properly 
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their targets. They can be applied to theory alone, to theory in relation to empirical 
evidence and to minimal requirements that any theory should meet. Epistemic values are 
just a proper subset of cognitive values. Moreover, it is not a very interesting set. As I 
have shown, data-driven and traditional molecular biology endorse the epistemic values 
of empirical adequacy and internal consistency, but just because these are the minimal 
requirements for a theory just to preliminary make sense. Therefore, looking for reasons 
of disagreement within this set of values is idle. Next, I identified the real disagreement 
of the controversy motivating this dissertation in the endorsement of different cognitive 
values of theories with respect to evidence. I called these values quasi-epistemic values 
to highlight the modesty of my proposal with respect to McMullin’s one: These values are 
truth-conducive not in the sense that they lead to Truth, but just that they restrict the 
interest of investigators to certain aspects of truths or to some ‘interesting’ truths. 
Moreover, I have also added that these values constitute a sort of background guiding the 
whole process of discovery. Traditional molecular biologists tend to endorse depth, in the 
sense that they are interested in going lower in the interplay between decomposition and 
localization, in order to pinpoint as many mechanistic details as possible. On the other 
hand data-driven biologists are more focused on the generality of their results, defined as 
“a measure of how many phenomena a model or set of models successfully relate to” 
(Matthewson and Weisberg 2009, p 180). Drawing from the distinction between a-
generality and p-generality delineated by Matthewson and Weisberg (2009), I concluded 
that data-driven biologists are interested in a-generality because they think that a-
generality is a good indication of p-generality. To sum up, the disagreement lies exactly 
in endorsing and valuing two different criteria for theory choice, namely depth and 
generality. Therefore the disagreement is motivated by the fact that traditional molecular 
biologists interpret data-driven results in light of their quasi-epistemic value.  In other 
words, if for traditional biologist a reliable model is a model that goes sufficiently deep in 
the mechanistic details, for data-driven biologists a reliable model is a model that has a 
high measure of a-generality. This is the core of the epistemological controversy.   
 
 
2. THREE OPEN QUESTIONS 
 
My results leave room for, at least, three open questions. Two are related to depth and 
generality, while one is strictly connected to the use of databases and to the assembly-
line nature of data-driven biology.  
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About depth and generality, two questions are in order: (1) what is the relation 
between depth and generality? Do they stand in a tradeoff relation? (2) What is the best 
quasi-epistemic value for biomedicine?  
On the other hand the assembly-line features of data-driven molecular biology 
poses normative questions over the constraints on discovery strategies and how such 
constraints are attempts of unification of biological knowledge through bioinformatics 
tools. Let us see each of these questions in detail. 
 
2.1 Relation between depth and generality 
 
In philosophy of science there have been some attempts to understand the relation 
between theoretical virtues – here understood in the same sense of cognitive values 
(Levins 1966; Weisberg 2004; Matthewson and Weisberg 2009; Odenbaugh 2003; 
Douglas 2014). The need to study such relations stems from the fact that scientists 
cannot build models embedding all the representational ideals that a model can possibly 
exemplify (Matthewson and Weisberg 2009). This can be a consequence of tradeoff 
relations between cognitive values. Standing in a tradeoff relation means that there is a 
relationship of attenuation, which occurs “when an increase in the magnitude of one 
attribute makes the achievement of another more difficult” (Matthewson and Weisberg 
2009, p 170). Matthewson and Weisberg then analyze the kind of tradeoff relations that 
can possibly hold between precision and generality. They distinguish several types of 
tradeoffs. For instance there is strict tradeoff, namely the fact increasing the magnitude 
of one automatically decreases the magnitude of the other. The second is the ‘increase 
tradeoff’ occurring when it is impossible to increase or decrease simultaneously the 
magnitude of two representational ideals. Finally, there is ‘Levins’ tradeoff’, namely that it 
is impossible to maximize both attributes of interest. Tradeoff relations are just an 
example. Douglas (2014) tries to uncover other types of relations, by dividing cognitive 
values in several groups. The ideas behind these types of works is to understand whether 
some cognitive values are mutually irreducible, and how certain scientific controversies 
involving the endorsement of different theoretical virtues between parties can be 
somehow disentangled. 
 The same could be done also for the controversy between traditional and data-
driven molecular biologists. How can we understand the relation between depth and 
generality? Is there a tradeoff relation? If yes, which kind of tradeoff relation? Once we 
have uncovered the relation between those values, one could ask: Is that relation the 
result of pragmatic considerations or it is a consequence of the logic of representations at 
hand? 
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2.2 Depth, generality and biomedicine 
 
Let us assume that there is a tradeoff relation between depth and generality, say strict 
tradeoff. How do we establish what is best desideratum for molecular biology? Clearly, it 
is very difficult to establish a sort of epistemological foundation explaining why depth and 
generality have become so important for molecular biology. Pure epistemic reasons are 
intertwined with pragmatic considerations and socio-historical analyses. Therefore, it is 
very difficult to understand which quasi-epistemic value should be endorsed in principle. 
But it is possible to delimit this task by contextualizing a little biological research. Here I 
restrict my analysis to the molecular biological works embedded in the biomedical 
agenda. Therefore, it is this agenda that we should look at to settle the controversy. This 
consideration can be linked with two sources of inspiration. First, let us consider an article 
by Helen Longino (1995) where she contrasts a typical list of theoretical virtues 
(accuracy, internal/external consistency, simplicity, fruitfulness, etc) with a feminist list of 
cognitive values (novelty, ontological heterogeneity, applicability to human needs, etc) in 
order to show that, sometimes, the only reasons for preferring a traditional instead of a 
feminist value (and vice versa), are eminently socio-political. Therefore it is not just that 
non-epistemic values can function as epistemic, but also that non-epistemic values can 
settle epistemic quarrels. The idea is that even “the apparently neutral criteria of 
accuracy or empirical adequacy can involve socio-political dimensions in the judgement of 
which data a theory or model must agree with” (Longino 1995, p 396). Therefore in order 
to understand which value between depth and generality is more appropriate we should 
look at the biomedical context, and the role that molecular biology has within the 
biomedical agenda. But the task here is not to explain how these values have emerged 
given the certain socio-political context of biomedicine and its goals, but rather to 
understand which value is the most appropriate to serve the duties that molecular 
biological basic research have in the biomedical context. Therefore, it is a normative 
inquiry, not (or not merely) descriptive. Clearly, I cannot develop on this further, but let 
us just say that a particularly obvious (but not trivial) duty of molecular biology within the 
context of biomedicine is to provide target molecules for drug discovery. Of course, there 
can be others, but let me simplify the context to make a point. These target molecules 
should be as much promising as possible in terms of being ‘druggable’. Therefore the 
question is: Which quasi-epistemic value can promote an efficient molecular biology in 
the context of biomedicine (efficient in the sense of discovering more promising target 
molecules for drug discovery)? Is the approach valuing statistical powers of findings, or 
the approach having as its main goal the construction of detailed mechanism 
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descriptions? Are these mutually exclusive? Please pay attention to the fact that these 
questions are important because they set the basis for the answer to other questions: 
Which projects should we fund? How do we distribute money among small science labs 
and big consortia (e.g. hundreds of small labs or the 100,000 Genome Project)? Therefore 
what is needed is a clear organization of scientific inquiry having clearly in mind the 
biomedical agenda, which is for the most part funded by public money. In other words 
(and here we come to the second source), what we need here is something similar to the 
idea of well-ordered science (Kitcher 2001).  
 
2.3 Tools for unifying biology 
 
The last open question is related to the idea that data-driven molecular biology is a sort 
of assembly line version of traditional molecular biology. We have seen its division of 
labor between wet lab biologists, computational biologists, and biological maps (about 
maps, see Boem 2015). This has somehow implied standardizations not only of practices 
(e.g. strict division of labor, strict protocols, a selected number of platforms for 
sequencing etc) but also a standardization of biological knowledge. This can be thought in 
line with the notion of regulatory objectivity (Cambrosio et al 2006). This refers to the 
idea that objectivity in science is somehow generated as well as constrained by specific 
forms of collective production of evidence where collective refers to the evidence 
produced by, for instance, research consortia developing collective devices guiding the 
processes of discovery. In other words, what counts as ‘objective’ is not “whether or not 
the results produced by a particular laboratory are true, in some absolute sense, but 
whether or not they are compatible (within conventionally determined statistical limits) 
with results produced by other laboratories” (Cambrosio et al 2006, p 192). Putting aside 
socio-constructivist drifts, what is to be considered here is that there are certain practices 
by big consortia that systematically pigeonhole data into predetermined categories, as 
well as determining the way in which these categories should be conceived and combined. 
Consider what I have shown about biological databases in Chapter 3. The fact that we 
identify certain biological phenomena in data sets depends strictly on whether the shape 
of data is sufficiently similar to archetypal phenomena type stored in a sort of 
computational hyperuranion. But the way this ‘cyber-hyperuranion’ is conceived and built 
in turn depends on the practices of research consortia such as the Genome Reference 
Consortium or The ENCODE Project Consortium. Therefore evaluation of evidence is an 
operation distributed across the single scientist interpreting data and computational 
infrastructures. A similar argument can be made also for the Gene Ontology Consortium 
(2000). The grand project of Gene Ontology is motivated by the fact that biological 
	 137	
knowledge is sparse, and often biologists use the same words with different meanings 
(Boem 2015). Therefore Gene Ontology aims to provide a controlled vocabulary that can 
constitute a common framework for biologists (though in the dynamical context of the 
progress of biological knowledge). Gene Ontology is conceived as a tool for the unification 
of biology. If you consider the biological criteria to develop hypotheses in GWASs and 
cancer genomics shown in Chapter 2, the ‘functional analysis’ – that is, the identification 
of function – is based on Gene Ontology functional categories. I have also shown how this 
functional analysis is fundamental to develop hypotheses in a way or another. This is not 
to say that ‘knowledge’ is completely dependent on the social dimensions of the consortia 
creating the standard of knowledge. As a matter of fact, databases and Gene Ontology 
categories can be conceived as a sort of interface connecting scientists to data sets. It is 
a level of abstraction or, due to the complexity of these computational complexes, a 
gradient of abstraction (Floridi 2008). After all, this is very similar to the Darden’s idea 
that the store of a field constrains the way discovery is done as well as what is 
discovered. But in Darden’s case the store of a field is something sparse that one may 
find in textbooks, or can be incomplete due to lack of the knowledge of the single 
scientist. Here the situation is different. Scientists are necessarily connected to the whole 
corpus of biological knowledge, independently of their understanding of that biological 
knowledge. This kind of standardization transform what counts as an adequate 
explanation within the molecular biological field, as well as shaping how things are 
discovered. But this is not just integration, if we understood integration as putting 
together perspectives or methodologies in order to solve specific and local problems 
(Plutynski 2013). Rather, these tools seem really to unify molecular biology well beyond 
specific necessities typical of problem solving. Therefore it would be interesting to develop 
a notion of unification (decoupled from the notion of explanation (Morrison 2000)) shaped 
by the idea of standardization, and to track down how (and in which sense) 
standardization unify the field, the epistemic dynamics involved in this process of 
unification, and the consequences for scientific discovery and the progress of the whole 
field. 
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